Potential threats to Spanish security : implications for the United States and NATO by Adams, Tamara Kaye
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1990-12
Potential threats to Spanish security : implications
for the United States and NATO
Adams, Tamara Kaye










POTENTIAL THREATS TO SPANISH SECURITY:




Thesis Advisor Frank M. Teti
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
91-14104
/ilit/~l/ll/!//~l,!!~l//lui 1 i( 2!. n
UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
"Ofrm Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE B8PvIo o7,?: C:88
la REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb REST~iCTVE MARK NGS
UNCLASSIFIED
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3 DISTRPBu',ON &,A'LABIL 7 ,F ; RE002
2b DECLASSiF,CATION, DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
4 PERFORMING ORGAN.ZAThON REPORT NuMBER(S) S MONITORING ORGAN;ZA70 N REPOR' *,/Bz'S
6a NAME OF PERFOFMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a NAME OF N1ONI'ORAG ORGANZAN7%
Naval Postgraduate School (if applicable) Naval Postgraduate School
6c. ADDRESS (City. State, and ZIPCode) 7b ADDRESS(City, State and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8a NAME OF FUNDING;SPONSORING 8b OFFICE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT iDENTIFICATON NuMBEz
ORGANIZATION (If applicable)
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS
PROGRAM PROjECT TASK WORK UNIT
ELEMENT NO NO NO ACCESSION NO
11 TITLE (includ Security Classification)
POTENTIAL THREATS TO SPANISH SECURITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO (UNCLASSIFIED)
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
ADAMS, Tamiara K.
13a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED r14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1S PAGE CO'.NT
Master's Thesis FROM TO I 1990 December 168
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position
of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government
17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary dnd identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Spain, separatist movements, ETA, Basque, NATO, New Europe,
Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melila, security issues, Spain - foreign
relations
19 ABSTRACT (Coatinue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Thirteen years ago, Spain held its first democratic elections since 1936. Prior to those elections, held in June 1977, Spain
spent almost forty years unde the dictatmhip of Generalissim Francisco Franco, who established an authoritarian regime in
Spain following the Spanish Civil Wa (1936-1939). Upon Franco's death in November 1975, Prince Juan Clos de Borbon
was crowned as King of Spain in accordace with Franc's 1957 announcement that the monarchy (abolished in 1931) would be
restored after his death Amidst problems ranging from inflation and unemployment to internal friction and, often. opposition
from rightist elements, Ju Carlos ed the Spanish naion-state through the uansiion into a democracy and. undaunted
by an attempted coup by military rightists in 1981, supported what might then have been considered a fragile democracy.
Now, nine y= , dwi and regi of Eastern Europe is in a saw of wnsidon, not toally unlike the tansition Spain
undertook over a decadeago. s, it sms particularly appropriate to examine the Spanish experie:c.
The purpose of this study is to examine the security aspect of tha experience. As such, it will address both internal
security issues such as sepirast movemnents, especily te asque terrorist organization (ETA), and external security issues
such as those posed by Gibrtar, Ceuta, Melilla,nd. in spite of the tendej = dismiss it as irrelevant to Spanish security, the
Soviet Union. In addition, as the utle suggem& this study will address how pan's security posture can be expected to affect the
United States and NATO, particularly a Spain finds a place within the context of a rapidly changing New Europe.
20OISTRIBUTION/AVALABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
J UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 0 SAME AS RPT C DTIC USERS UNCLASSIFIED
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 22c OFF)CE SYMBOL
Frank M. Teti (408) 646-2528 NS/T1
DO Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF 7, S ;A14E
S/N 0102-LF-014-6603 UNCLASSIFIEJ
i
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
POTENTIAL THREATS TO SPANISH SECURITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO
by
Tamara Kaye Adams
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., Brigham Young University, 1982
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of







Frank iM. Teti, Thesis Advisor
Thomas C. Bruneau, Second Reader
Thomas C. Bruneau, Chairman,
Department of National Security Affairs
ii
ABSTRACT
Thirteen years ago, Spain held its first democratic elections since 1936. Prior to those elections,
held in June 1977, Spain spent almost forty years under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco
Franco, who established an authoritarian regime in Spain following the Spanish Civil War (1936-
1939). Upon Franco's death in November 1975, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned as King
of Spain in accordance with Franco's 1957 announcement that the monarchy (abolished in 1931)
would be restored after his death. Amidst problems ranging from inflation and unemployment to
internal friction and, often, opposition from rightist elements, King Juan Carlos eased the Spanish
nation-state through the transition into a democracy and, undaunted by an attempted coup by
military rightists in 1981, supported what might then have been considered a fragile democracy.
Now, nine years later, the entire region of Eastern Europe is in a state of transition, not totally
unlike the transition Spain undertook over a decade ago. Thus, it seems particularly appropriate to
examine the Spanish experience.
The purpose of this study is to examine the security aspects of that experience. As such, it will
address both internal security issues such as separatist movements, especially the Basque terrorist
organization (ETA), and external security issues such as those posed by Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla,
and, in spite of the tendency to dismiss it as irrelevant to Spanish security, the Soviet Union. In
addition, as the title suggests, this study will address how Spain's security postum can be expected to
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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study is to examine Spanish security issues in an attempt to
ascertain Spain's stability as a democracy and potential role within the New Europe.
Thirteen years ago, Spain held its first democratic elections since 1936. Prior to
those elections, held in June 1977, Spain spent almost forty years wider the dictatorship
of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who established an authoritarian regime in Spain
following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Upon Franco's death in November 1975,
Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned as King of Spain in accordance with Franco's
1957 announcement that the monarchy (abolished in 1931) would be restored after his
death. Amidst problems ranging from inflation and unemployment to internal friction
and, often, opposition from rightist elements, King Juan Carlos eased the Spanish nation-
state through the transition into a democracy and, undaunted by an attempted coup by
military rightists in 1981, supported what might then have been considered a fragile
democracy.
Now, nine years later, the entire region of Eastern Europe is in a state of transition,
not totally unlike the transition Spain undertook over a decade ago. Given the fact that
Spain, as a nation, has had to deal with separatism that has threatened to tear it apart, it
seems particularly fitting to review Spanish security issues in light of the ongoing
transition in Europe, a continent whose nationalistic tendencies have, in the past,
threatened to tear it apart.
In order to develop this hypothesis, this thesis will address both internal security
issues such as separatist movements, especially the Basque terrorist organization (ETA),
and external security issues such as those posed by Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla, and, in spite
of the tendency to dismiss it as irrelevant to Spanish security, the Soviet Union. In
I
addition, the study will address the role Spain can be expected to play within the New
Europe and discuss implications for the United States and NATO. Spain's manifest
ability to maintain peace throughout its political transition may prove to be a valuable
experience, from which the rest of Europe can learn. In addition, Spain may have an
unexpectedly valuable role in the New Europe.
Historically, Spain has been isolated from Europe on many levels. Dominated by the
Moors in the early Middle Ages, Spaniards developed a culture apart from the rest of
Western Europe. Politically, Spain was under the dictatorship of Franco until his death in
1975, whereas virtually all other Western European nations were based on democracy.
Economically, Spain was impoverished, while other Western European nations had
industrialized and were thriving. Tallyrand asserted in the early nineteenth century that
Spain, geographically separated by the Pyrenees mountains, should not even be
considered as a part of Europe. His proclamation that "Europe stops at the Pyrenees"'I
seemed to be based not only on how the rest of Europe felt, but on how the Spaniards
themselves felt. Wiarda notes "the notion has been widespread that Iberia is both
'different' and inferior." 2
Early in its history, Spain looked outside of Europe towards the Americas for
expansion and development. According to Wiarda, "Iberia's active participation in
European affairs essentially ended with the termination of the Napoleonic wars." Wiarda
explains Spain's isolation from Europe following the collapse of Napoleon's Empire as
follows:
Both Spain and Portugal were subsequently torn by domestic upheaval,
civil wars, and repeated military coups. They had lost most of their American
colonies to independence by 1826, the rest to the United States in 1898. The
Wiarda, Howard J., The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal, p. 175. American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989.
2 Ibid.
2
great economic expansion experienced by the central and northern European
countries in the nineteenth century did not occur in Iberia. Hence when the
economic drive to maturity did finally begin in Spain and Portugal in the
twentieth century, it came in a different historical context and therefore not
necessarily with all the same social and political concomitants of modernization
that had accompanied the urban-industrialization process elsewhere in
Europe. 3
The Spanish Civil War was a watershed in Spanish history in that it marked the
beginning of a dictatorship under Franco that lasted almost forty years. If the Civil War
was a watershed in Spanish history, however, so was Franco's death, which marked the
beginning of Spain's transition to democracy under King Juan Carlos.
Now, Spain's transition to democracy is complete. Democracy in Spain has survived
elections that have resulted in rule by each of the two major opposing parties in the
nation. It survived an attempted military coup in 1981 and has acquired membership in
both NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC). It is indeed ironic for Spain
that its transition to democracy and the subsequent strengthening of its European ties has
been met with a Europe that is, in itself, in a state of transition with implications that are
more far-reaching than anybody could have imagined a decade ago.
Ibid.. p. 10.
II. SPAIN'S DOMESTIC SITUATION
As noted in the introduction, in the last two decades Spain has undergone impressive
political and economic transitions. The first part of this section of the study, then, is
devoted to describing Spain's evolution from an authoritarian regime to a democracy and
includes a summary of how Spain's party system developed. Second, the section will
address Spain's economic situation and third, it will discuss the existence of various
separatist movements in Spain. These issues comprise the crux of Spanish internal
stability in that political or economic failure would mean the collapse of democracy in
Spain, as could an increase in the intensity of the demands for autonomy that characterize
some of Spain's separatist groups. Further, Spain's ability to contribute stability to the
New Europe is intimately connected to its own internal stability. Thus, any discussion of
Spain within the context of the larger Europe must, of necessity, begin with an overview
of its own internal situation.
A. SPAIN'S POLITICAL SETTING
Prior to the Spanish Civil War (1931-1937), the Spanish Left consisted of "neither
socialists nor communists." One half of the Spanish working class (approximately 1.5
million people) belonged to the Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). The CNT's
ideology encompassed the "faith that anarchism can be achieved through a revolutionary
trade union." and that "a new world can be built in which no human being will exploit
another." The Socialists also played an important part in the Spanish Civil War but the
Spanish Left of the 1930s consisted primarily of anarchists. Not surprisingly, the Spanish
Left of the 1930s was "not a bloc, but a heterogeneous constellation of mutually
competitive and normally mutually agnostic groups." Also, not surprisingly, such a
politicai conglomeration was in no position to win a war.
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Following the Spanish Civil War, Franco declared the CNT and related regional
parties, the Socialists, and the Communist Party illegal. However, during the 1960s,
Felipe Gonzales, presently Spain's Prime Minister, helped initiate the secret rejuvenation
of the socialist PSOE4 . After Franco's death in 1975, when King Juan Carlos began
implementing his plans for the transition of Spain's government from an authoritarian to a
democratic regime, the open resurrection of the PSOE represented, to the Right, the
revival of the conflicts that led to the Spanish Civil War.
The new Spanish democracy seemed further impotent in light of violence perpetrated
by the Basque separatist movement, ETA. A terrorist group that has received support and
training from terrorist organizations such as the Irish Republican Army and the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the ETA claimed responsibility for almost
600 deaths in the 15 years between 1972 and 19875. One of the three principal political
forces in the Basque country, the ETA is composed of desperate militants who, "no
longer the heroes of the resistance to the dictatorship and the vanguard of majority
opinion,... have become the sectarian, embittered enemies of both Basque and Spanish
democracy."6
On the other end of the political spectrum are the extreme rightist groups which have
also posed a threat to Spain's democracy. A militant rightist group, under the leadership
of Colonel Tejero, Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch, and General Alfonso
Armado, "who served the King as tutor, intimate advisor, secretary, and confidant for
over twenty years," attempted a coup d'etat in March of 1981. The promises behind the
coup were, first that only Mie military could wipe out Basque separatist guerrillas and,
second, that a military regime could best combat mounting crime in the streets,
Martin, Benjamin, "Identity Crisis," The Nation, pp. 485-486, Nov. 17, 1979.
5 Valls-Russell, Janice, "Offiring Retirement to the ETA,"The New Leader, pp. 9-10, Nov. 30, 1987.
6 Jackson, Gabriel, "Can the Basques Live with Spainr The Nation, pp. 518-520, Nov. 15, 1986.
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pornography, drug abuse, and a "general breakdown of traditional Spamsh moral values."
Furthermore, the generals who instigated the coup believed that the King had "robbed
them of the victory Franco won in the 1936-1939 Civil War [and had] turned the fate of
the country to democrats, liberals, socialists, and communists, the very same 'enemies of
Spain' that Franco defeated to save the country from political chaos and dismemberment
by ethnic separatists." The timing of the coup was perfect. Adolfo Suares had resigned
from the premiership and Parliament was voting on confirmation of Leopldo Calvo
Sotelo as his successor. The military conspiracy had hoped to fill the brief power vacuum
with a government patterned after the Franco regime.
At the time of the attempted coup, the UCD, a moderate political party slightly to the
right of center, was in power. Largely due to Juan Carlos's stubborn determination to
preserve democracy in Spain, the coup was unsuccessful. However, the UCD, as well as
both right and left elements within the Spanish political spectrum, were painfully aware
of the still-existing dangers. First, as illustrated by the attempted coup, the ultra rightists
in the army were not enthusiastic about democracy. While the generals were deemed to
be, for the most part, loyal (due to a new retirement law that allowed the gcvernment to
fill vacancies with individuals more inclined to support democracy), many of the
colonels, captains, and majors were children of victors of the Civil War and, as such,
posed a danger to the fledgling democracy. Second, the civil service was dominated by
the same franquistas who held power under the old regirn.:. Third, the government was
too weak to move decisively against the anti-democratic right or to combat Basque
terrorism.
The socialists, viewing the potential dangers to the democracy, established their
priorities as, first, to reform the civil service, second, to consolidate democracy, and third,
7 Komisar, Lacy, "Spain's Fragile Democracy," pp. 437-441, Oct. 31, 1981.
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to halt terrorism. Felipe Gonzalez, the Socialists' prime candidate for the upcoming
elections, viewed his job as "to insure that the executive power - is strong enough to
defend itself from the attacks of democracy's enemies."8
Gonzalez's goals, given the difficulties inherent in Spain's transition, were not at all
unreasonable or excessive. In fact, in order to understand the delicate balance King Juan
Carlos attempted to achieve in order to maintain political stability i'- Spain, it may be
useful to summaize .. c development of the party system in Spain. Without question, the
most notable aspect of Spain's political development since Franco's death in 1975 has
been its dual-transition, both from an authoritarian state to a democracy, and from "a
unitary state into one based on 17 regional governments called Autonomous
Communities." However, the most important aspects of this "dual-transition" period - a
process that both influenced and came to be an intricate part of Spain's new political face
- has undoubtedly been the evolution of the party system in Spain. As one might
expect, given the multiple cultural, social, and regional facets to Spain, this evolut on was
accompanied by a myriad of complexities. As Crozier quoted in the National Review,
"within six months of Franco's death, more than five hundred political groups or parties
had registered, and that was just the national political spectrum; many of them had their
Catalan or Basque counterparts, without counting the purely autonomous or separatist
parties." 9
Though hundreds of political parties emerged on the scene in post-Franco Spain,
only a few came through the first elections with parliamentary representation. The two
'S
major parties that emerged in the 1977 election were the Union of the Democratic Center
(UCD) and the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). In addition, the Spanish Communist
8 Gunther, R., Sani, G., and Shabad, G., Spain After Franco, pp. 181-182, University of California
Press, 1986.
9 Crozier, Brian, "Invertebrate Spain," National Review, pp. 740-747, June 24, 1983.
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Party (PCE) and the Popular Alliance (AP) "gained enough votes to insure for themselves
a significant vote in the new parliament." 10
Obtaining parliamentary representation was just the beginning of the struggle Spain's
major political parties had to face, however. Whereas the PSOE and PCE had survived
clandestinely throughout the Francoist regime and, thus, had organizational foundations
in place, the AP and the UCD were newly created parties that had to establish not only
their organizational structure but also their party platforms and public images. On the
other hand, the PSOE and the PCE were sometimes limited by the images they had
already created 11. Thus, wh, -,as the PSOE's principal challenge was to consolidate
numerous existing socialist movements 12, and to handle rapid growth13, the CDU's
principal challenge was to develop an "organizational framework, a statement of
ideological principles, or [and] a mass-membership base.",14
On the periphery, the PCE and the AP had their own challenges to deal with. Not
only did they face overcoming their own developmental challenges, but they had to deal
with the challenges of their respective positions on the periphery. For example, the AP of
the late 1970s has been described as the UCD's "lightning rod, deflecting accusations of
Franquismo from vulnerable segments of the UCD."'15
While the development of the party system in Spain was peaceful, the political
situation in Spain was peaceful, the political situation in Spain in the 1970s was anything
10 Gunther, p. 38.
11 [bid., p. 42.
12 Ibid., p. 158.
13 Ibid., p. 165
14 Ibid., p. 127.
15 Ibid., p. 133.
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but stable, as became apparent in 1982 when the new democracy's second general
election was held. Prior to that election, the UCD collapsed and both the UCD and the
PCE "were caught in the throes of divisive intraparty struggles on the eve of the 1982
election...." Thus, the AP took up some of the slack in the political void created by the
UCD's collapse, and the PSOE, once outlawed, gained the popular vote. This created an
extremely difficult situation for the PCE. As Mujal-Leon explains in the following
excerpt:
Not only have PCE electoral fortunes come to depend more than ever
on mistakes the PSOE commits, but the Communists are now competing with a
Socialist party that, having proven itself capable of winning an absolute majority
in the Cortes, can rightfully claim to be the bes! and, given the allergy many
Spaniards feel toward a Popular Front, perhaps the only chance the Left has for
exercising power. The Communist dilemma is that they can only gain at the
expense of the Socialists. Yet by weakening the PSOE, the PCE would
undermine the prospects for the Left. Under present circumstances, and in the
absence of a viable Centrist party, those who voted Socialist in 1982 can hardly
be expected to shift to the Communist standard. The Communists therefore face
an uphill struggle in their quest for a more important position on the Left and in
Spanish politics. 16
Even given the difficulties inherent in creating and maintaining a party system in
Spain, however, "the beliefs of the electorate, the strategies adopted by political elites
[most notably the King], and the institutions established during the transition." 17 all
played a role in Spain's success. Whereas previous attempts at establishing a democracy
based on a party system had failed in Spain, the democracy that has evolved after
Franco's death has thus far been able to deal successfully with the same controversial
issues that contributed to the downfall of previous democratic attempts, namely, such
issues as "class conflicts, differences over the proper role of the church in social and
political life, and struggles between some regional micronationalist movements and the
16 Mujal-Leon. Eusebio. Communism and Political Change in Spain, p. 227. Indiana University Press,
1983.
17 Gunther, p. 2.
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centralist tendencies of Spanish nationalists... [in addition to] the general political
orientations and ideological predilections of the Spanish populace."18
Among other developments to be discussed later, Gonzalez's reelection in 1986 and
vote of confidence in 199019 serve as clear indications that Spain's party system has
stabilized. In accordance with his party's objective to consolidate democracy, Gonzalez
has pursued middle-of-the-road, sometimes contradictory policies. In an attempt to meet
a second party objective, that is, to halt terrorism, he began meeting with ETA members
in April of 1986. Gonzalez, apparently, hopes these meetings will "drive a wedge
between younger elements of the ETA bent on terrorism and older ones seeking a way
back to normality." 20
Spain's chosen road of moderacy and compromise is further exemplified by King
Juan Carlos's cautious treatment of the instigators of the attempted coup in 1981. The
King wanted "no harsh punishment for military plotters." Given the possibility of more
violent military reaction, this attitude was without doubt "a measure of the precariousness
of his own position and of the country's democratic institutions.', 21
In addition to steps already taken to improve Spain's precarious situation regarding
the ETA and the militant right, Gonzalez has taken some positive steps toward improving
Spain's economy and international relations, as the following sections indicate.
ISIbid.. p. 3.
19 Reuters, "Spain's Gonzalez Wins Parliamentary Vote of Confidence," 5 April 1990, Thnurs.. B C
cycle.
20 Russell, pp. 9-10.
21 Acoca.
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B. SPAIN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
Traditionally, Spain has been plagued with high unemployment rates that, especially
in the 1970s, threatened the new democracy's stability. While Spain's stability is no
longer an issue in light of its proven ability to maintain a democratic system for over a
decade (despite such threats as an attempted military coup in 1982 and continuing
demands for regional autonomy), unemployment has continued to be a problem.
In addition, Spain has been plagued in the past with inflation and a lack of productive
investments. In 1977, Spain's inflation rate was 26.4 percent: investment was negative,
and both interest rates and unemployment rates were high. The prospects for a healthy
economy were brighter in 1985. Although unemployment was still the highest of any
industrialized country (22 percent), "economic growth in 1985 was the strongest since
1977 (at 2.1 percent); investment.., grew by 5.5 percent; and inflation has [had] been
gradually reduced.., and is now [was] pegged at eight percent. Interest rates also
decreased to ten percent in mid-1986 and real salaries, buying power and consumption in
general" showed progress2 2.
Spain's economic problems have continued to decrease in the past few years. In
early 1986, Spain's decision to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was
fraught with the unknown, but the decision seems to have been profitable. In mid-1988,
official reserves stood at $38 billion, "nearly three times the level of 1985. In 1987, for
the first time, these reserves exceeded the level of external debt, which has slowly been
declining since 1983-1984. [Further,]... inflation remains relatively low; the peseta is
strong and is probably slatkd to become stronger, and integration in the EEC has led to
substantial shift in the complexion of Spanish trade." Membership in the EEC along with
the government's encouragement for the shrinking of "old-line industries, including steel
and shipbuilding, as a way of shifting resources to businesses with brighter futures. ' '2 3
22 Serfaty, Meir, "Politcal Pragmatism in Spain," Current History, pp. 379-380, Nov. 1986.
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have seemed to boost Spain's economy in a positive direction. Even so, according to an
article by David White, published in the Financial Times on January 18, 1988, "These are
still early days to measure the results of (Spain's] EEC ascension, the transition period in
industrial goods has five more years to run, and a large part of the farm sector has not yet
really joined. But that is not to say that nothing has happened." Indeed, Spain's
economic developments in recent years have been noteworthy. Since the nation joined
the EEC in 1986, Spain's economy has been characterized by rapid expansion that may
be, according to White, the most exciting period in Spain's economic history since
economic reforms of 1959, when Spain was still under the dictatorship of Generalissimo
Francisco Franco. Growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 1988 was five
percent, which, though slightly less than growth in 1987 (largely due to a decrease in the
growth rate of agricultural production) is still quite high.
As Table I indicates, Spain's overall economic performance in the labor market
improved even more than projected. Of course, as an outgrowth of Spain's economic
growth, however, Spanish consumer demands have increased, a situation that has forced
Spain to rely more heavily on imports and which has "brought the process of disinflation
to a halt and weakened the current balance of payments position more than had been
projected." 24
23 Time's U.S. Board of Economists, "New Members of the Club," Time, p. 37, 27 Jan, 1986.
24 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Economic Surveys: Spain
198811989, p. 12.
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TABLE 1. 1987 AND 1988 DEVELOPMENTS IN RETROSPECT
Percentage change over previous year
1985 1986 1987 1988
Outcome Preliminary Outcome Projections Outcome
estimates Provisional
Private consumption 2.4 3.6 4.5 5.5 3.25 4.5
Government consumption 4.6 5.7 6 8.7 4.5 5.0
Gross fixed investment 4.1 10.0 14 14.6 8 14.0
Total domestic demand 2.9 6.1 16.5 8.5 4.5 6.9
Exports of goods and services 2.8 1.3 7.5 5.9 4.25 6.3
Imports of goods and services 6.2 16.5 19 20.4 10 15.2
Foreign balance -0.5 -2.6 -2.5 -2.8 -1.5 -2.1
GDP at constant prices 2.3 3.3 4.5 5.5 3.5 5.0
Memorandum items:
Total employment -0.9 2.2 3.5 3.1 2.25 2.9
Unemployment rate 21.5 21.0 20.25 20.5 20.25 19.5
GDP price deflator 8.5 10.9 5.5 5.9 4 5.7
Consumer price deflator 8.2 8.7 5.5 5.4 4.5 5.1
Current external balance
(US$ billion) (2.5) (3.9) (1.5) (0.0) (-2) (-3.6)
(Percent of GDP) (1.3) (1.7) (0.5) (0.0) (-0.5) (-1.1)
The principal source of Spain's demand growth has been fixed investment, which has
grown rapidly since Spain's accession to the EEC. Foreign companies have gained a
confidence in the Spanish economy that was non-existent in the new democracy of a
decade ago. Hence, construction activity has boomed, with the need for office space, and
rents and real estate prices, especially in the larger cities such as Madrid and Barcelona,
have skyrocketed. The apparent confidence in Spain as a source of new investment
possibilities has been stimulated by several factors. Ironically, the OECD identifies the
first of these factors as increased prospects for demand, high and growing profits, foreign
capital injections, and increased pressure on resources. Hence, Spain's growing demand
both causes increased investments and is stimulated by the same. Whatever the reasons,
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however, it seems apparent that membership in the EEC has provided Spanish citizens
(based on demand growth) with a higher standard of living. In 1988, for example, private
consumption grew by four-and-a-half percent, which, though less than the preceding few
years, was still substantial. In addition, OECD estimates that the "total aggregate demand
rose by about seven percent in volume terms."'25
At the beginning of 1988, Spain still had the community's worst unemployment
record --- twenty percent of the active population26 . To make it worse, the government,
led by Mr. Felipe Gonzales, had promised to create 800,000 jobs prior to the end of its
first four-year term. The promise never materialized and, in fact, unemployment became
more pronounced. However, as the OECD survey points out, Spain's agricultural labor
force in 1988 continued to shrink, but almost 400,000 new jobs were created in other
sectors, especially in the construction, industry, and service sectors27. Employment
Promotion Programmes have helped to create new jobs by, for example, "restrict[ing] the
application of tax expenditure for new hirings to the net creation of permanent jobs, thus
no longer favouring temporary and part-time contracts as was the case before." As a
result of such measures, Spain's unemployment rate dropped to 18.5 percent in 1988.
While still the highest in the OECD area,28 it is certainly a marked improvement.
The role of the Spanish government in Spain's economic progress is indi: ,table.
Under Franco, in the 1940s, Spain practiced "economic autarchy", which was
2 5 Ibid.
26 White.
27 OECD, p. 15.
23 The OECD is composed of the following nations: Austria. Belgium, Canada, Denmark. France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain. Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Finland,
Australia. and New Zealand.
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characterized by high import barriers, low growth, high (partly repressed) inflation,
government control of the economy, and limited public spending. Even though public
spending was limited, however, the 1950s were characterized by large deficits in the
budget. In general, high inflation and excessive demand plagued the Spanish economy.
The liberalization of Spain's economy didn't begin until 1959, when Spain became a
member of the OECD. Franco's goals at that time included reducing public deficits and
deregulating the economy, and a "Stabilisation Programme" was initiated to support these
goals.29
After Franco's death, King Juan Carlos, in addition to establishing a democracy,
expanded Spain's social welfare programs. However, oil shocks in the 1970s put Spain's
economical aspirations on hold for a time, because of Spain's dependency on energy
imports. Consequently, unemployment benefits, subsidies, and capital transfers all rose.
In contrast, in the 1980s, the increase in public transfers has slowed and fixed investment
is the "most dynamic component of expenditure." 30
In light of the "rapid expansion of government activities," however, setting priorities
may be difficult for Spain. In an attempt to manage public expenditure, the Spanish
government has established "Committees for Functional Outlays," which are responsible
for coming up with and implementing four year plans. Typically, committee authorities
have not, however, had the power to regulate the actions of governmental spending
agencies. Consequently, "actual expenditure has always exceeded the initial budget
estimate by a wide margin, while remaining well within total credit lines.' 3 1
Regardless of the diffi~alties of the challenges ahead of Spain, however, all available
measurements indicate it is on the right track. Indeed, regardless of other aspects of the
29 Ibid., p. 52.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 63.
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economy in need of attention, Spain's willingness to reduce trade barriers in order to gain
membership to the EEC has given its economy a strong boost that should not be
overlooked. Spain's economic challenges do not seem to carry nearly the potential for
destabilization as does the continued existence of various separatist groups within its
borders.
C. SEPARATISM AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR RENEWED INSTABILITY
In assessing Spain's internal divisions, it seems only natural to first consider the
differing regions in Spain since d erse peoples have occupied of influenced the Iberian
Peninsula for literally thousands of years. The extent of this diversity is indicated by the
following excerpt, taken from a study prepared by the Foreign Area Studies of the
American University:
The ancient History of the peoples of the Iberian Peninsula is a hodge-
podge of tribal movements, warfare, incursions, invasions, and intermixing of
various tribes. That the peninsula was occupied in early prehistoric times is
attested to by the Paleolithic cave paintings of Altamira near the Bay of Biscay.
The Iberians probably came to peninsula about the third millennium B.C., most
likeiy from the eastern Mediterranean, although some scholars believed they
came from North Africa. In the first millennium B.C. waves of Celts arrived in
the peninsula, some to displace Iberians, others to mix with them to form
Celtiberian tribes. At the same time Greek and Phoenician colonies had been
established along the coasts; and in the late first millennium B.C. Carth. iians
had arrived from Africa, and Romans had crossed the Pyrenees to makc -
peninsula a battleground and eventually a part of the Roman Empire. G(imanic
tribes entered Spain-the Romans called it Hispania--during the declining years
of the empire, and by the fifth century A.D. the Visigoths were displacing the
Romans as rulers of Spain. 32
The same study recounts how the Muslims invaded the peninsula in A.D. 711 and
occupied the territory for almost eight hundred years; and, of course, like most of the rest
of the continent, Spain was controlled and influenced for a time by France under
Napoleon. It would be absurd to assert that current regionalism in Spain could be
32 Keefe, Eugene K. and others, Area Handbook for Spain, p. 2. U.S. Government Printing Office,
1976.
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attributed totally to the historical influx of such diverse groups, but it would be equally
absurd to assert that these groups had not influenced the complexities of regionalism in
modem-day Spain.
Paradoxically, there is a tendency among Spanish "pueblos" to isolate themselves.
As the authors of Area Handbook for Spain state, "[t]he Spaniard's sense of loyalty to and
integration in a community or larger group diminishes from a strong institutionalized
affiliation to his barrio (ward or suburb) or "pueblo" through progressively lesser
attachments to "comarca" [a unity of "production, language and culture 331 and region
to a more idiosyncratic and abstract sentiment toward the nation state." Brian Crozier
noted the same tendency among Spaniards in his National Review article: "The loyalty of
many a Spaniard is, first, to his 'patria chica,' the little place he happens to have been
born in; second to his native province; and third (if at all) to the centralized state of
Spain." 34
The loyalty, sometimes extreme, that some "puebianos" feel towards their village
communities was manifested in the Catalan borderland struggles during the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. In fact, as early as 1307, communities in France and Spain
along the Pyrenees mountains were disputing over water rights. In the early nineteenth
century, young, unmarried men often expressed "sociocentrismo," or "the sense of
attachment to village or parish and a corresponding hostility toward neighboring
settlements" by "initiatfing] 'outsiders' who married into the community, punish[ing]
agricultural abuses, enforcling] restrictions on common lands, or maintain[ing] road
networks of the parish." Despite perceived cultural differences between neighboring
villages, however, such differences seem to have been largely non-existent between
33 Karmen, H., Spain in the Later Seventeenth Cenavy, (No publisher given), 1981.
3 Crozier. p. 741.
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villagers in the nineteenth century. The elites of different villages were the first to use
"language as a vehicle of political nationalism." However, "the French and Spanish
identities of the communities in the borderland had their origins within a set of local
conflicts." 35
Currently, regionalism in Spain is no less complex, and probably no more so, than it
was in the nineteenth century. With history as a backdrop, the three principal actors of
regionalism in Spain today are the Catalonian, Basque and Galician provinces. Catalonia
has been autonomous in the past, with Catalan as its official language. Following the
Civil War, however. Franco prohibited the region's schools from teaching Catalan and
restricted its use. ,2atalans are proud of both their language and cultural identity.
Although some separatist sympathies exist among Catalans, most "see their destiny as
tied to Spain's."36
The Basque country is second only to Catalonia in Spanish industrialization, but the
Basques are "much more separatist in attitude than the Catalans." Even within the
Basque country, however, regional differences are prominent. For example, during the
Civil War, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, two of the Basque provinces, sided with the
Republicans, who lost the war. Alava, on the other hand, supported Franco. During and
subsequent to Franco's reign, Basques from Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa formed the
underground terrorist group known as Basque Nation and Liberty (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna
ETA). Many of the Basques, who, like the Catalans, have their own language
(Euzkera), still seek separation from Spain under the auspices of the ETA.
A
35 Sahlins, Peter, "The Nation in the Village: State-building and Communal Struggles in the Catalan




The only other region of Spain that uses a separate language is Galicia, but "unlike
Catalonia and the Basque country, the separatist movement in Galicia has been of minor
consequence."37
The remainder of Spain, however, is not "one great Castilian or Spanish entity; it is
rather a conglomerate of regions divided by geography and historical tradition. Although
Spanish is the common language, each of the regions has its distinct dialect and often
several subdialects. The people declare themselves to be of a region before they are of
the Spanish state. They are Castilian, Aragonese, Andalusian, or Valencian, among
several others, and their language betrays their region and more often than not a specific
area of that region." In addition, ethnic groups in Spain include several groups of
gypsies, to include Beticos, Castellanos, and Cefeletes; jews; foreign minorities' and
marginal Spanish minorities, to include vaqueros de Alzada (herdsmen of the heights),
pasiegos (herdsmen from old Castile), agotes (Navarrese herdsmen), maragatos (natives
of Astorga), morenos (Black people in the province of Huelva) and morcheros (also
black) 38.
Spain has been referred to as an "ethnic mosaic" and, since the time of Franco, as the
"Two Spains," one Roman Catholic, the other anticlerical; one traditionalist, the other
progressive; one reactionary, the other revolutionary; one authoritarian, the other
anarchical; one provincial, the other cosmopolitan; on Spain that "stresses the unique
character of Hispanic culture and institutions and the other values it shares with the rest of
Western Europe; there is the Spain of Castile (the Center) and the Spain of the regions
(the periphery)." Throughout the history of Spain, or at least, since the reconquest when
Spain overcame Moorish rule, "there have been recurrent periods of unity, but these
37 Ibid., p. 7.
38 Ibid., p. 117.
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cycles have been achieved most often by the suppression of local rights." Both Spains,
since 1977, have been united under democracy.
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III. THE BASQUE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
It is said that as of age 40 each person has the face that he has made for
himself. Starting with the supple clay of the newborn infant, we gradually mold
our own faces, as well or as poorly as we know how, amid joy and sorrow,
flashes of brilliance and acts of stupidity. Our faces are our own. And so it is
with the Basque Country. If the Basque Country has a tragic and at times
anguished face now, occasionally wearing a brutal expression, it is because that
is what all of us have made it.39
The face of the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna - Basque
Country and Freedom), as the author of the above excerpt suggests, has undergone
changes of facial expression since its conception. Rooted in Spain's regionalism, fueled
by Franco's dictatorship, and challenged by modem democracy, the ETA has managed to
survive. How the terrorist group has survived becomes an intriguing question. Whether
or not it will survive in the future is still another question. This chapter will explore the
ETA's historical roots, factors that have influenced its changing expressions, and its
development into a modem terrorist organization. In addition, the chapter will include a
discussion of the challenges the ETA must confront if it is to survive in the future as a
viable movement capable of changing Spain's face as a unified nation.
A. SPAIN'S REGIONALISM: ROOT CAUSES
The struggle between centralism and regionalism in Spain is usually traced to 1812,
when Spain adopted "a liberal centralizing Constitution40." (Prior to that time - since
the seventh century - thd Basques had been politically autonomous.) The struggle
evolved into armed conflict; from 1833 to 1840, and again from 1873 to 1876, the Carlist
39 Foreign Broadcast Infornation Service, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)," p. 2, JPRS-TOT-86-
010-L, 31 January 1986.
40 Robert P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 14, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.
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wars "pitted liberal Centralism against traditional regionalists not just in Spain but in the
Basque provinces themselves41 ." After these wars, the regional privileges and
autonomy that had characterized the Basque country gave way to more centralized
control. Even so, the Basque people hoped to regain their autonomy and the Basque
Nationalist Party was formed in the late nineteenth century for this end.
While, as previously indicated, regionalism is a factor in other parts of Spain, the
Basques' more fervent tendency towards regional separatism has been reinforced by
several factors. First, early industrialization stimulated a concentration of wealth in the
Basque provinces. This prosperity led to a "superior, or p. nizing attitude towards the
inhabitants of other regions." Moreover, with prosperity, Basque resentment grew toward
the rest of Spain as they began to feel that they were subsidizing "the more backward
regions4 2' ' of Spain. Thus, the Basques began to see themselves stereotypically as a
"hardworking minority group" entitled to more compensation for their labor than they
were getting.
A second factor that has contributed to Basque feelings of regionalism has to do with
feelings that a central government is incapable of understanding local problems. This
feeling is magnified because Basques have traditionally been "under-represented in many
of Spain's major public institutions.., disproportionately small numbers of judges, civil
servants, policemen and military personnel have been recruited from these groups [the
Basques and Catalans]43 ." Thus, the Basques' feelings regarding their relationship to
public officials have varied from that of "paying for the support of an army of parasitical
bureaucrats" to that of livink in an "occupied territory44."
41 Ibid.
42 Medhurst. Dr. Kenneth, The Basques, p. 5. The Minority Rights Group, 1972.
43 Ibid.
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In spite of, or perhaps because of minimal representation within the central
government, the Basques tend to maintain a high level of political awareness - a
tendency that only exacerbates existing schisms between the Basques and Madrid. This
political consciousness, a third factor in Basque regionalism, is evidenced, for example,
by the quality of services provided to the sick and aging and by a Basque propensity "for
forming and joining special interest groups4 5.",
Any discussion of the root causes of regionalism in the Euskadi would not be
complete without mention of the Basque Church and immigration. Both have heavily
influenced Basque society; the Church "because the Basque people... have been
particularly loyal to it46,"' and immigration because of the industrialization that has
characterized Euskadi.
Whereas in other areas of Spain, "the working classes.., have tended to become
indifferent or hostile to organized religion47," the Roman Catholic Church in Euskadi is
a central aspect of life. The priests in Euskadi have considerable empathy toward the
interests of the general population; by the same token, they exercise considerable
influence. As a result, the Basque priests are not always in step with the mainstream
Spanish clergy, as was illustrated in the Civil War - whereas "a large proportion of
Spanish clergy were in General Franco's camp, Basque priests, because of their sympathy







Immigration to Euskadi, like the Church, has tended to solidify regionalistic
tendencies. Immigrants to Euskadi face several difficulties, as Dr. Kenneth Medhurst
points out. The most obvious difficulty is perhaps the language, which is difficult and
unrelated to any other language found in Spain. Secondly, many of the immigrants "have
come from other fairly well developed regions and.., have brought with them their own
fairly fixed cultural and political values49." Thirdly, the Basques tend to be exclusive.
B. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY
If regionalism is a fact of Life in Spain as a whole, it is even more a fact of life in
Euskadi. The Spanish Basque country itself is divided Lo four distinct provinces:
Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra. Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa are located to the
North of the Cantabrian mountains; Alava and Navarra lie to the South (see Appendix A).
Thus, the topography of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa have historically "produced an
adventurous and daring maritime culture that has given us some of the world's premier
explorers;" while "the Southern plains, rolling gently Southward from the mountains
toward the Ebro River, fostered... (a] farming culture, one that looked inward to itself and
to Spain, rather than outward to a world of commerce and exploration50 ." Such
differences, fostered by the region's geography, persist today.
Navarra remains primarily an agricultural province, % aile Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, and
to some extent Alava have become heavily industrialized. Likewise, as Figure 1
indicates, use of the Basque language Euskera differs substantially from region to region.
49 Ibid.
50 Clark. The Basque Insurgens p. 9.
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Vizca 68 44 92% of total Euskera speakers
Vizcaya 22 13_____
Navarra • * _ _8% of total Euskera speakers
Alava **/
Overall 30 20
Figure 1: The use of Euskera in the Basque population
The data in Figure 1 were obtained in the early 1970s. Only nine percent of all






Figure 2: The location of Euskera-speaking schoolchildren
51 Ibid., p. 11.
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The demographics of the four provinces differ as well. As Clark notes, "In Navarra,
where industrialization has proceeded most slowly, about 80 percent of the population is
native-born. In Alava, Vizcaya, and Guipuzcoa, in contrast, the percentage of native-born
actually drops to about 60 percent52. ' Ironically, the Basque nationalist insurgency
movement has been most successful in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.
C. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE ETA
It could be said that Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA), a terrorist organization rooted in
Basque regionalism, has its roots in ancient Basque history. At the same time, one could
argue that its roots are somehow connected with Napoleon and the French Revolution,
which gave birth to the idea of national identity. As previously mentioned, the ETA's
roots could also be traced to the Carlist Wars which precipitated the Basque region's loss
of autonomy. Gurutz Jaurequi has traced the birth of the ETA to two factors: "traditional
Basque nationalist ideology" and "Francoism 53." As suggested in the previous section,
industrialization and the immigration that follows could also be given partial credit for the
ETA's birth. In reality, it is likely that each of these factors has played a part in the birth
and nature of the ETA.
If historical events such as industrialization and the birth of the nation-state can be
considered ancestral to the ETA, it seems that events closer to the ETA's actual birth may
have parental characteristics. Indeed, this seems to be the case.
In 1936, with the onset~of the Spanish Civil War, the Basque provinces of Alava and
Navarra supported Franco, while Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya supported the Republic. Less
52 Ibid.
53 Jauregui, Gurutz, "National Identity and Political Violence in the Basque Country," European
Journal of Political Research, v. 14, p. 587, 1986.
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than nine months later, Franco and his forces had conquered the Basque region and forced
its government to seek exile in France. Franco, in an effort to control any further
resistance in Euskadi, took extreme measures to repress the language and culture54 .
The following statements made by ETA members serve to illustrate both the nature
of thsc repressions and the feelings of the individuals who would later become terrorists:
Jose Maria Escubi Larraz (one of the chief ETA leaders in the 1960s):
I got to school, I realized that no one talked like me; I felt, then, a
feeling of loneliness. I couldn't understand Spanish and the lectures of the
teacher. They thought that I didn't want to study my lessons, and they punished
me. This marked me deeply. And when I grew up I decided to do something
for my Basque country. 55
Miguel Angel Apalategui:
Ten years ago [in about 1967 -RPC], in the festival in Aya, I was
wearing a cap with four clusters of ribbons hanging from it. They [the police]
grabbed me, they took off the ribbons and they took away my identity card, and
they told me to come to Ataun the next day to get it. I went there, and they
made me return home and come back with the cap that I had had on in Aya. I
went back with the cap. They slapped me around a little and yelled at me. And
I had to remain quiet. The ribbons were the (Basque] colors. They gave me a
fine of 500 pesetas [about ten dollars] and they let me leave.56
In addition to prohibiting the wearing of the colors of the Basque flag and the use of
Euskera "in all public areas, and teaching or using the language in communications
media57," Franco forbid the Basques "to enjoy simple expressions of folklore, such as
singing of nationalistic songs, [or] the playing of proscribed musical instruments5 8 ."
Further, officials assassinated Basque citizens randomly, "nationalist church officials...
M Clark, The Basque Insurgeits, pp. 20-21.
55 Clark. Roben P., 'Ntterns in the Lives of ETA Members," Terrorisn, v. 6, p. 437,1983.
56 Ibid.. p. 438.
57 Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 21.
58 Clark, "Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members." p. 438.
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were denounced and replaced with more reliable clergy" and "prisons bulged with
political prisoners59 ."
Ten years after the Basques had been defeated in the Civil War, "the basic elements
of a resistance organization were in place6O." The Basques who had been exiled to Paris
began an underground resistance movement; the Basques who had been imprisoned were
able to establish "a network of contacts and shared experiences that facilitated the
establishment of an underground political force in the late 1940s6."
If the Civil War served as a sort of paternal catalyst for the resistance movement, the
economic crisis that followed it served as a kind of maternal catalyst. Clark reports that
"by 1951, economic conditions had worsened to such an extent that serious strikes began
to appear spontaneously throughout the country62 ." In 1951, the Resistance Committee
sponsored a general strike in Balboa (similar to a strike it had organized four years
earlier). Franco crushed the strike, and the ensuing "repression imposed from Madrid
was so intense that the network of clandestine cells within Spain was left in ruins63. ' '
Only months later, the U.S. government (which had supported the Basque
government for at least five years, in an attempt to either destabilize or liberalize the
Franco government) lost interest in fighting Franco and began "negotiations that would
lead to the U.S. base agreement." Meanwhile, France, following the U.S. lead, "expelled
the Basque government-in-exile.., and turned the [its] building over to the Spanish
Embassy for its use64."
59 Clark. The Basque Insurges, p. 21.
60 Ibid.,p. 20.
61 Ibid., p. 21.
62 Ibid., p. 22.
63 Ibid., p. 23.
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The repressions brought on by the Civil War and Franco, poor economic conditions,
and finally, what must have felt like a political betrayal to the Basques fostered the
development of EKIN and EGI-EKIN (see Appendix B), the political forerunners of
ETA.
In 1952, EKIN ("to do" or "to make") was formed from a group of students from
Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. This group began discussing politics and contemporary affairs;
they also began publishing a newsletter, from whence they got their name. Later, in
1956, a group known as Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), or Basque Youth, established
itself clandestinely in Spain. (The PNV had helped to establish the organization ten ycars
earlier in Spain)6 5.
EKIN and EGI served as political precursors of the ETA in more than one respect.
First of all, they were the first Basque organizations to operate clandestinely in Spain
since the beginning of Franco's regime. Second, they came to typify the changing masks
that would characterize the ETA from its conception. The two organizations were short-
lived. On July 31, 1959, the ETA was born.
D. ETA'S IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
Clark has identified three ideologies that have dominated the ETA during different
periods of its evolution. ETA members with nationalistic tendencies - those who
believe that Euskadi should be autonomous - base their belief on Basque ethnicity,
wAich they consider to be "a product of their language." Clark calls the people
'ethnolinguists6 6 ." On the other hand, ETA members with a Marxist orientation,
64 Ibid., p. 24.
65 Ibid., p. 25.
66 Ibid., p. 33.
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concerned more with "liberation of the Basque workers" than with Basque ethnicity, have
been called "trotskyites," (though, as Clark notes, "what they borrowed from Trotsky is
not at all clear67 .") Finally, the third ideological belief common to the ETA is based on
a combination of ethnolinguistic and trotskyite ideology. Those who espoused this
ideology "believed Euskadi was suffering from a colonial relationship;" thus, advocates
of the ideology were called "third-worldists."
Gurutz Jauregui provides an extended perspective regarding the ideological evolution
of the ETA:
The doctrine of classic nationalism covered several important aspects:
firstly, what may be called regionalism in the sense of what is essentially
Basque (that is, the recovery of the Basque spirit) and in an inward-looking
sense (that is, the rejection of all that is Spanish); secondly, the assumption of
the Basque historical myths (the Basque people as a noble, just, democratic,
freedom-loving people has reached this state of degradation as a consequence of
the submission to and occupation by a reactionary, feudal country - Spain);
thirdly, the consideration of the immigrants as foreigners; fourthly a visceral
anti-communism in opposition to a doctrine that is radically incompatible with
what is peculiarly Basque; and finally, various socio-economic concepts based
on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church6g.
Jauregui further notes that the ETA's early ideology differed somewhat from
"historic nationalism." He cites two peculiar contributions toward nationalism as "non-
confessionalism - a particularly important aspect considering the omnipresence of the
Catholic Church in the Basque country - and... the rejection of the race as a biological-
genetic element;" instead, Jauregui observes that the Basques have substituted "the
ethnos, a linguistic-cultural element, as a sign of identity69."
In addition to his explanation of the elements of Basque nationalism, Jauregui
proposes a plausible explanation of the ideological evolution in the ETA. He states that
67 Ibid.,p. 34.
68 Jauregui, p. 593.
69 Ibi
30
the ETA's challenge revolved around "the search for a theory capable of giving solid
backing to the Basque people's national demands; the adaptation of Basque nationalism
to the socio-economic realities of the country; [and] the putting into practice of a political
strategy of national liberation7 0."
E. THE EARLY YEARS (1959-1964)
During 1959, large-scale strikes and social conflicts characterized Spain. Due to the
industry in Euskadi, the people there were hit particularly hard by the economic
difficulties and ensuing conflicts. As a result, the ETA found it necessary to deal with the
worker constituency rather than remaining true to the nationalism that was, initially, its
entire reason for being.
ETA's general frustration with the Franco regime was manifest in 1961, when ETA
challenged Spanish authority by derailing trains carrying Franco supporters to a
celebration over his victory in the Civil War. ("Nineteen-sixty-one marked the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the military rebellion that began the Civil War71]") The action was
followed by police arrests and deportations that temporarily stifled the ETA's
development in Spain. Even so, it gave the organization's exiles time to establish
themselves as the Executive Committee which, they hoped, would give the organization
direction. In accordance with their new structural organization, the ETA exiles "issued
the organization's declaration of purpose." The declaration identified ETA's purpose as
"to obtain as rapidly as possible and using all the means possible - including violence-
the independence of Euskai72."
70 Ibid., p. 584.
71 Clark, The Basque Insurgents. p. 35.
72 Ibid.. p. 37.
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In spite of the ETA's "new direction," however, economic instability and the ensuing
labor conflicts continued. According to Jauregui, "this labour conflict began to produce a
change of attitude at its [the ETA's] base73." Thus, it might be argued that the ETA was
forced to broaden its ideological base in order to meet the political challenge of gaining a
large enough constituency to be influential.
F. THE MIDDLE YEARS (1965-1967)
The Middle Years of the ETA's ideological struggle are characterized by the fourth
and fifth assemblies. The Fourth Assembly was held in 1965 and "was the first assembly
to meet in Spain under clandestine conditions." An important outcome of the assembly
was approval of the "action-repression-action spiral theory". According to this theory,
the ETA could, "by means of specific attacks.., provoke Spanish authorities into an
overreaction that would inflict heavy damage on the civilian Basque population74."1
Thus, "with each action, there would come a counteraction of such a repressive nature
that ETA would benefit with an increased flow of members to its ranks and increased
support from the noncombatants75." In this way, the ETA hoped to achieve its overall
goal of Basque independence backed by popular support.
The Fourth Assembly was also characterized by "the establishment of the Activism
Branch and the decision to launch an armed insurgency76 ." The purpose of the Activism
Branch was to assist in obtaining the financial resources necessary to further the purposes
of the ETA. Thus, they were responsible for robberies and extortions.
73 Jauregui, p. 594.
74 Clark, The Basque Insurgents. p. 40.
75 Ibid., p. 41.
76 Ibid.
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The Fifth Assembly met initially in December 1966. The events of the meeting were
dominated by a conflict between the Marxists and the other ETA constituencies (i.e. the
ethno-linguists and the third-worldists). Apparently, during the Summer of that year, the
Marxists attempted to take over the ETA by using the organization's newsletter to "call
for all ETA militants to vote in the Spanish labor union elections scheduled for the
autumn of 196677." The ETA's other factions, however, viewed participation in these
elections as a means of legitimizing Franco.
A report was prepared to document the accusations against the Trotskyites.
Following formal presentation of the report, members in attendance voted to expel the
Trotskyites; thus the Fifth Assembly was characterized by the first schism within the
ETA.
The second half of the Fifth Assembly met in March 1967 and "dealt with the split
between the two [remaining] factions... in a struggle over ultimate control of the
organization 78." The third-worldists dominated the Assembly, causing the ethno-
linguists to resign and form the BRANKA group. The remaining members of the ETA
(the third-worldists) also initiated "important structural changes79" within the ETA.
Francisco Javier Ortiz, the ETA's leader, oversaw the creation of "four fronts responsible
for political action, cultural action, economic action, and activity amongst the industrial
working class8 0 ." The ETA hoped this organization would be more effective. Though it
never really was, it serves as tangible evidence of the changes that characterized the ETA
during the middle years of its ideological struggle.
77 Ibid., p. 43.
78 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
79 Ibid., p. 46.
80 Janke, Peter, Spanish Separatism: ETA's Threat to Basque Democracy p. 7, The Institute for the
Study of Conflict, 1980.
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G. MORE RECENT YEARS (1968-1970)
The most significant event of the more recent years of the ETA's ideological struggle
is without doubt the Manzanas murder. Throughout the 1960s, the ETA "had depended
upon the enthusiasm of one man, Francisco Javier Echevarrieta Ortizl." The Guardia
Civil killed Ortiz on 7 June 1968 when "he failed to stop for speeding... and was killed in
an exchange of shots." The event precipitated the first murder that can be attributed to the
ETA; Janke reports that "to avenge his death ETA killed the San Sebastian police chief,
Meliton Manzanas, outside his home in Irun in August 196882.",
Sixteen individuals connected with the event were arrested and "put on military trial
at Burgos in 1970." As a result of the Manzanas murder, Franco suspended the
constitutional guarantees of Guipuzcoa; then early in 1969, Franco revoked the
constitutional guarantees of the entire Spanish nation for three months. Reportedly, "in
August alone.... more than six hundred arrests were made in the Basque provinces and
police maltreatment of prisoners rose dramatically 83." As a result of the massive police
actions, the ETA was almost destroyed.
Probably due in part to he devastation of the police reactions in 1968 and 1969, the
ETA began to question several pects of its ideolog, First, it began to appear that "the
action-repression-action spiral theory... [was] too costly a tactic4. ' Second, the ETA
(ironically) began to question "its relationship with workers, both Basque and non-
Basque." In an attempt to assimilate non-Basque workers into the organization, the ETA
81 Ibid., p. 15.
82 Ibid., p. 8.
83 Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 49.
84 Ibid., p. 51.
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"created the Workers' Front, charged with the responsibility of maintaining the
organization's ties with the labor unions that were active in the Basque region.
Meanwhile, ETA members in exile comprised various factions with differing
ideologies. The Red Cells resembled the Executive Committee, and their ideology was as
follows:
" They didn't believe the ETA met "the needs of the working class in the
Basque region8 5."
" "liberation of the Basque region could not be undertaken while Spain
remained under the control of a dictatorship;" therefore, the struggle would
"have to be extended to the rest of Spain86."'
" The Basques had to look for alliances.
In contrast, the exiles emphasized Basque ethnicity; the milis were radically anti-
communist, and insisted on an armed struggle; and the revolutionary war group of
Krutwig advocated armed struggle, although subordinating violence to the needs of a
political-military structure and refusing to reject Marxism out of hand.
The Sixth Assembly, like the Fifth Assembly, was dominated by the ideological
turmoil characterized by the differing factions. Also, as with the Fifth Assembly, the
Sixth Assembly was characterized by fragmentation. The milis were expelled, the Red
Cells and Ezkubi (the leader of the Krutwig group) resigned, and the Executive
Committee remained to direct the affairs of the ETA.
H. THE LAST YEARS OF THE FRANCO REGIME (1971-1975)
According to Gurutz Jauregui, the ETA has been "ideologically dead since 197087."
In spite of this so-called philosophical demise, however, the ETA has managed to survive
(in unction, at the very least), and to change its facial expression from time to time. In
85 Ibid., p. 53.
86 Ibid.
87 Jauregui. p. 598.
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the early 1970s, as Janke notes, the ETA's factions "eventually formed into ETA-V and
ETA-VI8 8." Jauregui notes that "the worker sectors and the military sectors coexisted
with great difficulty 89"' from 1970 to 1974.
ETA-VI, as Clark notes, was composed of the direct heirs of the organization that
remained after the Sixth Assembly 90. Shortly after the Sixth Assembly the ETA-VI
received a letter, allegedly from the Burgos 16, "the most famous ETA members," who
because of their involvement in the Manzanas murder, were imprisoned. The letter
accused members of the ETA-VI of "handing out folklore calendars or writing novels
while Txabi Etxebarriete [the first ETA member to be killed] lay dying on a road in
Euskadi 91 ." This letter seemed to influence ETA-VI into adopting a "belief that Basque
workers, forced to choose between class and ethnicity, would support a class-based
struggle 92 rather than a national one. This belief, in addition to "a series of mistaken
policy choices," spelled the end of the ETA-VI by the end of 1972.
ETA-V, ETA-VT's chief competitor, took its social base from the followers of the
authors of the Burgos 16 letter (which, not surprisingly, had actually been perpetrated by
the former leaders of the ETA, the war group of Krutwig, in an attempt to regain control
of the ETA). With the decline of ETA-VI, ETA-V became known sirnv as ETA,
indicating a high level of acceptance.
In early 1972, the ETA began changing its mask once again. In January of that year,
they kidnapped Lorenzo Zabala to demonstrate their support of the Basque workers. The
88 Janke, p. 8.
89 Jauregui, p. 603.
90 Clark. The Basque Insurgents, pp. 57, 58.
91 Ibid., p. 58.
92 Ibid., p. 59.
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kidnapping was particularly important because Zabala himself was a Basque, and it
therefore came to represent the ETA's willingness to defend the class interests of the
workers, even at the expense of the Basque nationalist movement. ETA's new mask
became further apparent when, on Easter 1972, the ETA merged with the EGI, the
Basque Youth Organization, thereby gaining additional popular support 9 3.
The willingness of the new ETA to extend beyond nationalist interests became
further apparent when "the organization began to reach out beyond the frontiers of the
Basque country to establish links with other insurgent organizatimis. ' These other groups
included Fatah, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Breton Liberation Front, and the Irish
Republican Army 94. Even as the popular base of the ETA was expanding, however,
internal fissures threatened to change its appearance again.
The conflict that would develop into a schism in the ETA's structure focused on
differences between the Frente Obrero, "the principal advocate of a political approach to
struggle," and the "Frente Militar, which continued to stress a military approach95 ." The
catalyst that caused the split was an attack on Carrero Blanco, "one of Franco's most
trusted advisors96" in 1972. Blanco's assassination surpassed the Frente Obrero's
tolerance level. Thus, when "the advocates of a unified political and military strategy
found themselves in the majority" at a meeting in October 1974, not content to forsake
"the clandestine struggle of a tiny armed group97," the Frente Militar split off to become
93 Ibid., p. 66-67.
94Ibid., p. 69.
95 Ibid., p. 70.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., p. 79.
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ETA(M). Despite appearances, however, the ETA(P-M) was the most radical faction
since it advocated a struggle based on Marxist sympathies and Basque ethnicity.
I. POST-FRANCO SPAIN
At first blush, it might seem that, since the Civil War and Franco's repression
contributed to the ETA's birth, Franco's death, followed by the emergence of a
democracy in Spain would contribute to the ETA's demise. However, in spite of the fact
that Spanish democracy has meant increased autonomy 98for the Basques, ETA militancy
has not subsided. On the contrary, the violence has increased. As Gabriel Jackson notes,
this occurrence "defies full explanation. However .e main factor is surely the isolation
of its [ETA's] members99."
Edward Moxon-Browne elaborates on the survival of ETA militancy. According to
his research, "the basic aims of ETA have remained very much the same as they were 10
or 20 years ago: to achieve the independence, and reunification of Euskadi. The right of
the Basque people to determine their own country, lies at the heart of ETA ideology. The
democratisation of the Spanish state since the death of Franco is acknowledged by ETA
as changing the political context in which the struggle must be fought, but it does not alter
the necessity for the struggle itselfl00." Further, as Moxon-Browne notes, "the Spanish
Constitution was rejected by 63 percent of the voters in the Basque country, and
consequently has dubious legitimacy, to say the least, in the regionl 0 ." In addition to the
98 Foreign Broadcast Infomalon Service. "Terrorism -Spain: ETA (1974-1984)."
JPRS-TOT-86-O10-L, 31 January 1986.
99 Jackson, "Can the Basques Live with Spain?" p. 519.
100 Moxon-Browne, Edward, Spain and the ETA: The Bidfor Basque Autonomy. The Centre for Security
and Conflict Studies. p. 5, 1987,
101 [bid.
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ETA's determination to continue its militant strategy in spite of democracy, "the reform
of the police under democratic institutions made it all the harder to control terrorism 10 2."'
The ETA's strong stance against the Spanish Go,,ernment, even after it adopted
democracy, may have been different had Eduardo Moreno Bergareche "Pertur" lived to
assist the ETA in adapting to the new government. However, "Pertur," the leader of
ETA(P-M) did not even live long enough to see democracy in Spain1 03. Instead, Miguel
Angel Apalategui "Apala" became ETA(P-M)'s leader, and the ETA "splintered into
three divergent forces":
* The Berezi Commandos under Apala
* The Political Faction of ETA (P-M)
* ETA (militar) 104
The Seventh Assembly, directed by ETA (P-M), was held in October 1976. As
might well have been expected, further splintering occurred. Most of those in attendance
broke away from ETA(M), and each of the different factions proposed a structure based
on various combinations of political and/or military strategy 105 which was intended to
support some combination of Marxist-Basque nationalist interests.
With the political changes in Spain wrought by Franco's death, the ETA itself did not
change; politically, however, more legal options were opened up to the Basques.
Specifically, aside from the PSOE and the PCE on the left and the UCD on the right,
several Basque parties came on the political scene. On the right, the Basque National
102 Payne, Stanley G., "Terrorism and Democratic Stability in Spain," Current History, p. 169,
November 1979.
103 Alonso, Alejandro Munoz, El Terrorismo en Espana, pp. 66-69, Talleres Graficos, 1982.
104 Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 93.
105 Alonso, p. 70.
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Party (PNV) was legitimiz. J and accounted for approximately twenty-five percent of the
votes in the 1976 election in Euskadi 106 . On the left, emerging parties included the
Patriotic Socialist Coordinating Council (KAS), the Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA),
and the Basque Left (EE). These parties and their coalitions were supported, at one time
or another, by ETA(M) 107.
On 28 April 1978, however, ETA(M), which is the ETA which has survived to the
present day, organized Herri Batasuna, an electoral coalition that, while it refuses to
occupy the seats it gains, has become a strong political party in the Basque provinces by
"synthesizefing] the two explosive interpretations of the Basque Country's history' 0 8.'
Thus, HB "combined radical Basque ethnicity with revolutionary socialism in a
parliamentary electoral setting." 109
The creation of HB was a smart political decision on the part of ETA. As noted by
FBIS, "leftwing extremist groups and cliques have been crushed by HB and swept away
by ETA's offer, which none of them can outdo, because what is more violent than death
and what is more nationalistic than advocating independence?."1 10
J. CHALLENGES TO AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE ETA
In spite of the ETA demonstrated inability to muster continued support for
violence, it should be noted that the organization faces new challenges, now that
democracy has taken root in Spain. In the first place, it faces increased legal opposition.
106 Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 95.
107 Ibid., pp. 97-99.
108 FBIS, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)."
109 Clark, The Basque Insurgents, pp. 97-99.
110 FBIS, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)."
40
Members of the Guardia Civil who traditionally persecuted Basquesl I I have now been
largely replaced by Basque policemen 1 12. Further, police successes against terrorist
actions have been on the increase, which, given the ETA's small numbers (currently
around 200 members), has certainly taken its toll on the ETA's abilities. Further, Spain
recently allotted the equivalent of approximately $10,000 towards improving the GAR,
"one of the principal elite forces of the country's Guardia Civil."1 1 3
Spanish police actions against ETA terrorist attacks have been assisted by French
cooperation as well. Traditionally, the Spanish government has complained that, without
the formerly traditional French sanctuary, the fight against the ETA would be easier114.
But while France gave ETA members refugee status in the past, more recently status has
been denied 115.
Probably the greatest challenge the ETA has to face is that of legitimacy.
Ideologically, the ETA has no more legs left to stand on. The problem with ethno-
linguist ideology is, as Figure 2 illustrated, that less than 20% of the region's population
can speak Euskera. The Trotskyites, on the other hand, never supported the Basque
movement for the movement itself, but as part of a larger movement. Also, communism
is now recognized globally as ineffective. ETA members who espouse third-worldist
ideology face similar problems. First, nationalism and communism are, in many ways,
conflicting doctrines. Second, the Basque region, due to current industrialization, is
wealthier than most of the rest of Spain. Thus, the colonialist argument does not work.
I I1 Alonso, pp. 66-69.
112 Riding, p. 6.
113 Joint Staff, "1989 Annual Teorism Report," Washington, D.C.
114 Alonso, p. 234.
115 Janke, p. 18.
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That the Basques themselves recognize the futility of legitimization based on their
traditional ideologies is apparent in an article by Alan Riding, in which he reports that
"nationalist groups in the Basque country are using events in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union to justify calls for regional self-determination in Spain1 16. As previously
noted, unlike the Poles or the Lithuanians, or any of the nations which in recent times
have demanded independence from the Soviet Union, the Basques have only limited
claim to national identity. Perhaps the only pervasive similarities among the Basque
people are distinct noses, an increased occurrences of Rh-negative blood factor, and a
language that seems to be uttering its last words. Whether or not these factors are enough
on which to base a national identity is dubious at best.
In spite of the fact that the ETA has lost a large base of its support, due largely to the
region's increased autonomy, the ETA has managed to survive. There may be several
reasons for this seeming paradox. Peter Waldmann, a German author, suggests that the
insurgency movement can be compared to a religion, wherein members demonstrate "a
fanatical devotion to a common cause,... faith in the miracles wrought by force,
combined with the not-too-hidden desire to become martyrs themselves117." He
illustrates this euphoric picture with a fairy tale-like story which illustrates the "religious
myth" taught within the Basque movement:
Once, the Basques lived happily in a paradisiacal Euskadi, which was
protected from the misfortunes of history, and successfully defended their
thousand-year independence from all who conquered the peninsula. Neither the
Celts nor the Ph~mcians, nor the Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, Arabs, or
Spaniards were able to put an end to the Basque golden age. They knew neither
slavery nor feudalism, but were all knights. Their harmony and the democracy
they established remained until they were conquered by the Spaniards in the
Carlist War. With that, a great evil came upon Euskadi in the form of
exploitive, corrupt, Spanish capitalism. The Basque revolution, led by the ETA,
116 Riding, p. 6.
117 Waidmann, Peter. "Gewahlsamer Sepnuzismus," Koetler Zeitschriftfwr Soziologi wid
Sozialpsychologie, p. 222, Juni 1985.
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will restore the earthly paradise in the form of an independent, socialist Euskadi,
where only Euskera shall be spoken.1 18
It has also been argued convincingly that terrorism, any terrorism, is a result of
psychopathic factors, the "desire to belong." In the case of the Basques, Jerrold M. Post
has set forth an intriguing argument regarding this possibility:
Even though the decision to join a "nationalist separatist terrorist
group" is less profound and does not represent a total break with society, here,
too, the desire to join well spring from a feeling of alienation. The Basque
region of Spain is remarkable homogeneous. Only eight percent of the families
are of mixed Spanish-Basque heritage, and the children of these families are
scorned and rejected. Yet fully 40 percent of the members of ETA, the terrorists
whose espoused cause is establishing a separate Basque nation, come from such
mixed-parent families. Not belonging, on the margins of society, they try to
"out-Basque" the Basques 119
.
Santiago de Genoves brings to light still another reason for the survival of the ETA,
which may be related to the idea of abnormal, psychological factors. He proposes that
Euskadi is living in a state of moral shock brought about by the industrial revolution - a
revolution that purports to employ the unemployed, but in reality places them along an
assembly line. According to Genoves, the problem the ETA terrorists are trying to solve
is not political but cultural. "In a world that doesn't yet know how to orient the plethora
of information that it receives day by day - in a world that is unequal, materialistic,




119 Post, Jerrold M., M.D. "Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Relations on Terrorist Group
Dynamics." Terroris, v. 10, p. 145-163, 1987.
120 Genoves, Santiago, La Vioencia an el Pais Vasco yen sus Relaciones Con Espanola, p. 139,
Universidad Macional Autonona de Mexico, 1980.
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Perhaps each of the above reasons has contributed to the survival of the ETA. One
thing is for certain, however, in spite of animosity towards the terrorists among the
Basques themselves, in spite of decreased legitimacy, and in spite of the fact that its
popular base has shrunk in recent years, the ETA will survive1 21 .
Ironically, the ETA been successfully compared to Franco's movement. As stated in
the FBIS Worldwide Report on Terrorism, "ETA has not undergone a political evolution,
and this has been one of its constraints. ETA does not evolve, although it is affected by
the evolution around it. Indeed, amid all vicissitudes it remains a hard-core group that
persists in maintaining the legitimacy of an immobile movement122." Indeed, the ETA
can be expected to remain a principal threat to Spanish internal security for an indefinite
time period. While the terrorist organization has experienced difficult challenges and
setbacks, largely due to the successes of the Spanish Guardia Civil, the conflict between
Basque separatists who foster terrorism and the Spanish nation is far from over. In fact,
Tiempo, a Spanish newspaper, recently reported that "security officials are predicting a
future full of package bombs, culminating in 1992123." (That year marks several
important events for the Spanish people to include the World's Fair, the Olympics, the
500t .aniversary of Columbus's discovery of the New World, and the greater integration
of the European community.)
The ETA has manifest a remarkable propensity for revitalizing itself when faced with
setbacks both from within and from without. (See Appendix C for a list of selected ETA
actions since 1980.) For example, while the terrorists used to obtain funding by means of
a so-called "revolutionary tax," when the tax became increasingly difficult to collect
121 FBIS, 'Tefforism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)." JPRS-TOT-86-010-L, p. 5, 31 January 1986.
122 Ibid.. p. 4.
123 Foreign Broadcast Information Service. JPRS-TOT-90-025-L, 16 July 90, p. 58.
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(around 1987), they resorted to increased kidnappings. While it is true, then, that the
ETA movement has made many superficial changes in organizational structure and even
in tactical approaches, the movement's face is a permanent and unchanging granite that
only changes masks periodically. As such, it seems clear that the ETA is determined to
pursue national autonomy at any cost.
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IV. SPAIN'S EXTERNAL INTERESTS AND POTENTIALS FOR CONFLICT
Spain's external interests are many and varied. Not surprisingly, Spain's primary
interest in recent years has been to secure a place for herself in the context of the new
Europe, a process that will be addressed in Chapter V. Other Spanish interests that may
well affect Spain's European role, however, include its relation with Great Britain,
especially regarding Gibraltar; its relations with Morocco, particularly concerning the
issues of Ceuta and Melilla; its perennial fear of the Arab nations combined with its
natural affinity for the same; and its bilateral agreements with Portugal, the United States,
and France. In addition, though the East-West confrontation has been almost totally
dismantled, Spain is a fairly new member of NATO. Thus, any discussion of Spain's
external interests would be incomplete without sections devoted to its relations with
NATO and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the points on a graph, these issues all
serve as points of reference that have both influenced and are influenced by Spain's
current position and direction. Hence, this chapter will discuss Spain's external interests
and the potentials for conflict that exist in conjunction with some of !hese interests.
A. GIBRALTAR
Without doubt, Spain's interest in Gibraltar is high on its list of external interests.
An area that "has been occupied by human beings since prehistoric times," 124 Gibraltar
first came to be a Spanish possession in 1309 when Ferdinand IV, the son of the King of
Castile, "ordered several of his nobles to attack Gibraltar." While the Spanish had
attacked the Moslems (who had possessed Gibraltar since 711), with some frequency
124 Levie, Howard S., The Status of Gibraltar, p. 3, Westview Press, 1983.
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during the previous century, Ferdinand IV was the first Spaniard to stage a successful
siege. Even so, "twenty-four years later the third siege, in 1333, resulted in her
[Gibraltar's] return to the control of the Moslems." Not until 1462, with the eighth siege,
did Gibraltar return to Spanish possession. Gibraltar was then under Spanish control from
1462 until 1704 when British Admiral Sir George Rooke seized the territory with the help
of the Dutch. The dispute between Spain and Great Britain over the rightful ownership of
Gibraltar, then, dates back to 1704125.
Though the British did not seize Gibraltar until 1704, British interest in the territory
was documented as early as 1625, and in 1655 Oliver Cromwell noted both the economic
and strategic value of attacking Gibraltar. Later, "in the negotiations between William III
and Louis XIV which followed the Peace of Rijswijk [20 Sep 1697], William several
times included Gibraltar in the list of naval bases which would be required by Great
Britain in order to ensure that she would be able to protect her trade and other commercial
interests against interference by a combination of France and a French-dominated
Spain." 126
Upon the death of Spanish King Charles H in 1699, both the Archduke Charles of
Austria and Philip of Anjou, grandson of French King Louis XIV, were potential heirs to
the Spanish throne because both had ancestors who had married into the Spanish royal
family. However, most of continental Europe feared a strong alliance between Spain and
France; thus, prior to Charles II's death, William III of Great Britain and Louis XIV
reached an agreement (the Second Partition Agreement) to name the Archduke Charles of
Austria as Charles II's successor. However, distraught at the proposed division of Spain's
possessions, Charles II drew up a will which superceded the Second Partition Agreement,
125 Ibid., p. 9.
126 Ibid., p. 10.
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naming Philip as his successor. The seeds of the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714)
and of the British siege of Gibraltar had been planted. 127
When the English occupied Gibraltar in 1704, the Gibraltarian citizens were given
the choice of staying or fleeing. About 4000 fled to the Spanish coastal city of San
Rogue, while only about 70 stayed on Gibraltar128 . Philip V subsequently tried to
reconquer the area, but was unsuccessful. Finally, on 13 Jul 1713, Great Britain and
Spain signed the Treaty of Utrecht, which obliged Spain, "against her will, to cede
Gibraltar to the English in addition to having to constantly vigil the territory of the
isthmus that the English also tried to annex using the most diverse pretexts
imaginable." 129
Several aspects of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht remain points of contention
between Spain and Great Britain to this day. For example, some Spaniards argue that the
treaty is invalid, given the fact that Philip V, Spain's ruler at the time of the signing, was
the grandson of Louis XIV (a French King), and therefore that "Spain had neither voice
nor vote" in the matter 130.
The opening paragraph, which reads as follows, has also proven to be a matter of
contention:
The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors.
yield to the Crown of Great Britain, the full and entire propriety of the town and
castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications and forts thereunto
belonging;, and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely
with all manner of right forever, without any exception or impediment
whatsoever. 131
127 Ibid., p. 8.
128 Ibid., p. 12.
129 Tornay, Francisco. La Linea de Gibraltar, 1730-1810, p. 30, La Linea De La Concepcion (Cadiz),
1981.
130 Casalduero, General Francisco. Europa, Gibraltar y la O.TAY , p. 29, Ediciones Dyrsa, 1985.
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According to the Spanish, "one must distinguish between the right of jurisdiction and
the right of propriety... sovereignty, that is, jurisdiction, belongs in its entirety to Spain."
Thus, according to Spain, "the most Britain can have in Gibraltar are the same rights of
propriety, not of jurisdiction and sovereignty, that it has over its Embassy in Madrid. 1 32
Levie, on the other hand, argues that the Spanish arguments regarding propriety have
little validity. He argues that "there was nothing whatsoever mentioned at any time by
any person to indicate that the cession of Gibraltar was to differ in any manner from the
then quite commonplace procedure by which one sovereign transferred the title to
territory to another." He further argues that such an interpretation would render "the final
clauses of the first paragraph of Article X... meaningless,' 133 and that had Article X
meant in 1713 what some Spanish authorities now claim it means, a "completely
anomalous situation... would have been created" since territorial jurisdiction "certainly
[did] not [belong] with Philip from whom it had been wrested by force of Allied arms and
from whom it was being detached by force of British diplomacy." 134
If Spain has stretched the interpretation of Article X to some degree, Great Britain is
no less guilty of the same. Throughout the period of negotiations, Spain made it clear that
Great Britain's claim on Gibraltar ended at the castle wall, whereas Great Britain
attempted to obtain territory on the isthmus to include the range of two cannon shots.
Spain's determination not to cede any territory around Gibraltar is evidenced in the
Spanish Red Book on Gibraltar 135 . Further, that the English were aware of these limits is
131 Levie, p. 42.
132 [bid., 36.
133 Levie, pp. 30-31.
1341 Ibid., p. 33.
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apparent in a letter Lord Lexington, English minister in Madrid, wrote to Brigadier
Stanwix, the first English governor of Gibraltar. He said, in reply to concerns Stanwix
had over Spain's vigilance of the territory just outside the walls of Gibraltar, "I don't see
how we can aspire to impede the Spanish from quartering troops wherever it seems best
to them within their own territory as long as they don't, as a result, direct any hostile acts
against the town of Gibraltar. '136
In spite of the limitations placed on the British by Utrecht, however, Colonel Ralph
Congreve, Gibraltar's second English governor, occupied Torre del Diablo and Molino
shortly after the treaty had been signed. Meanwhile, Philip V had had ample opportunity
to regain Gibraltar1 37, but "an Italian-oriented Queen (and Minister) had misled Philip
and had prevented him from... the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty." War
ensued, but not before Spain's Ambassador in London declared the cession of Gibraltar
invalid oecause of the "numerous violations of the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht by
Great Britain." According to the Ambassador's letter, the British "not only extended their
fortifications by exceeding the limits prescribed and stipulated, but what is more, contrary
to the express and liberal tenour of the Treaties, they receive and admit the Jews and
Moors, in the same manner as the Spaniards, and other nations confounded and mixed,
contrary to our holy religion; not to mention the frauds and continual contrabands which
are carried on there to the prejudice of his Majesty's revenues. '138
135 Tornay, p. 30.
136 Tornay, p. 31.
137 Not only was the Great Britain Whig party, which had replaced the Tories, willing to give Gibraltar
back to Spain. but twice Spain declined to accept Gibraltar in return for peace. In addition, rather than




The war between Spain and Great Britain, which constituted the thirteenth siege of
Gibraltar, was of short duration, but the peace treaty was ambiguous in that it did not
mention either Gibraltar or the Treaty of Utrecht. Four years later, Spain entered its first
agreement with France aimed at regaining possession of Gibraltar. France did not support
Spain as Spain would have liked; nevertheless, within ten years, Spain was again at war
with Great Britain. Again, Gibraltar was at stake, though not the central issue of the
conflict 139, 140 . As part of the hostilities, Philip V attempted to elicit France's help in
securing Gibraltar; when he realized the futility of his efforts, he began preparations for
another siege, but died before the siege was carried out. His son, Ferdinand VI, attempted
to procure peace by convincing Great Britain to return Gibraltar, but such attempts were
useless. He did procure peace, but only by agreeing to accept the ambiguous conditions
of the Treaty of Utrecht14 1.
Only six years later, in 1754, Britain offered to return Gibraltar to Spain in exchange
for her help in recovering Minorca from France. France, on the other hand, offered
Minorca to Spain in exchange for help against Britain. Ferdinand VI opted for a neutral
position, but upon his death in 1759, his half-brother Charles III succeeded him and
agreed to support France, "which by that date had actually already lost the war."142
During the reign of Charles Ill, Great Britain went to war with its American colonies;
because Charles III harbored a hatred for Great Britain, he supported the American
colonists and planned the fourteenth siege of Gibraltar, known as the Great Siege, which
lasted three years. Again, the British won and in 1783, a Treaty of Peace was signed143.
139 Relations between the two nations deteriorated over commercial issues.
140 [bid., p. 49.
141 Ibid., p. 50.
142 Ibid.
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Ironically enough, given the long-term conflicting nature of relations between Spain
and Great Britain, they fought as allies against Revolutionary France from 1793 to 1795.
As Levie notes, "Great Britain and Spain had fought their last war. Henceforth Spanish
efforts to recover Gibraltar, when they occurred, would be limited to the diplomatic
arena." Even so, diplomatic relations between the two countries remain somewhat
strained. Britain continued to demand that Spain evacuate all territory within cannon shot
distance of Gibraltar;, Spain continued to assert that Britain had no jurisdiction beyond
Gibraltar's castle walls. In an attempt to satisfy Britain's demands, in 1930 Spain
proclaimed a "neutral ground" on the isthmus, a concession that the British took to mean
that they had been granted legitimate access to the isthmus. In the mid-eighteenth
century, the Spanish permitted them "to garden and to graze cattle on the isthmus... [but]
when they established a more permanent installation there, a cemetery, the Spanish
pretested." Other British infringements on the "neutral" territory included building a
quarantine village for yellow fever victims in 1810 (a village that, by 1828, "had taken on
an air of permanence with a population of 1000."), the construction of a slaughterhouse in
1815 in addition to enlargement of the cemetery, the building of a drillground in 1817,
and, in 1825-26, the digging -f a new well. Thus, it became apparent "that the southern
half of this 'Neutral Ground,' this 'no-man's land,' was British territory, to do with as the
British desired, while the northern half was a true 'no-man's land' which must remain
devoid of all Spanish military installations144 .
The one-sidedness of Anglo-Spanish relations again became apparent when, in 1898,
Spain started building fortifications around the Bay of Algereciras against a possible
American attack during the Spanish-American War. Britain responded by demanding
143 Ibid.. p. 52.
144 Ibid.. pp. 66,67.
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that Spain not construct such fortifications within seven miles of Gibraltar's castle
walls 145 . Once again, Britain took advantage of Spain's weakness to gain control over
additional territory.
British provocations had not stopped by the early twentieth century. In 1908, Britain
informed Spain in "an act of courtesy" of its "intention to erect a fence [nine feet high]
along the British edge of the neutral territory at Gibraltar." In 1938, Britain built an
airfield in the middle of "its side" of the neutral territory. British claims regarding
criminal jurisdiction and water territorial rights have posed no less of a challenge to
Spanish diplomats.
Since 1963, the United Nations has become involved in the issues surrounding
Gibraltar, which continue to serve as a point of friction between Spain and Great Britain.
One of the primary issues at stake revolves around whether the laws of territorial integrity
or self-determination should apply to Gibraltar. According to the Spanish position, the
true Gibraltarians are those whose ancestors were forced out in 1704 and who took up
residence in San Roque. Thus, according to that position, Gibraltar was no claim to the
right of self-determination1 46 .
Because of tensions, the border between Spain and Gibraltar was closed in June of
1969, which only served to mandate the replacement of Spanish labor with Moroccan
labor. Even so, the tables had turned somewhat; whereas in former days Great Britain
had induced friction with its expansionist policies, during the UN-mandated attempts at
negotiation between Spain and Great Britain regarding Gibraltar, Spain provoked Great
Britain such that bilateral Mnegotiations never occurred. Spanish border guards made
crossings time-consuming and burdensome, "the export of almost all goods from Spain to
Gibraltar was embargoed, expiring licenses for trucks and passenger cars to cross the
145 Ibid., p. 75.
146 Casalduero, p. 43
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border were not renewed by the Spanish authorities, the frontier gates were closed an
hour earlier that ad been customary, etc. When the British refused to negotiate under
such circumstances, the General Assembly of the UN "declared the continuation of 'the
colonial situation in Gibraltar' incompatible with the Charter and with its Resolution 1514
(XV); it 'requested' Great Britain 'to terminate the colonial situation in Gibraltar no later
than I October 1969'; and it called upon Great Britain 'to begin without delay
negotiations with the Government of Spain. ' 1 4 7
It looked like Spain had finally regained its long-lost claim to Gibraltar. However, in
1970, the deed to Gibraltar still belonged to Great Britain, if largely due to sentiment on
Gibraltar itself. 148
Spain's change to a democratic form of government has in no way limited its interest
in Gibraltar. In October 1977, Spanish Prime Minister Suarez said in London that "the
Gibraltarians would be welcome to join 'the new democratic Spain' with regional
autonomy similar to that being offered to other ethnic groups149 ." In December of 1982,
Spain's Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez "decided to open the border to pedestrians.., as a
goodwill gesture designed to spur negotiations." 150
When Spain was debating whether or not to join NATO, the Gibraltar issue surfaced
again. Proponents of joining NATO supported the view that belonging to the Alliance
would increase the prospect of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, while opponents
argued that "since Britain is more powerful than Spain, NATO would always support the
United Kingdom on the issue of Gibraltar."151
147 Ibid., p. I15S.
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When Spain joined NATO, the move was not initially supported by the Socialist
government, headed by Felipe Gonzalez, that came into power shortly after the decision
had been made. According to Gonzalez, "[it is impossible to accept that Spain's armed
forces depend for the defense of this territory on a force that is, in our opinion and
according to the United Nations, occupying part of our territory." Along the same lines,
Jaime de Ojeda, Spain's Ambassador to NATO in 1985, stated that Spain would accept
full military integration "if it were to gain satisfaction from Britain in the Gibraltar
dispute." 152
To be certain, the Gibraltar issue is neither simple nor easily solvable. According to
Mr. Frank Folger, Spanish Desk Officer at the U.S. State Department, "the Spanish
understand the status quo. They have the issue in perspective and are becoming more
politically mature." Even so, he noted that "if circumstances arise, they [the Spanish] will
reiterate interests." According to historical perspective, Mr. Folger's observations are
correct since, according to Spain, Gibraltar still belongs to them.
B. CEUTA & MELILLA
Closely related to the Gibraltar issue is the issue of Ceuta and Melilla, which mirrors
the Gibraltar issue in nearly every respect. Like the Gibraltar issue, the Ceuta and Melilla
issue is rooted in history. As early as A.D. 700, "Northern Morocco and Southern Spain
were faced with the cruel choice of having to throw themselves into the arms of one or
the other of the two powerful masters who were face to face: Visigoths or the Arabs." At
this point in history, Melil was inhabited by the Arabs and Ceuta was inhabited by the
151 AlbaVictor, "Spain's Entry into NATO," in NATO and the Mediterranean. Lawrence S. Kaplan,
Robert W. Clawson, and Raimundo Luraghi, eds., p. 103, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985.
152 AIin, Major George R., "Spain's NATO Dilemma." Military Review, p. 68, (January 1985).
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Visigoths. As history has it, however, by 713 the Arabs had conquered the entire Iberian
peninsula. 15 3
Ceuta played an important role during the ensuing centuries, both as a cultural center
and as a port 154 . It was not until 1415 that it was conquered by Portuguese King Juan 1,
whose son convinced him to attack the city. In an attempt to regain possession of Ceuta,
the Moors attacked it in 1418, but Portugal retained it 155. In 1492, Isabel and Ferdinand
conquered Granada, which signified the end of Muslim domination of Spain 156.
While both Spain and Portugal were primarily concerned with the exciting prospects
offered by the newly disco,, ed America, their attention was diverted in some small
measure to Northern Africa for various reasons. First, they perceived a necessity to
defend commercial routes and "guarantee the security of their coastal population." Later,
confronted with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the Iberian nations decided that it
was in their best interest to "conquer the ports and isles of the North African Coast." In
1497, the House of Medina Sidonia, which was later ceded to Spain, conquered
Melillal57.
Following the death of the Portuguese King Sebastian in December 1578, the
Spanish and Portuguese crowns were combined (in 1580). As a result, in addition to
Melilla, Ceuta "was to become Spanish and to remain so until modern times." The two
enclaves were "frequently attacked by neighboring tribes;" 158 nevertheless, Spain
153 [bid.
154 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.
155 Ibid.. pp. 32, 33.
156 Del Pino. Domingo. La ddibna guerra con Marruecos: Ceuta y Melilla, p. 9. Editorial Argos Vergara,
S. A., 1983.
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retained control over them in fulfillment of Isabel's testament of 1504 in support of the
spread of Catholicism. She stated that her successors "'were responsible for' and should
not cease 'conquering Africa and fighting for the faith against the infidel." 159
In 1640, Lisbon rose against the reign of Philippe IV, bringing "the unison of the two
kingdoms to an end." Portugal regained most of the Moroccan territory it had previously
held, "but the nobles of Ceuta gathered before the Governor's Palace and proclaimed their
loyalty to the Spanish monarch." By 1668, the Treaty of Lisbon acknowledged Ceuta's
right to self-determination and the city was formally recognized as a Spanish
possessionl 60 .
While Portugal had ceded Ceuta to Spain peacefully, Morocco had not yet resigned
itself to the city's loss. Thus, throughout the latter seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, Ceuta was subject to sieges from its Moroccan neighbors. Likewise, the
Moroccans laid siege to Melilla from 1694 to 1696161. By the mid-eighteenth century,
both Spain and Morocco were interested in establishing and maintaining peaceful
relations, and both had much to gain from making this desire a reality. For Morocco,
peace would have meant total security since Spain was the only nation that posed any
threat to it; for Spain, peace would have meant freedom to pursue its interests in the New
World 16 2. By 1774, however, relations had deteriorated and the Moroccan sultan again
attempted to siege Melilla. He held the city for fourteen months 163, but Morocco's
158 Del Pino, p. 10.
159 Rezctte, p. 37.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.,p. 41.
162 Del Pino, p. 35.
163 Ibid. p. 40.
57
attention was diverted to other problems posed by Turkish invasions of Moroccan
territory164 . When the Sultan left Melilla in 1775, Spain interpreted it as
acknowledgement of Spanish sovereignty. Six years later, a treaty established the borders
of Ceuta, but by 1790, Ceuta was suffering its fourth siege by Morocco.
In the early nineteenth century, Melilla, upset with Spanish rule, insisted on self-
government. This lasted for three months until another Moroccan siege threatened.
Rezette notes that "following attacks by the tribes there was a succession of treaties:
Larache on May 6, 1845 dealing with the boundaries of Ceuta and that of August 24,
1859 with those of Melilla." As seems to have been a common practice in the nineteenth
century, the boundaries of Melilla were determined by the distance of a cannon shot165 .
As the agreement was being negotiated, a Moroccan tribe "laid siege to Ceuta" and
the Sultan died 16 6 ; consequently, war broke out in October of 1859 and lasted until April
of the following year, when Great Britain "imposed peace that ended with the Treaty of
Tetouan." In spite of the treaty, however, Riff tribes continued to attack the enclaves and
new treaties concerning boundaries continued to end hostilities for brief periods of time.
Between 1860 and 1894, this pattern occurred twice.
The situation was exacerbated in 1908 when Spain -quested authorization to expand
their territory near Melilla. When Morocco did not agr -) Spain's proposal, Spain took
the land by force and "pretended that it was a temporary occupation the purpose of which
was to prevent contraband in arms." Local tribes began attacking Spanish workers. The
conflicts that had surfaced periodically for centuries came to a head in the Riff War,
which lasted from 1906 to 1926.167
164 Rezete, p. 42.
165 Del Pino, p. 41.
166 Del Pino, p. 41.
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While Spain and Morocco have not been at war since 1926, relations between the
two countries are still characterized by tension and "as recently as 1975 the Spanish
enclaves in North Africa caused significant tension between Spain and Morocco as a
sidelight to the major issue of confrontation in the Spanish Sahara." In February of that
year, bombs placed in the enclaves were responsible for "killing one person and
wounding two. ' 168
The ongoing tension between Spain and Morocco over the North African enclaves is
ironic for several reasons, not the least of which is its similarity to the Gibraltar issue.
However, in this instance, Spain, not Great Britain, plays the part of the colonial power
that refuses to give up its possessions. Further, while Spain has adamantly refused to
cede additional territory in Gibraltar to Britain for protection, it felt no shame in
expanding its territory in the North African enclaves for the same reason. If this were not
irony enough, Spain even suggested the amount of territory be determined with a cannon
shot.
As with Great Britain in the Gibraltar issue, Spain also uses the demographic
argument to support its position in Ceuta and Melilla. According to this line of reasoning,
"the population of these territories is more than 90% Spanish, the original Moroccan
population either having been exterminated or driven out." Not surprisingly, given the
parallel situation in Gibraltar, the fact that the Spaniards were not the original population
"is not emphasized in the official Spanish argument." 16 9
Also parallel to Britain's position on the Gibraltar issue, Spain bases its North
African claims to a large degree on treaties signed between the Bourbons and the Sultans.
167 PoruitL Rictad H., Jr., Spain and Morocco: The Spanish Enclaves in North Africa, Potential
Medineranean Security Dilemma, p. 72, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
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While Spain insists on the validity of these treaties, "the very fact that the treaties were
signed by the Sultans, in many cases after wars, allows the Moroccans to argue with some
legitimacy that these treaties constitute the recognition of the sovereignty of the Sultans
over these cities. '" 170
As in Gibraltar, "the Moroccan population of Ceuta, an indeed of Melilla as well, is
one of the major areas of contention between Spain and Morocco... Specific issues
usually have to do with discrimination, control of the number of legal and illegal
Moroccans that work, live, or own property in the enclaves, and smuggling." Fishing
rights have also been a matter of contention171 .
Just as Spain took the Gibraltar issue before the U.N., Morocco took the Ceuta and
Melilla issue before the U.N. in 1961. In reply to Morocco's request for support in the
Ceuta/Melilla issue, Spain claimed that "the steps taken by the Moroccan Government
constituted 'an attempt to disrupt Spain's national unity and territorial integrity,"' and that
such an attempt was "incompatible with the goals and principles of the United Nations
Charter." Further, from the Spanish point of view, its claim to the territories goes back
further than the Moroccan claim since Morocco did not even achieve independence until
1956. As Rezette notes, however, what Spain tends to forget is "the f a dozen
dynasties that had existed and governed since the eighth century." Thr. situation is
complicated since, as Spain is quick to point out, Spain did not obtain the enclaves by
conquest but from Portugal, and according to the will of its citizens1 72.
If Spain's position on the issue of Ceuta and Melilla is ironic, it is just as ironic that
the issue has come to be linked with the Gibraltar issue. Though King Hassan has ruled
170 Del Pino, p. 14.
171 Del Pino, pp. 185-198.
172 Del Pino, p. 34.
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out "using force to recover them (the Spanish enclaves] or sending a 'Green March' like
the 1975 assemblage when 350,000 Moroccan civilians walked into Western Sahara when
it was still a Spanish colony," 173 he is determined not to allow Spain "to dominate both
sides of the entry to the Mediterranean." The king has, in fact, "declared that the return of
Ceuta and Melilla would not become a major issue until Gibraltar was returned to
Spain." 174
The instability of the situation, then, remains and, if such a thing is possible, has
stabilized somewhat. In reality, the issue has become a political one since Morocco
gained its independence in 1957. Since that time, Ceuta and Melilla have served little
purpose for Spain; their defense value is non-existent 75. Whereas initially, Spain
conquered North Africa to prevent the French from gaining control over the area, the
French no longer pose such a threat1 76. Further, Spain has no need for the enclaves to
serve as points of departure for the conquest of Morocco, since such a policy would no
longer be compatible with international interests or lawl 77 . Economically, the enclaves
have become more of a liability than an asset1 78. Spain's only real concern is that
dialogue with Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla would encourage the Canary Islands,
"which they consider vital not only to Spanish security but to the security of the European
and Atlantic Community, ' 179 to seek to lessen Spanish control.
173 "Moroccans to March to Spanish Enclave of Ceuta to Press Claim," The Reuter Ubrary Report, July
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Geographically, Ceuta and Melilla appear to fall more naturally within Morocco's
territory than within Spain's. The Spaniards would argue that, first, the enclaves are
culturally and socially Spanish 180, and second, that natural boundaries between nations
are not a valid means for determining actual borders - if they were, France would have
been allowed to extend to the Rhein long ago181.
In short, the issue of Ceuta and Melilla is no less complicated than the issue of
Gibraltar. While it is unlikely that Spain and Morocco will resolve the issue militarily,
the two nations will no doubt act in their own best interest. Thus, for example, if it were
impatient, Morocco could help a Spanish blockade on Gibraltar succeed by not allowing
Arab workers to go there, thereby pressuring England into giving up Gibraltar and, in
turn, pressuring Spain into giving up Ceuta and Melilla 182. According to Del Pino,
"[p]reventive military action on Spain's part is possible, but such an attack 'would have
to be totally motivated by politics,' because Spain's prestige would be irreparably
affected and pressures fro.. the West, the Arabs, the Africans, and the U.N. would have
such grave consequences that Spain and its general interests would be in a terrible
state." 183
Because of the negative repercussion any military action on Spain's part would have,
it seems more likely that Spain will eventually either cede C. a and Melilla to Morocco
on the condition that Britain return Gibraltar or, on a more pessimistic note, that other
Spanish internal issues high on the priority list will "unduly shift Spanish national
179 Del Pino, p. 18.
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attention to that crisis issue. This potentially would put Spain in a vulnerable situation in
regard to the enclaves. Any corresponding challenges by Morocco to the status of the
enclaves, either militarily, economically, or socially, could then send shock waves
through Spain, because of the military's close association with the enclave." To date,
however, both Morocco and Spain are holding their own: Morocco is living with a
situation it cannot accept and Spain is living with a situation it refuses to change.
C. THE ARAB NATIONS
In July of 711, an event was to occur which would affect Spain's foreign relations,
customs, and outlook to and beyond the present day. Spain was invaded "by a mixed
force of Arabs and Berbers," who "slashed through Spain in nine years, conquering all
but a few Christian strongholds in the north mountains." Not until 1492, with the fall of
Granada, could Spain say she had totally regained the territory that was hers18 4 . Even so,
during the seven hundred years of Moorish rule, Spain could not help but sustain some
permanent changes. (A chronology of Spain's reconquest comprises Appendix E.)
One effect of the conquest was that Spain learned to fear the Moor, and this fear has
been repeatedly reinforced. In this century for example, the Moors helped General
Franco during the Spanish Civil War. Franco won the war, but in the meantime, "the
atrocities that these troops carried out in Republican villages re-dressed the old nightmare
of the Moorish bogyman in twentieth-century battle-camouflage." Just prior to Franco,
Spain had to face the Moors in the Riff War over the Spanish enclaves and, in more
recent years Spain had to fNe Morocco in the conflict over Western Sahara185.
Most of Spain's encounters with the Arabs, then, have not been happy ones and, in
fact, in Spain, if you "call someone a Moro,... you're calling him a dangerous, conniving
184 Langer, p. 304.
185 McGirk, p. 17.
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savage." The fact that Spain still perceives its primary security threat to be the Arab
nations is evidenced "in the Spanish military academies [where] teachers unscroll plans of
possible Moroccan attack routes for the new cadets.",186
In spite of Spain's fear of its neighbors to the south, however, most Spaniards are
also somewhat "proud of the Moorish fire in their souls. It sets them apart from other
Western Europeans who were never under Arab dominion. 187
Ironically, Spain hoped to play the role of arbiter between the United States, Europe,
and third world nations, to include Arab nations. An example of Spain's strange affinity
for its long-time enemies is evidenced in a statement by - nse Minister Oliart in 1982.
In the debate regarding Spain's membership in NATO, ne "stressed the necessity for
'playing roles in Latin America, North Africa, and the Arab world - with the countries to
which it [Spain] is linked by a common history, such as Morocco.' Foreign Minister
Perez-Llorca expounded on this thought and predicted that NATO entry would give Spain
... greater weight as an interlocutor... I have found in the Arab
countries, with which we maintain manifold relations, an interest in knowing
that they have a friend in NATO and a country which has traditionally listened
to them sensitively and which maintains good relations with them. Of course,
the same applies to the Latin American countries.188
The extent to which the United States and European nations are willing to allow
Spain to serve as an arbiter in dealing with third world nations is uncertain. Nevertheless,
the fact that Spain sees its own role as such may serve as an indicator of Spain's external
interests and foreign policy goals. In addition, Spain's role in European affairs will most
certainly be affected by her own self image. With the prospect of military conflict in the
Middle East lurking in the near future, the fact that Spain's self image encompasses a
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
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unique understanding of the Arab nations may well serve to its advantage as events in
Europe and the Middle East unfold.
D. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH PORTUGAL, THE U.S., AND FRANCE
During the Franco regime and prior to its joining the North Atlantic Alliance, Spain's
general defense situation can be described by two phenomena: isolation and internal
crisis. Traditionally, Spain was a dominant power, both in Europe and in the Americas.
However, by the early 1800s, Spain "had lost almost all the possessions owned by the
Spanish Crown both in Europe and America." Thus, it "turned on itself and withdrew
from the European stage." Spain's isolation can be largely attributed to its loss of
influence, a phenomenon that "distanced Spain from all the current thinking and progress
that had come to the fore in the countries that make up what is known today as the
Western world." Simultaneously, internal crises "culminated in a Civil War (1936-9)",189
which led to Franco's regime.
Following the Civil War, the only bilateral defense agreement Spain had until 1953
was with Portugal. Generally known as the "Iberian Pact," this agreement was signed in
March 1939 and served as a treaty of friendship between the two Iberian nations. It was
"successively ratified in three Additional Protocols signed in 1940, 1948, and 1970,
respectively." 190
The beginning of Franco's regime coincided with the beginning of World War II.
Spain remained neutral and, to a large degree, isolated from European affairs throughout
the war, nevertheless, the, war complicated the European situation and, as such, of
necessity affected Spain. Specifically, since the Soviet Union had supported the Spanish
189 Ibid.
190 Salas Lopez, Femando d. iNos Interesa La OTAN?, p. 5. Madrid, 1981. translated from Spanish by
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Republic, which had lost to Franco, during the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union was
obviously not a friend to Franco. In fact, the two nations did not resume diplomatic
relations (though they did maintain considerable contact) until 1977191. By the same
token, following World War II, Franco found few friends in the European sphere because
his government was seen as a fascist regime that was supported by the axis. As such, it
was a natural enemy to democracy.
While the onset of the Cold War did not ease Spanish/European tensions sufficiently
in European eyes to merit the acceptance of Spain as an ally in the Atlantic Alliance, it
did provide an opportunity for Spain to establish links with the Western world. Thus, as
Wayne C. Thompson notes, "Spain's strategic location brought it into an indirect
relationship with NATO through a series of bilateral defense agreements with the U.S.
beginning in 1953." In September 1953, Spain and the United States signed a defense
agreement that, although less than ideal for both nations, was pragmatic for both. From
Spain's perspective, the agreement signaled "the end to isolation" and the beginning of
what Franco perceived as "substantial help for the survival of his regime." It "provided
Spain with enough economic help to avoid national bankruptcy" and "involved the
provision of a substantial amount of U.S. military equipment and assistance." From the
U.S. perspective, the agreement bolstered Western defense by allowing the U.S. "to
establish military bases in Spain, among them Rota in southwest Spain, Torrejon near
Madrid, Zaragoza, Moron, and some other minor installations." Furthermore, a secret
clause in the 1953 agreement gave the U.S. the right to use the bases in Spanish Territory
to "attack the Soviet Union wvithout previous consultation with the Spanish government."
Angel Vinas, in his article "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges,"
makes further reference to the secret clause in the 1953 agreement. According to Vinas,
the clause stipulated "the possible activation of U.S. military bases in time of war or
191 Adams, Taunara K., "Soviet Relations with and Influence on Spain," (unpublished)
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emergency" and "gave the United States carte blanche but left the Spanish government
little scope for action." 192
Subsequent agreements between Spain and the United States which led, ultimately, to
Spain's unique, if limited, role in the North Atlantic Alliance were signed on 6 August
1970, 19 July 1974, and 21 September 1976. The Spanish-American Treaty of
Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1976, was of particular importance. The following
characteristics of the treaty are especially pertinent:
" The treaty promised to contribute to the solution of the colonial act of
Gibraltar.
• The treaty did not pertain to a military alliance and specified that Spain was
not obligated to take part, either directly or indirectly, in situations of
conflict in the Mediterranean that did not affect her national interests. In
relation to NATO, it hoped to bring a higher level of security, both for
Spain and for the nations that form the Atlantic bloc. Even though Spain
had not established a defensive alliance, it pledged a defensive relationship
to NATO.
* The Agreement of 1970 was converted to this treaty following
parliamentary approbation by both nations.
• The Spanish-North American Council was responsible for supervising the
application of the treaty.
* In addition, the ad hoc commission existed for coordination with NATO.
* When the treaty was signed, the Spanish Ministry of Defense had not yet
been created.
• The treaty provided for the lessening of risks to include nuclear weapons
and airplanes.
" Military help consisted of 600 million dollars credit over a period of five
years and a donation of 75 million dollars. A contribution of 50 million
dollars for Red Alert and Control and 10 million dollars for training was
also specified.
" The U.S. promised to give Spain the technical data necessary for production
of defensive material in Spain.
* The U.S. and Spain committed to negotiate the establishment of a Spanish-
North American Center for Solar Energy.
* The treaty specified that Spanish bases were not to be employed in
localized conflictmas, for example, in the Middle East.
* The Rota-Zaragoza oil duct was authorized for U.S. use and the U.S. agreed
to deliver three generous petroleum deposits to the Spanish government by
19 December, 1978.193
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Franco's tenure as dictator was also characterized by an Agreement of Military
Cooperation Between the Government of the Spanish State and the Government of the
French Republic, signed on 22 June 1970. The roots of the this agreement lie, according
to the preamble, in the geographical relationship the two nations share, since both have
access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Hence, the purpose of the agreement was to
ensure friendly relations through cooperation and exchanges between the Armed Forces.
For example, they agreed jointly to produce military materials, organize joint maneuvers,
promote both personnel and unit exchanges, and arrange industrial cooperation and
technical assistance1 94 .
E. SPAIN AND NATO
1. The NATO Debate
a. Benefits of NATO Membership
According to Gary Prevost, "the Spanish NATO debate began on June 15,
1980, when Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja, in a major policy speech, declared 'the
necessity of Spanish membership in NATO before 1983."' Those in favor of NATO
membership at the beginning of the debate naturally focussed on what they perceived as
the benefits such membership would have. For example, Oreja linked "NATO
memberships and integration into the European Economic Community and the regaining
of sovereignty over Gibraltar from the British." Domestic concerns also, no dout.,
motivated NATO accession. As Vinas notes in the following excerpt:11
Fist, it is probable that the government felt that participation in the
Alliance would take the armed forces out of their ideological and emotional
ghetto, by offering them many attractive professional opportunities and
providing a special reason for the continuance of necessary technical and
organizational reforms. However, this argument was never made explicit.
Second, given the growing disintegration of the UCD, the NATO issue might
19 Salas Lopez, p. 152-54.
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have served for some time as an element of self-identification and unity within
certain sectors of the party. Third, it was believed that if Spain under the UCD
government did not accede to NATO, a Socialist or Socialist-supported
government would be very unwilling to countenance such a move... Forecasts
of forthcoming regional elections did show that the UCD would not fare
well. 195
NATO membership was seen by some, then, as a means of preventing
military coups such as the attempted coup in 1981.
Salas Lopez further notes possible advantages NATO membership may
have meant for proponents. Politically, NATO membership meant greater identification
with the West and the possibility of "having a voice in the decision-making organs of
Europe." 196
Militarily, NATO membership signified "better actualization of doctrinal
concepts, methods of combat, unit organization, and logistic development." Furthermore,
Spaniards in favor of NATO membership saw it as a possibility to "augment
infrastructure in our territory" and to modernize Spanish Armed Forces 197. Defense of
the Canary Islands and better protection of Spanish air space were also seen as
advantages.
Economically, advocates of Spain joining NATO hoped for more
opportunities for technological advancement; "a better yield from expenses dedicated to
defense; development of military industries and defense relations; and increased
coproduction, etc." 198.
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b. The Anti-NATO Movement
For every argument in favor of joining NATO, however, the opposition had
an argument for staying out. In the eyes of many Spaniards, NATO and the U.S. were
inseparable, and anti-American sentiments in Spain date back at least to the Spanish-
American war of 1898. Such sentiments have been periodically exacerbated by events
such as "the accidental fall of a nuclear bomb from an airplane off the Spanish
Mediterranean coast on 7 January 1966,"199 and Kissinger's pragmatic renewal of the
bilateral treaty immediately following "a series of political executions" by Franco, an
event that some European leaders condemned by recalling ambassadors and appealing
"for 'clemency' on behalf of those executed.' 200
In addition to their anti-American sentiments, opponents of NATO
membership felt that "Spain's membership would disrupt the East-West balance of power
and increase the chances of new conflicts." They questioned whether Spain could afford
the expense of membership and whether it would be "better to wait to join until the
defense of Europe is completely in the hands of the Europeans, free of all dependence on
the United States." 20 1
While proponents of joining NATO supported the view that belonging to
the Alliance would reduce the prospect of military coups and increase the prospect of
Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, opponents argued that "NATO is not a 'vaccination'
that would render a country immune to military coups" as evidenced in Greece and
Turkey and that "since Britain is more powerful than Spain, NATO would always support
the United Kingdom on the'issue of Gibraltar. "20 2
199 Alba, p. 100.
200 Ibid., pp. 100-101.
201 Ibid.
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Some opponents cited that "the expansion of NATO would not accord with
the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act; others argued that the nuclear umbrella would not
extend to Ceuta and Melilla, that Spain could become "a nuclear target in time of war,"
and that nothing would "be gained from NATO membership that was not already
provided by the bilateral agreement with the United States." The possibility of
"militarization" was seen by some as a negative effect of joining the Alliance. Others felt
NATO membership should be used as a bargaining chip to secure Gibraltar and entry into
the European Community.203
Of course, the Soviet Union attempted to pressure the Spanish government
into staying out of NATO. The first Soviet Foreign Minister to visit Spain after a thirty-
eight-year break in diplomatic relations (Gromyko) chose Spanish membership in NATO
as one of the principal topics for discussion 204 . Further, "according to a Spanish weekly,
a Soviet leader proposed aid, in the fight against the ETA and its terrorism.., if Spain
would stay out of NATO."205
Based on the anti-NATO arguments discussed above, leaders of the PCE
and other organizations to the left of the PSOE organized an anti-NATO movement. The
movement mobilized for the first time in January of 1981 when "20,000 persons marched
12 kilometers from Madrid to the American military base at Torrejon." The
demonstration has become an annual event and has continued to grow in size (within four
years the size of the crowd had multiplied by a factor of five).
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With the anti-NATO movement, the Spanish debate was well underway
and was, it seems, characterized by the same kind of ambivalence that characterized
Spain's transition to democracy. As Treverton notes, "on the one hand there is the
yearning for Spain to be a full member of Europe and of the club of industrial
democracies. On the other, however, there is the feeling that Spain, still removed from
the clash of forces in Central Europe, has little to fear from the East and little to gain by
more direct participation in 'Europe's' quarrels."206
c. The Decision to Join
In spite of growing opposition to Spanish accession to NATO, and the UCP
government's "weak parliamentary base," Parliament approved the decision to join
NATO in October 1981207, and the government under Soelo accelerated "the process of
accession to the Atlantic Alliance." The explanation for what appeared to some as a rash
decision has never been fully revealed. Only five days after Spain had officially joined
the Alliance, questions such as the following ran rampant:
Was the government rushing into NATO because its election defeat in
Andalusia meant it was in danger of collapse? Was it expecting trouble because of the
sentences about to be imposed on the officers who organized last year's abortive coup?
Or was it simply cashing in on the military spirit generated by a week of propaganda in
praise of the armed forces, which had saturated the media and added shellshock to the
hazards of watching Spanish television?20s
206 Treveron. Gregory F. Spain: Domestic Politics and Security Policy, p. 5, Adelphi Paper 204,
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208 Economist, "Ask Not Only What Spain Can Do For NATO...". pp. 4748, June 5. 1982.
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According to The Economist, Spain's primary reason for joining NATO
was Sotelo's genuine support for the Alliance. Joining it was, in his opinion, "his greatest
political achievement."'2o9
Regardless of why Spain joined NATO, the decision, as Treverton notes,
probably "owed as much to reasons of tactics and domestic politics as it did to
calculations of foreign-policy interest." The decision had been made and Spain was left
with the challenge of dealing with the decision. Alba lists four circumstances that "made
Spain's entry into NATO... a special case:"
• It is the first country to join NATO since 1955. It therefore is in the
position of dealing with a working institution without having the advantage,
as did the founding members, of being able to influence its structure.
" Its joining did not take place either during a Cold War Period, as was the
case when the alliance was founded, or during an age of detente, as was the
case during the following years, but rather during a time of hesitation,
disorientation, and absence of specific international policies and clearly
defined objectives.
* Spain joined NATO after many years of dictatorship, during which it was
somewhat shunned by the organization. Therefore, the Spanish expect
more from the alliance than it probably can offer, such as protection against
right-wing coups, in spite of the examples to the contrary in the instances of
Greece and Turkey.
* Outside of the context of NATO, the United States maintained special
relations with the Spanish dictatorship. The anti-Americanism in
democratic Spain that resulted from those relations has extended to the
alliance. 2 10
While the Socialists opposed NATO membership based at least partly on its
lack of public appeal in addition to other perceived problems, they "were unwilling, for
domestic political reasons, to bring down the government." Hence, they proceeded to
oppose NATO membership through legal means.
In particular, the Socialists capitalized on the volatile nature of the NATO
debate in the 1982 election campaign. Thus, two major points characterized the PSOE's
209 Ibid.
210 Alba p. 97.
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electici platform. First, the PSOE promised to "suspend integration into NATO's
military structure." Second, they piomised that, if they won the upcoming election, they
"would call for a referendum on Spanish membership in NATO." 211
d. The Referendum
In October 1982, just five months after Spain's entry into the Atlantic
Alliance, Felipe Gonzalez, representing the PSOE, won the general elections. The new
Socialist Government faced several challenges regarding the direction Spanish security
would take. Sr. Don Narcis Serra has identified three key objectives the new government
hoped to meet. First, Gonzalez was faced with "giving a new structure to the Ministry of
Defence, reorganizing the air force, providing it with improved equipment and making it
fully operative within an overall project of defence policy"; second, he was challenged
with "working out a security policy;" and third, he hoped to resolve the issue of "how to
structure Spain's defences in relation to Western Security." How to handle Spain's new
membership in NATO would certainly determine how each of these objectives would be
met.
While some members of the PSOE were in favor of leaving the Alliance,
others recognized that "choosing not to enter and deciding to leave NATO" were based
on two different frames of reference 212 . By 1984 some members of the FSOE Executive
Committee even supported NATO membership2 13. Even Felipe Gonzalez's perspective
changed once he saw "the realities of power." Whereas he had stated in 1976 that
"NATO is nothing but a military superstructure implanted by the Americans in order to
guarantee the survival of th capitalist system,"2 14 he came to support Spain's "continued
211 Ibid.
212 Vinas,"Spain and NATO," p. 162.
213 Sacwhez-Gijon, p. 111.
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membership in NATO." Furthermore, he communicated the following reasons for his
new perspective to the voting populace:
Spain could not live isolated. In particular, PSOE members "defend their
change of heart by arguing that since Spain is [became] a member of the
Common Market, it has [incurred] a moral obligation to contribute to the
defense of its partners."Z15
* The Alliance strengthens Spain's economic and technological relations.
According to Gabriel Jackson, "party technocrats believe modernization of
the Spanish economy depends on increased investment in high technology,
and that requires access to military technology and capital which only
NATO countries can offer. 216
* Neutrality is impossible for Spain.217
Nevertheless, in spite of Gonzalez's and the PSOE's new perspective, they
could not forget their promise to the voters in 1982 to hold a referendum regarding
Spain's NATO membership. Thus, "during 1984 the Spanish government gradually
developed the policy of linking the EEC question with the NATO issue" and in October
1984, Gonzalez "announced a ten-point defence programme which included, among other
things, continuation of Spanish NATO membership without participation in the integrated
military structures, the opening of talks with the USA for the reduction of their military
presence in Spain, the non-nuclearisation of the Spanish territory, and consideration of the
possibility of Spain's joining the Western European Union." 218
Based on Gonzalez's apparent turnaround, some doubted whether he would
honor his promise to hold a referendum and, again, the referendum issue fostered
ambivalence in Spain. According to D. Eduardo Serra Rexach, the referendum was
214 Ibid.





necessary for three reasons. First, "while the averagc Spaniard has for years identified
Europe with democracy and political pluralism, it has not been the same with NATO or
even with Spain's bilateral agreements with the United States." This is due, in many
cases, to what Spaniards perceived as U.S. support to the Franco regime. Second, Rexach
asserts that many in Spain remember "the advantages of neutrality." "Finally," as Rexach
points out, "one must remember that Spain was not liberated by the Allied Forces, as
were the other European Countries at the end of World War II. Unlike these countries,
Spain did not receive all of the benefits of the Marshall Plan, nor did it sign the
Washingto,. Treaty in '949, which crystallized a defense policy closely pursued by
Europeans in order to face the Soviet advances of 1945-1948."219
Serra was not alone in arguing for a referendum regarding the NATO issue
in Spain. In fact arguments both for and against the referendum were prevalent. Vinas
listed several arguments for both positions. According to him, the arguments supporting
a referendum included the following:
* Failure to hold the referendum would damage the PSOE's prestige and,
consequently, that of any party aspiring to hold office. In a country that had
only recently become a parliamentary democracy, non-adherence to a
solemn commitment might considerably harm the credibility of the
incipient democratic political class.
* Any damage done to the PSOE's prestige would be detrimental to the
nation (not just the party) given the PSOE's pledge to undertake a thorough
modernization of Spain.
If the Spanish people, under the proper guidance of the government, were to
support the government in the referendum, this would make it possible to
develop security policy in the future on a much firmer basis. It would also
help to get rid of the NATO issue, thus ending all the strife that it had
caused.
Weighty arguments against holding the referendum included:
No other country had ever had a referendum on NATO membership.
(Against this position, it was argued that the referendum was part of the
process of Spanish accession, and that in other countries NATO had not
been so consistently questioned as in Spain.
219 1bid.
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* The government might not be able to carry the majority of the nation with
it, which would give rise to a politically delicate situation.
* A problematic situation would be even more likely if the right-wing
opposition voted 'no' in the referendum, or abstained.
• The referendum campaign and the referendum itself would cause
considerable turmoil in Spanish society if the majority parties failed to
reestablish a minimal consensus on the basic principles of security
policy.220
Other arguments against the referendum included the following:
" Spanish withdrawal from NATO due to the negative outcome of a
referendum "might strain Western unity and encourage similar action by
others." 221
" As Gonzalez warned, withdrawal "would embarrass Spain with its new
Common Market trading partners, cause a breech in relations with
Washington and even lead to 'instability '", 222
Fears regarding the outcome of the referendum were compounded by
Spain's internal political situation. Specifically, even though the Popular Alliance party
supported continued membership in NATO, its leaders did not want to support the PSOE
decision to hold a referendum. Thus, its leaders advised constituents to refrain from
voting in the referendum. In spite of fears regarding the outcome of a referendum due to
both those opposed to Spain's membersidp in NATO and those who were either
indifferent or could be expected consciously to refrain from voting, the Spanish
government opted to hold a referendum. Thus, on 12 March 1986, it became a reality.
Fortunately, "against the forecasts of nearly all public-opinion polls taken days earlier, at
the polling booths, Spaniards who favored remaining in NATO outnumbered those who
advocated taking Spain out of the Atlantic Alliance.",223
220 Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 169.
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2. Implications of NATO Membership
a. The Spanish Perspective
The 1986 referendum served to strengthen the Spanish decision to join
NATO and thus dispelled, at least to some degree, the intense debate that had surrounded
the issue for so long. Even so, the Spanish perspective towards memt 1.,:hip is unique
and merits attention. Since Spain is far from being a homogeneous nation, this section
will describe five aspects of Spain's perspective: political, territorial, economic, internal,
and defense-related.
Politically, as previously mentioned, the PSOE has adopted a pro-NATO
stance that is only moderated by "the deep-seated opposition of the Spanish people to
military alliances and the relatively low salience of harsh anti-Soviet themes in Spanish
politics." As Prevost notes, "by just about any standard, the Spanish populace turns up as
more pacifist, less anti-Soviet, and more anti-American than any other European
country." The political difficulties that have surrounded Spanish accession to the
Alliance are particularly significant since Spain's decision to join seems to have been
based more on political issues than on military concerns.
Prior to the referendum, advocates of Spain's membership su - sted that
continued affiliation with the Alliance would "strengthen the democrat ystem in
Spain." From a political perspective, such would seem to be the case since "not only
would Spanish defense be boosted, but its officers would be brought into closer contact
with foreign officers who ire committed to democracy and civilian rule." In addition,
William Heiberg lists three other political objectives that characterize Spain's perspective
on NATO membership:
* Increasing influence in Europe according to Spanish .radition,
* Gaining independence from the United States, and
* Promoting interests outside of NATO.
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For example, Spain has traditionally perceived itself as the mediator
between Latin America, the Arab nations, and Europe. From a political perspective,
Spain would claim to have gained greater influence in this realm.224
Spain's territorial objectives that it hopes to meet through the Atlantic
Alliance include regaining sovereignty over Gibraltar225 , guaranteeing protection of
Ceuta and Melilla, its African enclaves, and insuring "Spanish command over maritime
areas," an objective that, given Portugal's interests in the area, is quite sensitive226 .
Just as Spain hopes to promote Latin American and Middle Eastern
interests within the North Atlantic Alliance, it has made it clear that it will not "allow its
bases to be used for operations" against those states "it considers friendly." 227
If Spain's territorial interests differ from those of other Alliance members,
so does its economic position. According to Heiberg, Spain's economic objectives which
it hopes to fulfill through through its membership in NATO initially included improving
its prospects for entering the EEC and strengthening the general economy. Spain's
acceptance into the EEC may or may not have been influenced by its decision to remain
in NATO; its concern with economic crisis remains a primary aspect of the nation's
perspective. Whether or not NATO has helped or hindered the Spanish economy is
debatable. On the one hand the Spanish economy's technological and productive
dependence on more developed Western nation "tends to increase Spain's vulnerability
vis-a-vis external pressures." On the other hand, the referendum tended to push the
NATO debate into the background of political awareness, thus freeing Gonzalez "to tend
224 Heiberg. pp. 32-34.
225 Thompson, p. 457.
226 Heiberg, pp. 34, 35.
227 Economist, "Ask Not Only What Spain Can Do For NATO...", pp. 47-48.
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to the country's ailing economy." Whether or not NATO has helped Spain handle its
economic problems, cooperation with the West is generally perceived as an economic
priority in Spain.
Spain's internal objectives relative to its NATO membership include
stabilizing its democracy and avoiding deployment of nuclear weapons. These objectives
concur with Spain's traditional concerns. As previously noted, Spain is traditionally more
concerned with internal violence than that from any exterral threat. Furthermore, "when
Spaniards do talk of external threats, the discussion is usually vague but the assumption is
always that it will come from the South." 228
One persisting internal threat in Spain is that of terrorism. Mikhlin
suggests that Spain's NATO affiliation has assisted in the war against terrorism. He
points out that, whereas the PSOE was unsuccessful in its attempts to induce France's
cooperation in "tackling the problem of terrorism,... Paris suddenly changed its position"
in 1983. According to El Pais, cooperation between the two nations may have had some
basis in Spain's membership in the Alliance, since other NATO countries could,
conceivably, have pressured France into cooperating229 .
Spain's internal character is different from most other NATO members in
yet another aspect that rises from its traditional emphasis on internal violence over any
external threats. Spanish citizens, by and large, fear the army. Paradoxically, "the media
feel obliged to flatter the generals frequently and tell them how much everyone loves
them." It stands to reason that Spain's perspective of defense, then, also differs from that
of most other Alliance members.
As stated previously, Spain's reasons for joining NATO did not revolve
around any perception of a threat from the Warsaw Pact. In short, while Spain's defense
228 Treverton, p. 16.
229 Mikhfin, I., "Under Pro-Atlantic Pressure," New Times 35, p. 9, 1984.
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objective is "to enhance Spain's defensive posture, Spanish objectives appear to be
virtually unrelated to the defensive purposes of the Alliance." Nevertheless, since joining
NATO, Spain has encouraged its military officers to "acquire modem military skills' 230
and has attempted "to bring the Spanish defense structure into line with patterns already
tested in neighboring Western countries, [and] to make the armed forces more
professional, effective, and streamlined. '23 1
That Spain is concerned with defense is evidenced by its interest in
purchasing military equipment such as the SORAS 6, an instrument used to locate enemy
artillery systems232. Even so, to date, Spain has shown no interest in becoming a part of
NATO's integrated military structure233 . While the Right postulates that the Spanish
government is "depriving the country of the NATO 'security umbrella' by keeping Spain
out of the bloc's military organization,"2 34 it seems unlikely that Spain will change its
posture in the near future. North Africa remains, in Spanish eyes, a more viable threat
than does the Soviet Union 235 .
b. The Alliance Perspective
Thus far, this section has focused primarily on the Spanish perspective of
NATO membership. What about the Alliance perspective? According to Salas Lopez, a
230 Thompson, p. 456.
231 Heiberg, pp. 40 41.
232 Foss, Chr;soj.her F., "Spain Orders SORAS 6 Plus Simulator," Jane's Defense Weekly, p. 690, 9
April 1988.
233 Piquer, p. 328.
234 Mikhin, p. 8.
235 Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz, "Spanish Security Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Implications for
Long-term Defense Planning," draft of a panel discussion "Implications for Spain" held at the
International Conference of the Asociacion de Periodiztas Europeos, p. 7, Toledo, Spain, December 1989.
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possible concern within the Alliance is that, due to Spain's unique perception regarding
defense, it would not be willing to defend central Europe in the event of an East-West
conflict 236. Further, Spain's determination "to reduce American military forces in the
country" and to keep nuclear weapons off of Spanish soil237 cannot help but be of some
concern to NATO.
Other issues and concerns within NATO are not peculiar to the Spanish
situation. Burdensharing, strategic deterrence, and host nation support rank high on the
list of general concerns. Though some concerns are inevitable, however, Treverton
suggests that "the NATO perspective on Spanish memrnership, like Spain's own, is
dominated by politics." He further asserts that "the Alliance sought Spanish accession
more in order to symbolize Spain's joining the West than for any military advantage that
it might bring." 23 8
Since Spain has joined NATO, the challenge has been more one of how to
accommodate both Spanish and NATO political concerns than anything else. NATO, as
Treverton suggests, is primarily concerned with maintaining its own integrity and Spain is
only of concern in light of its potential, given its rejection of full integration, to
"encourage centrifugal tendencies within the Alliance." Generally, however, Victor
Alba'> percept. of NATO's position on Spanish .nembership seems to be the most
accurate. According to Alba, "NATO's position... has been one of essential
indifference." 239
236 Saln Loe p. 214.
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Whether or not Spain has been of concern to NATO, it would be a mistake
to overlook Spain's potential as an alliance member. Vinas argues that the most valuable
contribution Spain could make in the event of a conflict may be to secure "its own
national interest," since Spain shares NATO's concern for "ensuing the defence of the
destination points of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) from the United States to
central and southern Europe as well as of the oil route and the sea routes that go through
the Straits of Gibraltar." However, Spain could also be useful in performing "logistical
and reinforcement functions within NATO's overall strategy of European defence," as
well as in "providing access to aeronaval bases and infrastructure and logistical systems."
Should Spain decide to become part of NATO's integrated military structure, then, both
its strategic position and its manpower and material resources could contribute to
NATO's ability to defend itself against potential aggressors. Even more importantly,
Spain's membership has the potential of increasing "NATO's dissuasive value.' 240
If Spain is to reach any or all of her potentials as a member of the North
Atlantic Alliance, it stands to reason that her objectives must coincide with the objectives
of the Alliance as a whole. In some, though not all, cases, a definite correlation exists
between NATO's objectives and Spain's contributions or potential. For example, one of
NATO's primary objectives is "tow demonstrate the solidarity and health of the
Alliance." It seems fair to assert that Spain has, at least initially, assisted NATO in
meeting this objective. Other NATO objectives include enhancing "deterrence through a
more credible combat posture," maintaining "current NATO boundaries," respecting the
"sensitivities of all member nations," encouraging "the development of members'
democratic institutions," preserving "the integrity of NATO," limiting "costs to the
Alliance," and developing "the capability to combat terrorism." Sensitivities that must be
addressed with regard to these objectives include Britain's claim to Gibraltar and
240 Alba. p. 110.
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Portugal's command jurisdiction. In light of Spain's thriving democracy and greater
cooperation with France regarding terrorism, however, it seems that Spain has contributed
enough to NATO's objectives to be considered a valuable member of the Alliance.
As with Spain, U.S. objectives should both enhance NATO's objectives as
a whole and contribute to the objectives of other member countries, including Spain.
Because of the U.S. role in the Alliance, it seems beneficial to review some of the U.S.'s
major objectives to enhance understanding of the Alliance perspective regarding Spain.
Heiberg lists U.S. objectives as follows:
• To enhance the capability of the Alliance...
* To prepare for contingencies outside of NATO...
* To coordinate the Allied response to armed conflicts outside of NATO...
• To increase the European share of the NATO burden...
* To avoid massive increases in U.S. military assistance...
* To better integrate U.S. and NATO war planning...
* To protect bilateral relationships with other nations. 24 1
Given these objectives and the various perspectives this paper has
attempted to bring to light regarding the implications of Spain's membership in the
Atlantic Alliance, Spain's actual role in the Alliance becomes an important consideration.
Following, then, is a discussion of Spanish contributions to NATO.
3. Spanish Role in the Alliance
a. Spanish Contributions
Clearly, Spain could contribute more to NATO if it were integrated into the
military command. Initially, NATO hoped to incorporate Spain into contingency plans,
even though, as reported in the Economist in 1982, "its 225,000-man army is [was]
oriented more toward parades, the imposition of martial law and skirmishes with
Moroccans than towards defence against the Warsaw Pact.' -2
241 rbid., pp. 26-30.
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In spite of Spain's refusal to join NATO's integrated military structure,
"Spain's willingness to act as a staging and transit area in support of the SACEUR Rapid
Reinforcement Plan... adds a new, still undefined dimension to AFSOUTH's rapid
reinforcement planning." In addition, according to a Eurogroup publication, Spain has
agreed to contribute "to the common defense" by assuming the following roles outside
the integrated military structure:
* Prevention of occupation of the Spanish territory;
• Naval and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic;
* Control of the Straits of Gibraltar and its approaches;
* Naval and air operations in the Western Meditenanean;
* Air space control and air defense in the Spanish area of responsibility and
cooperation with the adjacent areas. This will include air surveillance and
all kinds of air defense operations;
Utilization of the Spanish territory as a transit, support, and rear logistic
area.243
As the following chart (also taken from the Eurogo.,p publication 244)
indicates, Spanish military contributions, though generally downplayed because of
Spain's special role in the Alliance, are worthy of note.
NAVY
Conventional submarines: 8
Major surface combatants: 22
Mine counter-measure vessels: 12
Other naval vessels: 22
Support vessel: I
















Fighter bomber/ground attack: 12 squadrons
Maritime patrol: 2 squadrons
Refuelling tankers: I squadron
Transport: 9 squadrons
Search and rescue: 3 squadrons
Reconnaissance: I squadron
While it is obvious, given Spain's troop positioning. that Spain perceives
Morocco as its primary threat, it is also true that "continental contingencies are not being
ignored." Provisions for such contingencies include "the establishment of a new armored
cavalry tigade and a new fighter-wing - equipped with the latest F-18 fighters."
Further, Spain seems gradually to be cooperating more with NATO's military forces in
other areas. For example, the Spanish Navy is concentrating on updating its frigate
fleet245 and has participated in joint maritime operations with Britain, thus "assuming a
wider naval role within NATO." 246
Spain's geostrategic position can also be considered a contribution to the
Alliance. It "constitutes a rear guard position of support for the Rhine, the Po, and the
Loire. It is also a forward American port in Europe and the European antechamber of the
South Atlantic routes. Finally, it occupies a very special position in the
Mediteranean."2 7
245 Gallego. Fermin, "Spanish Update Plans Detailed," Jane's Defense Weekly. p. 418. 10 March 1990.
246 jne's Defense Weekly, "Spain. UK Team Up For NATO's 'Sharp Spear 89'," p. 563, 23 September
1989.
247 Alba. p. 107.
86
b. Problems
Although Spain has definitely made progress in the political, economic, and
security arenas since its transition to democracy and subsequent decision to join NATO,
its role in the Alliance is certainly not without problems. Some of these problems, such
as Spain's conflict with Britain over Gibraltar, anti-U.S. sentiment, the amount of
economic commitment NATO membership requires, "the resolution of competing
Spanish and Portuguese interests in the Atlantic, ' 248 and Spain's concern that its enclaves
in Morocco be protected have already been discussed. However, several other problems
characterize Spain's role in the Atlantic Alliance. For example, as Vinas points out,
Spain is geographically vulnerable. He adds that "many of these vulnerabilities do not
directly affect the purely military aspect of security, but they do have a bearing upon its
political, economic, and social dimensions. These are very important since they shape
people's perceptions of governmental efficiency and ability."
249
Another problem Spain has had to confront deals with defense information
proliferation. The publicity which Spain's accession to NATO naturally attracted
fostered the "trivialization" of Spanish defense issues. Hence, whereas Spanish citizens
had little opportunity to shape their nation's defense policies prior to the referendum, the
right to participate in defense decisions has come to be expected. As a result, public
debate and ambivalence can be expected to continue. 250
Regardless of the existence of problems and challenges for Spain regarding
its role in the Alliance, how it handles those problems is more important and can be
expected to influence Spain's future security situation.
248 Heiberg, p. 36.
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F. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AND INFLUENCE ON SPAIN
1. Historical Perspective: Soviet Relations with Spain During the Spanish
Civil War
Prior to the Spanish Civil War and the events immediately preceding it, Russian
and, later, Soviet interaction with Spain was primarily limited to mutual colonial
interests25 1 or other less direct contact. Just prior to the Spanish Civil War, however, the
Soviet Union became directly involved in Spanish affairs. The complexity of peripheral
events in the same time period make it difficult to interpret Soviet motivations and
influence on Spain. -hat the oviet Union influenced events in Spain in some manner is
hardly disputable.
Rubinstein, in The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union enumerated three possible
motivations for Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War. According to Rubinstein,
the USSR may have hoped to establish a Soviet Republic, a view which Germany, Italy,
and "many conservative and reactionary European circles" 252 supported. On the other
hand, Moscow may have hoped to postpone Nazi expansion into the Soviet Union by
involving "Western democracies in a war with the fascist states." A third possibility,
espoused by the pro-Communists, is that the Soviet Union supported the Republicans in
the Spanish Civil War because of "a desire to strengthen the principle of collective
security and thereby halt the spread of fascism. '" 25 3
There is, doubtless, some truth to all of the possible motives that have been
attributed to the Soviet Union; all have been argued convincingly. The events
0
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immediately preceding the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, however, indicate that
Soviet involvement was probably not as defensive as some might suspect. In 1931,
Manuel Azana was the leader of the pro-Marxian Republic Action party. With the birth
of the Spanish Republic, Azana, the Marxian Socialists, the Anarcho-Syndicalists and
other important unions, and some of the Progressive Republicans gained strength and
"dominated the drafting of the 1931 constitution."'254
From 1932 through 1933, the Spanish government was pro-Soviet and was itself
"oriented along Marxist lines," as exemplified by a Socialist Manifesto dated 17 July
1932. The document made it clear that, according to its authors, "the revolutionary
movement is not yet over." (The document's accuracy was strangely ironic, as October
1933 marked the date of the last free election Spain was to have until its attempt to
support democracy again over forty years later.) In 1933, the anti-Marxist coalition won
the elections, a victory that incensed the leader of Spain's Socialist party, Largo
Caballero. Caballero, along with the Communists and the Anarcho-Syndicalists, "led
riots and strikes which helped prevent the appointment of the anti-Communist Gil Robles
as Premier, with the result that the milder Lerroux was made head of the cabinet." Leftist
groups, including youth groups and Marxist militias formed to "defend the republic" and
were opposed by the newly-formed Spanish Fascist group. In 1934, Caballero and his
followers on the left revolted when three individuals who represented contrary interests
joined the cabinet. According to Bouscaren, the new cabinet members made "a perfectly
normal and parliamentary move'2 55 by joining the cabinct, but it went beyond the
tolerance level of the left.
254 BouscarenAnthony T., Imperial Communism, p. 189, Public Affairs Press, 1953.
255 Ibid., p. 190.
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In support of the revolt, "French and Russian ships landed ammunition and the
First Soviet Republic of Spain was proclaimed, with its seat in Oviedo, Asturias.
Currency and stamps were issued bearing the hammer and sickle insignia" and, according
to Bouscaren, "the left lost every shred of moral authority to condemn the rebellion of
1936" with this rebellion. The Communist International, basking in the fruits of the 1934
rebellion, noted that "the workers of Asturias fought for Soviet power under the
leadership of the Communist Party. '" 56
Though the Ccmmunists and their supporters failed in their attempt to establish
a Soviet state, they were not beaten. Instead, they helped form the Popular Front, which
insisted on new elections. Spain's president, Zamora, bowed to the Popular Front's
demands and scheduled elections for 15 February 1936. The outcome of the elections is
not clear - the anti-Marxist coalition won the overall election, but the Popular Front
could not agree with the anti-Marxists over how many seats each would get in the cabinet.
In the midst of the disagreement, "President Zamora asked Azana to take over the
premiership," but Azana protested and "proceeded to appoint a commission to 'verify' the
election, with the result that forty more anti-Marxists were deprived of their seats and
reolaced by members of the Popular Front, some of whom had not even run for office in
first place.257
As the following quotation indicates, after the Popular Front gained control, any
hope for democracy in Spain was gone:
The "election" of 1936 was the death blow struck at the Spanish
Republic not by Fascism, as some have held, but by the partisans of Soviet
power. Constitutiona'government and parliamentarism was dying, and the left
admitted as much. Following the seizure of power by the Popular Front, the
Marxist daily Claridad commented: "We are approaching the ultimate
implications of our electoral triumph. Shall we return to legality as the Rightists
demand? To what legality? We know no law but that of revolution.' 258
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid., p. 19 1.
90
The 1936 election and the events that followed can be seen as the watershed
from which the Civil War was to spring. In March 1936, "Soviet and other agents began
arriving in Spain. ... On April 2 0 th a party of Russian Communists passed through Paris
on their way to Spain, and were granted every courtesy by the Popular Front ambassador
there." On 16 May, the Soviet Ambassador, the Comintern representative, Caballero, and
the Stalinist SociZIict Alvarez del Vayo held a meeting in which they "planned to
transform the Popular Front into a Communist-dominated regime capable of holding the
Iberian peninsula in the interests of Soviet power." In accordance with this plan, a coup
was planned for 25 July.
In the meantime, the Popular Front successfully replaced Zamora with Azana.
Violence between the right and the left ran rampant in Madrid.
In spite of the violence, a few members of Spain's political right groups stayed
in the parliament and tried to help restore order and constitutionalism. One such
ind.iidual was Calvin Sotelo, who "made speech after speech demanding resteration of
public order, and listing the number of people killed, buildings and churches fired, and
other terrorist activities." Following such a speech on 7 July, the Communist
parliamentary leader threatened Sotelo by telling him that he had just spoken his last
speech. It was no surprise, then, when on 2 July, Sotelo was taken by government police,
who "worked him over and dumped his body at one of Madrid's outlying cemeteries early
the next morning." Sparked by Sotelo's assassination, the Nationalist revolution started
on 17 July. As Bouscaren tiotes, "[h]is murder, threatened by a government deputy and
carried out by the government police, was a signal that there was no longer room for an
opposition party, and that only force could assert the will of the majority as expressed on
February 15 th.' 259
258 Ibid.
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While Bouscaren's explanation of what provoked the Spanish Civil War sounds
plausible enough, it is by no means the only explanation. As Hugh Seton-Watson points
out, "[t]he Spanish war was represented as a new version of religious war. European
civilization was being defended against Red bestiality, or democracy was being defended
against Fascist terror, depending on your point of view." 260
Vinas, on the other hand, is content to explain the beginnings and direction of
the Spanish Civil War as follows:
The February 1936 general election was won by centre-left and left-
wing parties grouped in a 'Popular Front' coali " on. The new government...
was formed by republicans and attempted once in, to pass reforms that
previously had been blocked. This was enough -some powerful groups in the
army and the civilian right to intensify their actv Lies leading to a coup d'etat on
17 July 1936. A new Popular Front government then armed the masses,
although it could not prevent large areas of the country from falling to the
insurgents. Nazi Germany and fascist Italy provided immediate help for the
Spanish rebels out of fear that the republican government might change the
balance of power in Western Europe by allying itself with France.26 1
With the commencement of the Spanish Civil War, it did not take long for
foreign aid to arrive. The situation, however, got more and more complex. In the first
place, the fascist threat of Nazi Germany loomed nearby. In the second place, both
Germany and Italy supported the Nationalists (the right wing) during the war. Thirdly,
Stalin was concerned with maintaining "good relations with France, which had [along
with Britain, Germany, Italy, and the USSR] previously signed a nonaggression pact and
a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR." In short, while Stalin likely wanted to
maximize the Soviet Union's potential for power in Spain, the situation was too complex
to treat lightly. The Communist Party in Spain was certainly not weak; but by the same
259 Ibid.
260 Seon-Watson, Hugh, The Soviet Impact on World Politics. p. 53, ed. Kurt London. Hawthorn Books,
Inc., 1974.
261 Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 145.
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token, the Soviet Union did not want to risk involvement in a general war, especially in
light of the purges that Stalin had initiated within the Soviet Union. Hence, Stalin's goals
were, of necessity, limited and, Kaplan argues, "operationally did not include the takeover
of Spain by Communists loyal to Moscow." 262
Nevertheless, it seems that the thought of Soviet control did not escape the
minds of all Soviets involved. Kennan notes that "Soviet agents were in complete charge
of military operations on the Madrid front." Salvador de Madariaga states that Soviet
advisors and military personnel in Spain were adamant about maintaining "a unified army
under a unified command," 263 but in actuality, refused to submit their own army to
Spanish control. Thus, Madariaga argues, "the true aim of this campaign... was not
merely technical but political as well. The Communists felt that if the Army could be
unified, it could be put more efficiently under their complete control, owing to their hold
on supplies, and once in possession of the Army, they would be in possession of
Spain."264
The role of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in the Spanish Civil War is far
from clear cut. Even today, that role is a "highly disputed and controversial subject." An
example of this controversy is apparent in an article by Angel Vinas in which he notes,
first, that the Popular Front coalition won the general election held in February 1936 and
second, that Socialists and Communists were excluded from the new government 265;
however, as previously noted, Bouscaren and also Bolloten, author of The Grand
Camouflage, virtually equate the Popular Front with communism throughout the Spanish
262 Ibid.
263 de Madariaga, Salvador. Spain: A Modern History, p. 511. Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.
264 Ibid., pp. 511-512.
265 Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 145.
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struggle266 . Gary Prevost concurs with Vinas and argues that Stalin was primarily
concerned with forming a military alliance with France and Britain that would stay Nazi
Germany. Prevost argues that "Stalin withheld massive aid to prove to his prospective
allies that he was not interested in promoting the spread of revolution" and that it is thus
apparent that "the PCE played a conservative non-revolutionary role during the Civil
War." 267
Still another explanation for Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War has
been offered by Hugh Thomas. Thomas argues that the Soviets hoped to push France into
a war with Germany and Italy by supporting the Republic (Popular Front) in Spain
(Germany and Italy supported the opposition group led by Franco). Thus, Stalin hoped to
avoid the collapse of the Republic while mounting an extensive propaganda campaign
against Germany and Italy in Western Europe. Had the campaign worked, Thomas
argues that the Soviets would have been free to "remain on the sidelines. ' 26
Rubinstein amplified the difficult dilemma Stalin was faced with by pointing out
that, while "a victory for the fascist Franco might push Paris into more intimate ties with
Moscow,... a Loyalist victory achieved with open Communist support, though it would
undoubtedly raise Soviet prestige, might paradoxically frighten France and lead her to
view h aer less belligerently. ' 269
It is certain that Stalin saw the advantages of non-aggression. In the following
statement Stalin was purportedly commenting on his view of why the western powers did
266 Bolioten, Burnett, The Grnd Camou4lage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War, p.
88, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961.
267 Prevost, p. 21.
268 Johnston, Verle B., Legions of Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War, The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967.
269 Rubinstein, p. 20.
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not intervene in Spain. Paradoxically, however, his comments are probably an accurate
mirror of his own political aspirations:
The Policy of non-intervention means the abetting of aggression, of
unleashing war - consequently the transformation of war into world war.
There shines through the policy of non-intervention the desire not to hinder the
aggressors in the performance of their dirty work.... not to hinder Germany, let
us say, from getting bogged down in European matters or becoming entangled
in a war with the Soviet Union, to permit all the participants in a war to become
deeply bogged down in the mire of the war, to encourage them surreptitiously in
this direction, to let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they
are sufficiently weakened, to come onto the scene with fresh forces, to come
one, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate one's terms to the
weakened participants in the war... "270
If, as the above excerpts indicate, the purposes for Soviet aid to the Spanish
Republic are clouded with controversy, the amount and nature of that aid is no less
controversial. On 23 August, 1936, the Soviet Union agreed to the Non-Intervention
Agreement, even though they had already contributed 12,145,000 rubles to the Spanish
Republic. The Soviets had alluded to the apparent contradiction as early as 6 August,
when they, "like the Italian[s], agreed to the French non-intervention plan 'in
principle."' 27 1
In fact, there are indications that the Soviet Union attempted to abide by the
agreement, at least until it noted non-compliance, particularly on the part of Italy.
Kennan argues as follows:
Stalin, with his characteristic caution and timidity, would have
preferred to remain aloof. But this was not feasible. The immediate and
energetic intervention of the Germans and Italians meant that if Russia failed to
intervene, an early and dramatic victory of the insurgents could hardly have
been avoided. Such a victory would have meant the encirclement of France by
fascists, the probable triumph of fascist tendencies within France herself, and the
further weakening of western resistance to Hitler. The way would then be clear
for a German aggression toward the East 2 72
270 Stalin, Josef, "Voprosy Leninizma," taken from Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941, George F. Kennan,
pp. 172-73, Greenwood Press Publishers, 1960.
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Just as there are differing accounts regarding the extent and nature of Stalin's
political interests in Spain, there are controversial accounts regarding the Soviet Union's
willingness to assist Spain's Popular Front. Those who support the notion that the Soviet
Union was interested in Soviet control of Spain tend to interpret Stalin's agreement to
support the Non-Intervention Agreement as a necessary step toward avoiding French
embarrassment, but difficult to support in actuality27 3. Those who see the Soviet Union's
role in the Spanish Civil War as primarily defensive in nature tend to support the view
that Stalin signed the Non-Intervention Agreement with the intention of abiding by it, but
that Italian and German intervention necessitated his .vn involvement274 . Those who
believe that the Soviets wanted the Spanish conflict to last as long as possible, thereby
drawing interest away from German and Italian fascism, downplay the amount of
assistance the Soviets provided275 . Still others assert that Soviet aid to the Republican
cause in the Spanish Civil War was a natural expression of what was "probably the most
popular political feeling ever permitted by Josef Stalin.' 2
76
The amount of Soviet aid the Spanish Popular Front received also remains a
matter of controversy, as was mentioned above. Kaplan refers to the Soviet contribution
of military personnel as "relatively small.' 27 7 and Kennan asserts that the Soviets "came
out squarely for the Spanish Republic and, for a short time, gave military aid on a major
272 Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 86-87.
273 Bollown., p. 97.
274 Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, pp. 150-51.
275 Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 88.
276 Jackson, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War, p. 60, Thames and Hudson, 1974.
277 Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power, p. 151.
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scale to the Republican cause." Hugh Thomas, however, gives what seems to be the most
detailed account regarding exactly how the Soviets backed the Popular Front. According
to Thomas, "the republic bought about 1,000 aircraft frem Russia;" in addition, Russia
supported Spain with approximately 900 tanks, 1,550 pieces of artillery, 300 armoured
cars, 15,000 machine guns, 30,000 automatic rifles, 15,000 mortars, 500,000 riles, 8,000
trucks, 4 million artillery projectiles, I billion cartridges, and 1,500 tons of
gunpowder. 278
In analyzing Soviet aid to the Spanish Republicans, it is easy to overlook the
fact that Soviet Russia's decision to provide assistance required some amount of
organization to implement. As Angel Vinas notes, the USSR had to establish
mechanisms to distribute the weapons. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to send
specialists and technicians who were not supposed to participate in any actual combat and
to monitor an organization established to acquire foreign material and services that Spain
might otherwise have had difficulty acquiring.2 79
Hugh Thomas substantiates Vinas's record, noting that Soviets involved in arms
shipments were ordered to "stay out of range of artillery fire." Later, however, Thomas
supports the fact that the Soviets, like other members of the International Brigade,
actually fought in the war. While the number of Russian volunteers was minimal
compared to other foreigners who fought in the war, Soviet "volunteers" included tank
operators and pilots28 0. According to Thomas, "the maximum Russians in Spain at any
one time was 700, the total number being probably between 2,000 and 3,000. Perhaps
1,000 Russian pilots flew il Spain." 28 1
278 Thomas, pp. 981-82.
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97
Another aspect of the Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War that merits
attention is the transfer of over half of the Spanish treasury (approximately $578 million
in gold, at $35.00 per ounce) at the war's onset. One explanation for the transfer is that it
was to serve as advance payment for arms. Gabriel Jackson claims that "since 1939 the
Soviets have claimed that their deliveries to Republican Spain more than exhausted the
value of the gold.' 282
That the event may not have been so clear cut is evidenced by Soviet hesitation,
at the conclusion of the war, to recognize any Spanish government at all, in spite of the
fact that all her satellites :ognized the government-in-exile (i.e. the Popular Front).
Salvador de Madariaga asserts that this oddity "proves that Moscow's reluctance is due to
the fact that once a Spanish government were recognized by Moscow a prima facie
obligation would arise to return the gold to it. ' ' 83
If the Spanish Civil War can teach us anything about Soviet/Spanish relations
historically, it is probably that they were extremely complex and unclear. As this paper
has attempted to illustrate thus far, Soviet motives .,roughout the Civil War were unclear.
One thing is certain, however. The Soviet Union acted according to its perceived national
interest. In light of this observation, whether or not Soviet Russia, in essence, robbed
Spain or just provided a few expensive weapons does not seem as important as why the
Soviet Union (or any other nation) became involved in what some have argued began as a
purely internal Spanish affair - a conflict not between the Fascists and the Communists,
but between Spain's own political parties.
281 Thomas, p. 984.
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That Moscow, initially at least, had no apparent malevolent intent to overtake
Spain is evidenced by the following statement by W.O. Krivitsky, the Chief of the Soviet
Military Intelligence in Western Europe, who defected from the Russian Service:
At the first thunder of guns beyond the Pyrenees, I [Krivitsky was at
his headquarters in The Hague.] dispatched an agent to Hendaye on the
French-Spanish border, and another to Lisbon, to organize a secret information
service in the Franco Territory.
These were merely routine measures. I had received no instructions
from Moscow in regard to Spain, and at the time there was no contact between
my agents and the Madrid government. As the responsible head of the
European Intelligence Service, I was simply securing general information for
relaying to the Kremlin.
Our agents in Berlin and Rome, Hamburg and Genoa, Bremen and
Naples duly reported to us the powerful aid that Franco was receiving from Italy
and Germany. This information I dispatched to Moscow, where it was received
in silence. I still got no secret instructions regarding Spain. Publicly also the
Soviet government had nothing to say.
The Comintern, of course, made a great deal of noise, but none of us
practiced men took that seriously...'2 84
As suggested earlier, it seems reasonable to view Soviet involvement as due to a
variety of factors. More than likely, there were those who were interested in the
possibility of Soviet control of Spain; others no doubt saw involvement as a way to
deflect potential German or Italian aggression from itself, as a way to weaken
surrounding powers (thereby strengthening the USSR's own position on the European
continent), or simply as a spontaneous expression of political empathy towards the
Spanish Republic. Each of these explanations likely pertains to at least some portion of
Soviet relations with Spain during the Spanish Civil War.
Whether or not his policies, and the official Soviet policies, were laden with
aggressive intent, Stalin did not want to appear aggressive. He apparently took care to
instruct specialists involved with supplying Spain with weapons not to participate in
284 Puzzo, Pante A., Spain and the Great Powers 1936-1941, p. 39, Columbia University Press, 1962.
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combat. He did not act decisively, in spite of the belief, as evidenced by the British
ambassador's dispatch dated 14 August 1936, that Spain would adopt a communist form
of government. He did not even supply Spain with an over-abundance of supplies. It
seems safe to conclude, then, that any thoughts of pursuing an overtly aggressive policy
towards Spain were necessarily overridden by larger security concerns.
2. Soviet Influence on Spain During the Franco Regime
A natural outgrowth of national victory in the Spanish Civil War was the
severance of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Spain. Since Soviet
Russia had assisted the Republicans, who opposed Franco during the war, Franco's gain
meant Soviet defeat. Consequently, the two nations were cautious in their dealings with
one another throughout Franco's dictatorship. Paradoxically, in spite of the lack of
formal diplomatic relations between the two nations, Soviet influence on Spain for the
forty years following the Spanish Civil War was far from minimal. As Madariaga notes,
"From the point of view of ideology, it may be said that the regimes of Moscow and
Madrid are allies, as close allies as the two blades of a pair of scissors. Franco finds
[found] the existence of the Soviet system an excellent pretext for justifying his own
existence (though the idea that the July 1936 uprising was prompted by the need to put
down Communist menace in Spain is arrant nonsense); and the Soviet Union finds Franco
invaluable as a blatant proof of the "fascist" nature of the West which relies on him as an
ally.",2 85
In addition to this "scissor-like" relationship with Spain during the Franco
period, the Soviet Union influenced Spain internally more than might be expected given
the lack of diplomatic relations. Constantine Christopher Menges points out that "the
Communist party generally survives better than democratic opposition groups during
periods of dictatorship." Menges reasons that such is the case because Communist parties
285 Madariaga, p. 637.
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have "long experience in clandestine operations, internal screening, selectivity, discipline,
and international Communist support," experience that "more open groups" don't have.
As far as Spain is concerned, the Communist party survived Franco's dictatorship quite
well and, as Menges cites, was able to penetrate and use the Workers' Commissions,
"which made the Communists the most important single element in the labor movement
during the Franco period. '"286
Just as the Spanish Civil War complicated the world situation, World War II
complicated matters in Spain somewhat, in spite of Spain's limited participation. Since
Italy and Germany had supported Franco's coup, Franco was sympathetic to the Axis
powers. Benny Pollack notes that "highly emotive speeches were common in this period,
in which the existence of an international conspiracy of Masons, liberals, Communists,
and Jews was used to justify calls for 'national unity."' Both Franco and Spain's foreign
minister, Serrano Suner, openly defended the Axis powers; nevertheless, when Hitler
asked Spain for actual military support, Franco was quick to fall back on Spain's
extensive losses during the Civil War as a reason for non-involvement.
As the War progressed and it became apparent that the Axis was losing,
Franco's politics took a pragmatic turn. In 1943, Franco attempted to "consolidate a
grand alliance of 'Christian' nations against the rising spectre of Bolshevism and the
Soviet Union." Politically, this was an important move for Franco, because it meant that,
"if the Allies were to accept his rationale, then he could transform a political defeat,
which is what the collapse 9 f the Axis would mean to Spain, into a political victory." In
1944, as a continuation of his early version of "Realpolitik," Franco totally abandoned his
pro. Axis foreign policy.
286 Ibid.
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Even though Spain's support to the Axis had been primarily in the ideological
realm, the Allied powers "deeply resented Franco's collaboration, and were prepared to
exact some sort of punishment." That Stalin, in particulax, maintained animosity toward
Spain was evidenced at the conclusion of the war when he suggested at Potsdam that the
Allies "break relations with Spain, which had dispatched a 'volunteer' division to fight
against Russia." The U.S. and Britain vetoed Stalin's suggestion.
The end of World War II marked the beginning of tensions between Western
democratic states and the Soviet Union that deteriorated into the Cold War. In this
environment, the Western Alliance "felt it could no longer afford the democratic niceties
of opposing and isolating Franco's Spain." Hence, the Western democracies, in particular
the U.S., began negotiating with Spain regarding potential bases and membership in
NATO. The Soviet Union felt more and more isolated from Spain. As a result, Pollack
notes that "overtures were being made towards some form of unofficial link" between
Spain and the Soviet Union. He further states that "reliable sources in both the Spanish
and the Soviet Foreign services attribute significant importance among Soviet motivations
to its desire to limit the potential damage to its security as a result of the American bases
which were being discussed at the time between the United States and the Franco
government. "287
Even before Spain's admittance to the U.N. (which occurred in 1955 in spite of
Soviet opposition), Franco agreed to support Western defense by building ten military
bases on Spanish soil. Pollack lists several reasons for U.S. interests in Spanish bases,
among which are the follo%4ing: (1) "to provide 'incentives' for the Soviet Union to divert
aggression forces and armaments towards areas other than the United States" and (2) "to
consolidate Spain's anti-Communist commitment." Thus, it seems clear that, even
287 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
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though the Soviet Union and Spain avoided cultivating any direct , legitimate
relationships, their indirect contact was significant.
The nature of the underlying antagonism between the two governments is
perhaps best illustrated by several secret documents. The first, an "'additional clause' to
paragraph two of Article III of the defense agreement of 1953... deals with the utilization
of the [Spanish] bases at times when Communist aggression threatens the security of the
West, and less specifically, at times 'of emergency."' As the following statement,
summarized from the conclusions of Vinas, indicates, this secret clause gave the United
States considerable power in Spain and served as an illustration of Franco's commitment
to the West:
Vinas concludes that this was in effect a blank cheque for the United
States regarding the bases in Spain, allowing Washington to take the initiative in
acts of reprisai. with no obligation to Spain and her head of state than the
passing-on of information in their possession regarding the imminent
'aggression' or threat and the intention of counteracting it by means of
attack. 288
A second document, dated 30 November 1956, essentially reiterates the 1953
document. In this document, classified "top secret," "the National Security Council of
the United States declares its intention to use the bases in Spain to attack the Soviet
Union, if necessary." Thus, Spain's animosity towards the Soviet Union was manifest in
its agreement to allow such bases to be built; on the other hand, the Soviet Union,
likewise antagonistic, had an interest in maintaining the Franco regime in order to exploit
U.S. support of Franco, a policy that "could and very likely would be construed as a new
form of appeasement of a Fascist regime.' 289
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Spanish-Soviet commercial links are another interesting aspect of the Franco
period. The two countries maintained their mutual antagonism; verbal attacks were not
uncommon and at least superficially, Franco fueled an ongoing anti-Communist crusade.
In fact, "Franco was, in Jvly 1954, calling for a boycott of Soviet goods."
Simultaneously, however, "the New York Times was revealing a secret deal to exchange
300,000 tons of Spanish iron for 179,000 tons of Polish coal and the British House of
Commons was being informed.., of a number of suspicious trade accords between Spain
and several countries of the Eastern bloc .290
Other indicators of warming relations also began to be apparent. From 1960
until the end of the Franco regime seventeen years later, "Spain opened diplomatic
representations in all Communist states, with the exception of the Soviet Union and
Albania." Given the satellite relationship of the Eastern bloc nations with the Soviet
Union, Soviet influence on Spain was indirect but inevitable. It was to the Soviet Union's
advantage to postpone establishing formal diplomatic relations for several reasons. First
of all, as previously noted, the Soviet Union had approximately $578 million of Spanish
gold that it felt no obligation to return as long as they didn't recognize the Spanish
government; second, the Soviet Union, because of Spain's previous ties with Germany
and Italy, could exploit U.S. support of Spain as "fascist."
While it appears obvious then, that it was advantageous, at least to some degree,
for the Soviet Union to maintain the status quo regardmg Spanish relations, several other
factors made improved relations difficult. Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War
and repression against the'Communist Party in Spain were among these factors. In
addition, the Soviet Union harbored quite a few Spanish exiles. The situation became
especially tense when, in May of 1960, the Soviet Union attempted to return 557 of the
290 Ibid.. p. 53.
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refugees to Spain; Franco deported a number of the exiles back to the Soviet Union,
thereby causing "an international furor."29 1
In s| te of such potential setbacks, however, relations between Spain and the
Soviet Union gradually warmed throughout the 1960s. At approximately the same time
as Franco's rejection of the exiles, Spain and the Soviet Union competed in soccer, and
Franco allowed those Spanish citizens who wished to attend to do so. As early as 1964,
"important sections of the Spanish media were calling for a 'normalization' of relations
between the Soviet Union and Spain." Cultural exchanges began to be frequent; then, in
1965, the Soviet Union and five other Communist nations sent missions to Spain, "Soviet
tourists began taking their holidays in Spain,' 292 and Soviet-Spanish relations were well
on their way to normalization.
The 1970s marked even greater cooperation between the Soviet Union and
Spain. In 1972, an air link between the two nations' capitals was established.
"Commercial interchange increased and the Spanish government came out publicly in
support of the old Soviet aspiration for an all European conference on security and
cooperation." 2 9 3 ,2 9 4
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's primary strategic considerations during this time
period were, according to Pollack, first, "to do all it could to stop Spain from becoming a
member of the EEC and NATO" and second, "to open up new commercial areas for
Soviet products." Further, Moscow looked optimistically towards some sort of Spanish
291 Ibid.. p. 54.
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neutrality, basing its hopes on "coincidence in certain areas of foreign policy." (Soviet
and Spanish views regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cuba, decolonization in Africa and
Asia, and a number of other issues were similar.)
3. The Evolution of Spain's Communist Party: Historical Connections with
Moscow
The Partido Communista Espanol (PCE) has its roots in the Spanish Socialist
party. Formed in 1921, its first members295 were in favor of affiliating with the Soviet
Cominterm; hence, the party's political foundation was based on Stalin's policies.
Though banned in the 1920s, it survived to participate in the Civil war and functioned
quite effectively during Franco's regime. Originally against both the Spanish Republican
government in 1931 and the workers' movement in general, the party shifted under
Stalin's leadership to the policy of "'popular front' against Fascism." This policy shift
can be traced to the defeat of the Communists and Socialists in Germany in 1933.296
During the Spanish Civil War, leaders of the PCE included emissaries from the
Soviet secret police and the GPU. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the
exact role and motives of the PCE during the Civil War are still debated. Suffice it to say
that the PCE, and hence the Soviet Union, was an influential entity in Spain during that
time period. As recently as 1983, evidence came to light which indicated that the PCE's
role, at least in the war's beginnings, may have been substantial. In June, 1983, William
Herrick published an article insinuating that the Spanish Communists were responsible
for killing Andrea Nin, the leader of the anti-Stalinist Partido Obrero de Unificacion
Marxista (POUM) and were also responsible for "triggering a police action in Barcelona
that provoked both POUMists and Anarchists into taking to the streets to protect
295 Prevost notes that the first members included "the entire Central Committee of Socialist Youth" in
addition to "dissident members of the Socialist Party." (Prevost, p. 69).
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themselves." Herrick further indicates that Stalin issued an order to the PCE to drive
Caballero (the Prime Minister) from office because of Caballero's refusal to accept any
responsibility on the part of the POUM for the events. Caballero was, indeed, replaced by
Juan Negrin, a right-wing Socialist. In spite of PCE's support for peace and democracy
and its corresponding anti-fascist policies, Herrick attributes Nin's murder to Margarita
Nelken's husband; Nelken was "a Communist deputy in the Cortes [cabinet] when the
Civil War started" who apparently convinced her husband "to do part of her share of the
dirty work required by Stalin.' 297
Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, in a book published in 1988, confirm that
"Soviet power was determined to destroy the POUM, the achievement of this goal being
one measure of the degree of Spanish hegemony within the wartime republic. ' '298
Following the Spanish Civil War and World War II, from 1946 to 1970, the
PCE focused on resisting the Franco government. The group's underlying premise was
that the Franco regime would inevitably collapse as a result of its inability to come to
terms with the feudal, agrarian nature of the Spanish economy. The PCE banked its
resistance on the assumption that Franco's government would not be able to industrialize
Spain.299
The beginnings of dissention between the PCE and the Soviet Union can, then,
perhaps best be traced to Spain's industrialization under Franco. During the 1960s,
Fernando Claudin and George Semprun, PCE members, argued that the party should "not
insist upon a complete break from the Francoist State" 300 since circumstances had
297 Ibid., p. 12.
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changed since the aftermath of the Civil War. In 1965, Claudin and Semprun were ousted
from the PCE as "'Right deviationists,' but by 1970 Carrillo had adopted their
perspective, a strategy that favoured alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie to create a
democratic Spain." 30 1
4. The Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union: Drifting Apart
The roots of the Spanish PCE-Soviet rift are generally traced to a memorandum
written by Togliatti, the First Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Published
in 1964, the document advocated a policy of free debate for solving problems brought
about by local conditions. Toward this end, he advocated that communist parties be given
more autonomy. While Togliatti's memorandum does mark the first successful break
between European communist groups and the Soviet Union, recognition as the first
Marxist-Leninist party in Spain to oppose Soviet central control rightly belongs to the
POUM. Ultimately unsuccessful because of communist measures, the POUM still stands
as a historical landmark in its attempts to promulgate Marxist-Leninist ideologies
autonomously. It is ironic, then, that the PCE (which under Stalin had vehemently
opposed the POUM) would ultimately follow suit by drifting from the Soviet Union and
Stalinism through( the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The PCE did not immediately follow the PCI's lead in 1964 - probably
because the PCE had been in exile in Eastern bloc nations, including the Soviet Union,
since Franco became dictator. Hence, the PCE was dependent on Moscow and other
socialist nations for its very existence. In 1968, however, the PCE began criticizing
CPSU policies, particularly "the absence of democracy in the USSR and the other Eastern
European countries." 302
300 Ibid., p. 72.
301 Ibid.
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Throughout the early 1970s, the PCE, along with the French and Italian
Communist Parties, drifted further and further away from Soviet control. By 1975, the
movement had adopted a policy perhaps best expressed by Carrillo's "manifesto
program." At a National Conference held in September, Carrillo announced, in addition
to various socio-political reforms, his conception of the PCE's future: "... [w]e do not
conceive the future socialist systems in Spain being a system of one single party
controlling state power, but a democratic multi-party system." These changes in the PCE,
in addition to similar evolutions in the Italian and French Communist Parties, were, by
1975, pronounced enough to merit (at least by Franc Barbieri, the Croatian journalist who
coined the phrase) special recognition apart from Soviet Communism. The new ideas
promulgated by Western European Communist groups independent of the CPSU came to
be known, then, as "Eurocommunism." While it is difficult to define Eurocommunism's
specific ideology, Szajkowski outlined its basic assumptions as follows: (1) "[D]ifferent
circumstances call for a different approach in order to bring about socialist transformation
of Western Europe. This can be achieved through ordinary parliamentary procedures and
elections contested by several parties." (2) "Eurocommunism accepts plurality of
political parties including the right of opposition parties to exist and perform their
functions." (3) "Eurocommunism guarantees all the liberties that are the result of the
bourgeois democratic revolutions; freedom of thought and expression, of publications, of
assembly and association, of demonstration and strikes, of travel home and abroad, the
inviolability of private life, religious liberties and complete freedom of expression of
I
philosophical, cultural and artistic tendencies and opinions." (4) "Eurocommunism
supports the formation of broad alliances between communists and socialists and between
communists and popular forces inspired by Christianity." (5) The Eurocommunist
parties explicitly reject the Soviet model of the one-party state and denounce the
302 Ibid., p. 261.
109
limitations on civil liberties imposed in the USSR... Eurocommunism, asserting its
complete autonomy, rejects any centre of the international communist movement,
denying the primacy of the Soviet communist party among the communist parties and
consequently abandons the basic concept of proletarian internationalism which has
traditionally governed the relations between the commurist and workers' parties and the
CPSU.",303
By 1970-71, the PCE-Soviet split was "all but complete." Officials of the party
who maintained pro-Soviet views were given their walking papers; the Soviet Union tried
to "influence... the PCE-dominate': trade union movement in Spain," thus destabilizing
the PCE; and in May 1971, the C. )U attempted to recognize Spanish officials who had
been expelled from the PCE due to their pro-Soviet views30 4 .
Prior to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and the
Soviet Union in 1977, Santiago Carrillo, the PCE leader, published Eurocommunism and
the State, thus solidifying the break between the PCE and the CPSU. In the book,
Carrillo "goes beyond simply criticizing the human rights situation in the Soviet Union...
he questions whether the Soviet Union has maintained socialism. He asserts that the
October Revolution produced a type of state which 'without being bourgeois cannot be
regarded as a state of workers' democracy in which the organized proletariat constitutes
the ruling class.' 30 5
Following legalization of the PCE in the post-Franco era, it only attracted ten
percent of the Spanish popular vote,306 a fact that the Soviet Union was quick to exploit.
I
303 Ibid., p. 256.
304 Pollack, p. 60.
305 Prevost, p. 75.
306 Urban, Jean Barth, "The West European Communist Challenge to Soviet Foreign Policy," in Soviet
Foreign Policy in the 1980s, p. 177, Ed. Roger E. Kanet, Praeger Publishers, 1982.
110
For example, New Times, a Moscow periodical, attacked Carrillo's book and accused him
of "favoring a strengthened NATO," an illogical accusation "given the PCE's opposition
to Spain's entry into NATO." Though fierce and timely (given the PCE's poor
performance in the elections), the purpose of the attacks did not appear to be directed at
discrediting the PCE in Soviet eyes but, rather, "to bring about a change in Spanish
Communist Party policy or at the very least, to threaten the PCF [the Communist Party in
France] and PCI [the Communist Party in Italy] with similar polemical retaliation if they
perservere[d] in their mounting challenges to Moscow.' 307
In addition to the issue of autonomy, detente brought new conflicts between the
PCE and the CPSU. Initially in favor of relaxed tensions, the PCE diverged from Soviet
hopes that detente would weaken the European Economic Community (EEC). Noting the
advantages which European economic unity would have for Spain, Carrillo criticized
Soviet strategy and accused the Soviet Union of favoring "the West European status
quo." 308Carrillo asserted that the CPSU "feared the contagious influence of a West
European model of socialism on Eastern Europe;" further, he claimed that "the existence
of a Europe-NATO, controlled by the United States, justifies z qecond Europe on the
other side controlled by the Soviet Union."'30 9
In spite of the split between the PCE and the CPSU, however, the
Eurocommunists may not be as unmanageable as they might seem. As one PCI
ideologist, "when asked what the party would do in a crisis, said, 'We would choose the
Soviet Union, of course."' A similar answer should be expected from the PCE, especially
in light of the fact that the CPSU and the PCE rarely differ if a matter is "of major
307 [bid., p. 112.
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international concern." B,. 1982, the pro-Soviet and Eurocommunist factions within the
PCE, riffs between Carrii.o and young leadership,3 10 and its social democratic approach
caused the PCE's percentage of the 1982 vote to fall to four percent. In contrast, the
Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) attracted more votes from the Left. It seems
likely that, as Prevost observes, the PCE, "by adopting a basically social democratic
approach,... has done very little to differentiate itself from the PSOE.'3 11
The PCE's problems do not stop there. With the PCE split from the CPSU and
the PCE's weakened show at the elections came an internal PCE split. Ignacio Gallego, a
Civil War veteran, led the pro-Soviet faction, which called itself Partido Communista
(PC), or "Communist Party," as opposed to the PCE's "Spanish Communist Party." Not
surprisingly, this development in Spanish affairs was welcomed by Moscow, and several
PC members including Gallego received all-expense paid trips to Moscow. Further,
contacts between the PC members and members of the Soviet Embassy are not
uncommon. As a result of such developments, Eurocommunists no longer have a place in
the Spain-USSR Association and PC headquarters have been opened in nearly all Spanish
provinces.
The PCE-CPSU rift has not been a source of problems solely for the PCE. If
the PCE has lost strength in Spain because of the new ideology that Paul Heywood
suggests is mirrored in the PSOE312, the Soviet Union has also lost political advantage
the PCE might have offered iL Kanet and Kempton, in a discussion regarding the global
correlation of forces, point out that the Soviet Union, once the role-model for the Left,
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"can no longer consider communist parties in the West as automatic allies or as
instruments of its own policy preferences." Indeed, "as Hannes Adomeit has noted, 'the
primary challenge of Eurocommunist is that posed to the legitimacy, validity and
relevance of Soviet ideology and the Soviet Union." If anything, this challenge has only
become greater with time.
5. Soviet Strategy Toward Spain
There are several dimensions to Soviet strategy in Spain and Western Europe in
general. Among these are the military dimension, the economic dimension, and the
political dimension.
The Soviet general strategy within the military realm has included expanding
and modernizing conventional and theatre nuclear weapons within the Warsaw Pace,
attempts to postpone and/or eliminate modernization of NATO military capabilities, and
the attempt to separate U.S. and West European security interests while simultaneously
attempting to demonstrate that "Soviet and West European interests overlap and
differences between them could be worked out if only West Europe could reduce its
dependence on the United States." 313
Within the economic realm, the Soviet Union has attempted to expand trade
with the West since the early 1970s. Western technology is of particular interest to the
Soviet Union, as evidenced by the technology transfer case published in the New York
Times on 6 Sept 1985314. According to the article, a Spanish company exported "almost
$2.5 million in valuable American manufacturing equipment." The purpose of the
equipment was reportedly to manufacture "national security and defense equipment." In
addition to the economic advantages of increased trade with the West, however, the
313 Jbid., p. 96.
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Soviet Union stands to gain politically as well. First, Moscow is interested in
"strengthen[ing] the West European commitment to detente and if possible.... induce
[ing] the Europeans to be more accommodating toward the interests of the USSR - in
return for expanding export markets for West Europe in the USSR." Second, the Soviet
Union hopes, through commerce agreements with Western Europe, to weaken the
Western Alliance, particularly West European ties with the United States. A third
objective that seems likely is "the creation of Western economic dependence on the
USSR... which the USSR might later be able to use to exert political pressures on West
Europe. 3 15
Historically, the most important political goals the Soviet Union maintains in its
strategy toward West Europe continues to the "to weaken the relationships between West
Europe and the United States... [and] to gain acceptance by the governments of West
Europe of its dominant position in East Europe." 316
Implementation of strategies in Spain to achieve these goals takes on diverse
forms and can be evidenced, for example, by Soviet citizens charged with espionage.
Further, Soviet attempts to cultivate relations with different factions of Spanish society,
while possible a strategy in and of itself, can also be seen as a means if implementing
larger political military and economic strategies.
The necessity for the Soviet Union to extend its relationships beyond the
limitations of the Communist Party is especially noticeable in Spain. Since the PCE and
the CPSU have drifted apart, the Soviets have focused energy on other political parties in
Spain, such as the PSOE. 7his strategy has been important to Soviet success for several
reasons. First, Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties "are actual or prospective
governing parties.... Second, these parties represent that part of the West European public
315 Ibid.
316 Ibid., p. 99.
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that the Soviet analysts regard as 'realistic' in its attitudes toward the USSR and
'progressive' on other issues.... Third, the parties of the non-Communist Left, at least
according to Soviet ideology, are potential partners in the revolutionary struggle. ' 317
Soviet cooperation with the non-Communist Left began to be apparent in 1969
when, at the International Conference of Communist Parties, Communists everywhere
were encouraged to cooperate with the Socialists and Social Democrats "to establish an
advanced democratic regime today and to build a socialist society in the future." In 1972,
the Socialist International was pressured internally to allow Socialist parties to form
bilateral relations with other parties (namely the CPSU) because some Socialist parties
were already cooperating with Communist parties. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE)
was among the first to establish such bilateral links. Since the beginning, one of the
primary topics of discussion between the two parties has been "the dangers of war." This
was evidenced at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in
Madrid. In a letter presented at the conference, the CPSU concluded the following:
We proffer our hand to the Socialists, Social Democrats and Laborites
for a joint struggle aimed at freeing mankind from further wars of extermination
and to salvage peace. To achieve these aims of vital importance to mankind, we
are willing to cooperate with you in forms mutually acceptable to both sides.3 18
Specific object, 'ves the Soviet Union hopes to achieve through better relations
with the non-communist left include, of course, erosion of popular support for NATO in
Western Europe, increased influence over Commur-, parties in Western Europe,
increased cooperation between West European Socialist and Communist parties in "the
struggle for advanced democracy and ultimately 'Socialism,"' and greater credibility for
Soviet peace initiatives within the Soviet Union itself. 3 19
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At least in the case of Spain, Soviet strategies seem to have been somewhat
successful. Ft :xample, the Soviet Union effectively lessened the effects of
Eurocommunism, both in Spain and within the Soviet Union, by dealing with the
Socialist Party in Spain. When PCE and CPSU relations were particularly strained, the
Soviet invited Felipe Gonzales, then PSOE party leader to Moscow, where he was
received "with great honors." 320
Well thought-out diplomacy and pragmatic hospitality characterizes the Soviet
Union's implementation of its strategies. Not only is this approach evidenced in the case
of the newly formed PE, but in the Soviet Union's affinity for finding (and t 1
exploiting) either perceived or real similarities between the two nations. A prime
example of this phenomenon can be found in the July 1985 issue of New Times. In an
article entitled "A Good Beginning," Vadim Zagladin focuses initially on the
contributions of such noted Spanish authors as Cervantes, Lorca and Ibanez and such
painters as Goya, Velazquez and Picasso toward the "successful development of relations
between Spain and the Soviet Union. Following this appeal to Spanish pride, Zagladin
attempts to link the two cultures by asserting that, just as the Soviet Union considers the
great Spanish masters to be r f its culture, Tolstoy. Chekov, Sholokhov and Pushkin
"have become part of the her e of the people of Spain. 32 1
Having "linked" the two cultures, Zagladin focuses next on other shared
attributes: "their industry, their attitude to one another, their hospitality, open-heartedness,
and readiness to give an attentive hearing to others, not only to listen to them, but to
understand them." As if to remind the Spaniards of their moral obligation to support the
319 Ibid., p. 15.
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Soviet Union, the author next focuses on Soviet sympathies with "the people of Spain
[who] became the first victims of fascist aggression in Europe" (in the 1930s). Finally,
Zagladin focuses on the necessity for Spain and the Soviet Union to "work to reduce
tension, to stop the arms race, and to reduce armaments so as to move on to detente..."322
It could seem, at first glance, that Soviet strategy is succeeding in Spain, since
Spain, not unlike other West European members of NATO, is concerned with many of the
same issues that have motivated Soviet strategic interests since NATO's conception.
While Soviet influence on Spain is undeniable, it would be unfair to give total credit to
the Soviet Union for the existence and influence of leftist factions on the Spanish political
spectrum today. Indeed, Spain has nourished a sizeable leftist following since the
Spanish Civil War, even during Franco's dictatorship when leftist parties were illegal. It
seems only fair to attribute Spanish democracy and pragmatism with at least partial credit
for the decisions that affect Spain and its relationships with other nations.
6. Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy and Actions for Spanish Security
The ongoing changes in the Soviet Union since Gorbachev first initiated
glasnost and perestroika have fostered an ongoing debate in the West regarding not only
Soviet capabilities, but Soviet intentions as well. Whereas the previous section of this
paper discussed general Soviet strategy towards Spain, this section will deal more
explicitly with specific Soviet policies and actions that have the potential of affecting
Spanish security.
As noted in the following excerpt, Spain carries historical importance for the
Soviet Union and is, hence,'important to Soviet policy-makers:
Since the days of Peter the Great, the Soviet Union has desired to be a
Mediterranean power. As long as the United States maintains its position within
Spain, the Soviets cannot achieve that end. Spain, therefore, has become
important to the latter, and it will use its diplomatic post in Madrid to wean
Spain away from United States influence.323
322 Ibid.
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The significance of the Mediterranean for Soviet foreign policy makers has also
been aptly explained by Thomas H. Etzold. He asserts that Soviet policy, posture, and
activity in the Mediterranean are significant because of the number of potentially
dangerous situations that all intersect in the Mediterranean. By way of illustration, he
lists "East-West competition in Europe, regional strife in the Balkans, Arab-Israeli
conflict, the contest between political Islam and Arabism, and global U.S.-Soviet rivalry
as well as the North-South struggle" 324 as "out-of-area" problems that intersect in the
Mediterranean.
In spite of the volatile nature of the conflicts enmeshed in the Mediterranean,
Etzold asserts that Soviet goals and actions are moderat, "rid "appear to be primarily
defensive in their political-strategic character." Along these lines, Soviet foreign policy
favors a "dynamic status quo," which would encompass "trends and movements
ultimately favorable to the emergence of socialism and people's democracies throughout
the world." 325
Towards this end, Soviet policy strives to eliminate U.S. access to bases and
facilities in forward areas and to limit U.S. military power. Thus, in 1985 when
Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, met with Prime Minister Felipe Gonza . talks
"centered on 'how to prevent the militarization of space and how to contain the arms race,
above all the nuclear race, and to forswear a new war."' Without doubt, Gromyko's
position targeted Spanish PSOE members. In fact, it seems reasonable to suggest that
0
323 Cortada. J.W. ed., Spain in the Twentieth Cenasry, p. 177, taken from Pollack. p. 64.
324 Etzold, Thomas H.. "The Soviet Union in the Mediteranwan," in NATO and the Mediterranean, p.
29, eds. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Lurashi, Scholarly Resources, Inc.,
1985).
325 Ibid., p. 32.
118
Gorbachev has made "development of ties with the West European Socialists a key
element of his foreign policy" in order to influence Western European (and thus,
Spanish) perceptions of the arms race, nuclear weapons, and the U.S. Strategic Defense
Initiative.
That Sov'tt internal concerns and German reunification take current precedence
over foreign policy with Spain can hardly be disputed. Nevertheless, Soviet Union
foreign policy is concerned with such issues as limiting the arms race and U.S./NATO
military strength, strengthening ties with the PSOE, detente, and strengthening CPSU ties
with West European communist parties 326 . The implications of this foreign policy for
Spanish security depends to a large degree on Spain. Chipman argues that the Soviet
Union "has a [naval] capacity to threaten, at a distance, the whole Southern region, so that
the NATO Mediterranean states... cannot remai, i-nmune to Soviet power." So far,
however, Spain and her dynamic Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, have managed to tow
a pragmatic, relatively hard line without offending the leftist extremes of the PSOE in
Spain or the Soviet Union too much. Whether or not this trend continues remains to be
seen.
7. Spanish Separatist Movements and the Soviet Union
As noted in the previous chapter, the most active separatist movement in Spain
is by far the Basques, many of whom organized the underground terrorist group ETA
following Franco's victory in the Civil War. Since the ETA is still active, the opportunity
for Soviet involvement with the ETA in an effort to destabilize the current Spanish
government is obvious. 'Both the Soviet Union and the PCE have, however,
systematically dismissed accusations of ETA support. During the early 1980s, when
general strikes ran rampant throughout the Basque region and workers in other parts of
Spain were sympathetic to Basque demands, the PCE declared that it did not support the
326 Hamburg. p. 178.
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strikes. Its leaders argued that their desire for peaceful free elections prohibited them
from establishing solidarity with the ETA. 327
Even so, suspicions of Soviet links with the ETA were reported in the press as
early as February 1980. During that time period, two Soviet citizens were expelled from
Spain on charges of espionage, but several newspapers with sources close to the Prime
Minister suggested possible ties to the ETA as well. Apparently, the suspicions were
based on reports that the manager of the Soviet airline Aeroflot "had met with an extreme
leftist group in Barcelona," 328 and that, previously, in July, 1978, Soviet agents and ETA
members met in a town in Southern France.
In addition to the alleged meetings, Gromyko (the first Soviet Foreign Minister
to visit Madrid 329 ) was reported as suggesting that terrorism in Spain would diminish "if
Spain discontinued its plans to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 330. Snitten
expanded Soviet conditions for an abatement of terrorism in Spain to include allowing
Moscow to use it as a springboard to penetrate South America 331. In addition, Western
sources indicate that a Soviet Canaries fishing fleet has been linked to "arms smuggling to
the ETA." In spite of all the indirect evidence, however, it is difficult to prove that
So, :-ETA links really exist. For example, while "it is known... that ETA guerrillas
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have been trained in Cuba and Southern Yemen, both Soviet clients,"' 332 direct evidence
of Soviet training is hard to come by.
8. Potential Effects of Current Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc
on Spain
While it is true that Spain does not fear the Soviet Union in the same way other
NATO members have been considered to fear it, it is also true that the rapidly changing
events in the Soviet Union and the East bloc contribute to a feeling of uneasiness of a
different sort in Spain. As a new member of the EEC, Spain "fears new competition for
community resources, foreign investment and export opportunities, ' 333 from the new
market economies in the East. Especially in light of reunification, it seems likely that
West Germans in particular will invest more in the East and less in Spain.
The Basque and Catalonian separatist groups have not been impervious to
changes in the Eastern bloc, either. These groups have been able to capitalize on "events
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to justify calls for regional self-determination in
Spain." Preceded by EC calls for "'self-determination' in East Germany," 334 both
Catalonian and Basque separatists have called for greater autonomy, "Lithuania's
demands for independence from the Soviet Union" only served to give momentum to the
cause.
9. Commercial Relations Between Spain and The Soviet Union
Western European trade in general has been important to the Soviet Union since
the mid-1 0 70s. It seems evident that these economic relations "will continue to be
I
important" 335 to the Soviets for at least two reasons. First, the Soviet Union faces a
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shortage of hard-currency that it hopes to alleviate by exporting energy to the West.
Second, the Soviet Union maintains a continued interest in Western equipment and
technology "to build up its economic infrastructure."
As previously noted, prior to the restoration of Spanish-Soviet diplomatic
relations in 1977, Spain and the Soviet Union began developing commercial interests. In
1976, an agreement signed in Moscow encouraged both nations to participate in trade and
industrial exhibitions. Contacts between foreign trade organizations and firms were also
encouraged 336. Pollack notes the following regarding Spanish-Soviet economic relations
in the early 1980s:
The Soviet market had, by 1983, become the most dynamic of all
foreign markets for Spanish products. Exports had increased by 98.3 percent
since 1982. Spanish imports from the Soviet Union in 1983 amounted to 492.9
million, an increase of 1.4 percent on the 1982 total of 487.2 million. Spanish
exports to the Soviet Union totalled 344.5 billion in 1984.3 3 7
In 1985, economic relations only improved. "A delegation of the Spanish
Confederation of Enterprise Organisations... visited the Soviet Union,"338 and, as
Yeugeni Olgin noted, by that time, Spain served as host to several joint-stock companies.
In addition, by 1985, Spanish banks and firms had their offices in Moscow," and the two
nations had been "making good heac ,ay in the coope .don of their fishing industries."
(It should be noted here that in 1985, Spain resisted an increased "pressure of the Soviet
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fishing fleet" for security reasons, which had hoped to base itself either at the Canary
Islands or in Algecisas, a mainland Spanish por 339)
Soviet interest in maintaining good economic relations with Spain extends to
out-of-area interests as well. In particular, the Soviet Union hopes to extend its influence
in Latin America in cooperation with Spain; no doubt the Soviets see a potential to
exploit the special relationship shared by Spain and Latin America to gain increased
access to Latin American markets. As Yeugeni Olgin was quick to point out in an article
published in October 1986, "both partners believe that the realisation of joint projects in
third countries, particularly in Latin America, offers good prospects." 340
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V. SPAIN'S EVOLUTION AND THE NEW EUROPE:
IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS
The purpose of previous chapters has been to lay a foundation based on political and,
in particular, security realities in Spain. Though Spain is a relatively new democracy, its
transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy has beep' relatively smooth. It has,
thus far, managed to balance successfully internal and external pressures that have, at
various times in Spain's history, threatened its demise. This chapter then, will explore
Spain's position relative to the New Europe. First, it will exam. jotential states of
equilibrium in the new world order. Second, it will discuss Spain's decision to unite with
Europe. Third, it will review Spain's possible contributions to a united Europe, and
finally, it will discuss implications for the United States. The purpose of this chapter,
then, is to assess Spain's role in the new world order, a role which, given Spain's
apparent success in effecting a smooth transition from an authoritarian regime to a
democracy, from a state isolated from Europe to one that has been integrated into
European structures to a huge degree, and from a floundering economy to one with
optimistic potential, may well be larger than might have been imagined a decade ago.
A. A CHANGING WORLD ORDER
Over thirty years ago, Morton Kaplan identified "six distinct internationai systems -
or, with possibly greater accuracy, six states of equilibrium of one ultrastable
international system.' 341 They are, according to him, "(1) the 'balance of power' system,
(2) the loose bipolar system, (3) the tight bipolar system, (4) the universal system, (5) the
hierarchical system in its directive and non-directive forms, and (6) the unit veto
341 Kaplan, Morton, System and Process in International Politics. p. 21, Robert E. Krieger Publishing
Company, 1975.
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system." 342 Kaplan was quick to admit that these six systems do not allow for all of the
possible international systems; even so, the systems identified are useful in understanding
directions which the current global transition might be expected to take. The following
list, based on Kaplan's book, System and Process in International Politics, identifies the
characteristics of each of these systems
System Characteristics
" "Balance of power" * International social system without a political
subsystem.
* Actors are international actors who fall within the
subclass "national actor."
* At least five essential actors
* Example: Pre-WWI period, with England, France,
Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, & the
United States as essential actors
" Loose bipolar * In addition to "national actors," there are two major
"bloc actors," each with a leading national actor,
non-member national actors, and "universal
actors."
* Example: Cold War period, with NATO and the
Warsaw pact as bloc actors, and the U.N. as a
universal actor.
* Tight bipolar * Similar to the loose bipolar system, but there are no
non-member national actors, and no universal
actors: every nation actor belongs to one of the two
blocs.
* Example: no historical counterparts
* Universal - There is a single "universal actor," to which all of
the national actors belong.
* Politics dictate the actions of the national actors
within the system.
* Only possible when all essential national actors
submit to coordination and integration within the
system.
* Example: no historical counterpart
342 Ibid.
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• Hierarchical • System operates directly on individuals. There is a
single hierarchy rather than a set of "national
actors."
• Can be "directive" (authoritarian) or "non-
directive" (functions according to rules generally
operative in democracies).
- Example: no historical counterpart, but a directive
hierarchical system might have developed if the
Nazis had succeeded in conquering the world.
" Unit veto • Each actor has weapons capable of destroying any
other actor, even though it cannot prevent its own
destruction.
• Actors may be bloc or national, but no universal
actors can exist.
• Unstable system.
• Example: no historical counterpart
While it is obvious, based on current events, that the global system is in a period of
transition, it is less obvious what the result will be. It is just as obvious, however, that
whatever the result is will depend largely on whether or not both Eastern and Western
Europe and the Soviet Union are successful in implementing the "new thinking" that
currently characterizes both continents. Should the Soviet Union maintain stability as it
continues along the apparently irreversible path it has chosen under Gorbachev, the loose
bipolar system as we know it will continue to disintegrate. While current events in the
Middle East suggest the existence of a type of universal system, as essential national
actors rally to control a situation that is perceived as a global threat, the ongoing
transitions may not support such a system permanently.
Many, anticipating a more united Europe and noting increasing economic capabilities
in the Orient, seem to think'the world is evolving into a multi-polar system, with Europe
as one of the central poles. For such a system to remain stable, however, Europe would
have to unite enough to accept a hierarchical system within the global system. Any other
solution would be unstable and would only encourage nationalism and either a return to
the balance of power system similar to the one operative prior to World War I or, if each
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nation were to acquire its own security system, would create some version of the unit veto
system that Kaplan described.
One of the keys to maintaining stability on a global level, then, seems to lie in
creating a stable European order, and Europe, it seems, has at least three options if it is to
remain stable: (1) the creation of a united Europe under a hierarchical system, (2) the
continued presence of an arbitrator such as the United States within NATO, or (3), the
acceptance of an entity such as the United Nations as an arbitrator on the global level.
Since Europe has not yet realized full integration, NATO, as an arbitrator has not yet
outlived its usefulness. However, since Europe has already embarked on the attempt to
become more united, both economically and politically, it may be difficult for NATO to
either maintain its position or, should European efforts fail, to regain its position. Thus,
whether or not national interests can be subdued to the benefit of Europe becomes of
primary importance to the world order.
Both Europe and the United States are all too well aware of the fact that European
attempts to unite in the past have failed miserably. As early as 1625, Grotius envisioned
an organization like NATO or the United Nations, "some sort of body with its assemblies,
where the litigations would be judged by those not involved so as to force the parties to
reconcile themselves in reasonable conditions. ' ' 34 3 Lawrence Kaplan also notes that the
Due de Sully of France, William Penn and, later, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi of
Switzerland envisioned a united Europe. Such "attempts at least to mitigate the chaos
inherent in national statecraft" were, apparently, abundant during the eighteenth century
Age of Reason as well.3
343 Kaplan, Lawrence S., NATO and the United States, p. 5, Twayne Publishers, 1988.
344 ibid.
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Following the Napoleonic wars, the Quadruple alliance, composed of Britain,
Austria, Russia, and Prussia was able to preserve European peace for 33 years. A
"fragmented Europe," however, eventually stifled the alliance. Renewed attempts to
establish a European alliance system in the early twentieth century included the
establishment of an International Court as part of a very complicated alliance system.
This alliance system, competing nationalisms, and competing imperialisms however,
contributed to the upset of the balance of power and to the beginning of one of the most
destructive wars ever fought. Later, the establishment of the League of Nations failed in
the wake of World War II. Following the war, in 1949, "the revived interest in European
unification, the 'European Movement' as it was called,... consisted of those who wanted
a federated Europe with r"l, ively limited powers as well as those who wanted an
integrated European r,11, -. ,345 When, in 1946 and 1947, European leaders turned to the
United States for aid, however, "their primary interest was.., not the pursuit of any
particular form of unification.... They were concerned with the survival of their nations,
threatened as they were with social as well as the economic bankruptcy and exposed [as
they were] to Communist blandishments and threats." 346
Traditionally, international politics in Europe was characterized by the kind of
nationalism that Kenneth N. Waltz explains as follows:
In a self help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not
in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself
against others.... When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual
gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are
compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an
expected gain is to be 4ivided, say in the ratio of two-to-one, one state may use
its disproportionate gaht to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy
the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gain for both parties does not
elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased
capabilities. Notice that the impediments to collaboration may not lie in the
345 1bid., p. 6.
346 Ibid, p. 7.
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character and the immediate intention of eitherparty. Instead, the condition of
insecurity.., works against their cooperation. 347
In spite of Europe's inability to harness nationalism in the past, as evidenced by
Napoleon's Empire, Hitler's Third Reich, and Britain's imperialism, however, the
possibility of its doing so in the future cannot be excluded and, in fact, Europe is banking
on its ability to do so. Its challenge will be to unite without the kinds of border wars that
characterized the formation of European nation-states. To date, it has met those
challenges head on.
B. SPAIN'S DECISION TO UNITE WITH EUROPE
On November 3, 1990, Fernandez Ordonez, Spain's Foreign Minister, announced
Spain's plans to unite with Germany, France, Italy, and the three Benelux nations in
eliminating border controls amongst themselves prior to the 1991 meeting of the
European Community (EC)3 48. This announcement, and others like it, serves to
underscore Spain's commitment to the EC, but where did such commitment come from,
especially given Spain's historical ties to the Arab world and Latin America? According
to Howard S. Wiarda, "the petition of Spain and Portugal for entry into the European
Economic Community (EEC) came at precisely the time the community itself had
developed increasing doubts as to whether there were such an entity." Wiarda echoes
Stanley Hoffnan in explaining Spain's attraction to Europe as a national reaction to the
historical isolation that characterized Spain. Both scholars see such isolation as the
reason that, to Spain and Portugal "Europe look[s] larger and more singular than is in fact
the case; for them, Europe remains very much a reality, a model, and a symbol both of
economic modernity and of 'civilization.' 'Europe' and the 'European Community' in
347 Joffe, Josef, The Limited Parmership, p. 183, Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987.
348 Vilanour, I. Cembrero, "Fernandez Ordnonez Anuncia la Entrada de Espana en el Grupo de Paises
Sin Frontera," p. 13, El Pais, 4 November 1990.
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this understanding obviously mean something more than commodity agreements and
lowered tariff barriers; to the Iberians, 'Europe' implies cultural, political, social, and
psychological interconnections as well as economic ones." 349
Although Spain was not officially admitted into the EEC until June 1985, Wiarda
notes that Spain began making attempts to be associated with Europe as early as 1953
when it "signed the Bases Agreements with the United States." Spanish progress towards
breaking out of isolationism is marked. "In 1955 it was admitted to the United Nations,
in 1958 it became an associate member of the OEEC, in 1959 it was elevated to full
membership in the succeeding OECD and also became a member of the World Bank, and
in 1962 it approached the EEC." In fact, as Wiarda notes, "by the late 1960s it is fair to
say that Spain and Portugal were already de facto members of Europe - although that fact
could not be admitted publicly 350 .
During Franco's reign, Europe refused to admit Spain into their organizations
because Franco's authoritarian regime was deemed to be incompatible with the
democracy that characterized other European nations. Later, when Spain espoused
democracy, Europe viewed Spanish membership in the EEC as a potential way of
encouraging democracy while discouraging Eastern hostilities.
Nevertheless, by 1980, the European perception of Spain and, indeed, actual
conditions had changed sufficiently to merit, at least in French eyes, postponement and
review of Spain's application for EEC membership. Wiarda notes that "by 1980
democracy and antifascism in Spain... seemed sufficiently well established that European
involvement in the struggle no longer seemed so necessary.... The possibility of a 'red
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid., p. 191.
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Mediterranean' no longer loomed large; the political crisis in southern Europe seemed to
have stabilized. ' 351
If European support for Spain's imminent entry into the EEC had dropped by 1980,
however, Spain's hopes for entry had not diminished and "the French pronouncement
(actually supported by Germany and some other EEC members, although the French were
held chiefly responsible) came as a tremendous shock to Spain and Portugal. 352
As previously indicated, when Spain joined NATO in 1982, it was largely with hopes
that NATO membership was a step towards membership in the EEC. The road to EEC
membership was not without difficulties, however. As Wiarda notes, "In the summer of
1980 there we-re instances of French farmers burning Spanish trucks transporting cheaper
agricultural products into European markets. ' 353
Since June, 1985, when Spain was finally admitted to the EEC, its challenges have
been manifold. Not only have Spain's "heavily subsidized and protected industries" had
to face the challenge of "accommodate ingj its foreign policy to a common EEC position,
especially regarding Latin America, its special relationship with the Arab world, and its
earlier nonrecognition of Israel." In addition, Spain's agricultural products, including
olive oil, promised to "be a further strain on EEC budgets at a time of tightened
finances." 354
Not surprisingly, given Felipe Gonzales's propensity for ambiguity, Spain has
attempted to maintain its ties with Latin America while pursuing a European policy. This
ambiguity is not compatible with the EEC's expectations for Spain to "define the nature
351 Ibid., p. 195.
352 Ibid., p. 196.
353 Ibid., p. 198.
354 Ibid.
131
of its relations with Latin America" in addition to defining its relations with other nations
that are not members of the EEC. In spite of Spain's insistence on apparently ambiguous
ties, however, Wiarda states and, indeed, it seems clear that Spain's future lies
...not with Africa or the third world and not even so mu in Latin
America, but in Europe and with Europe, however uncomfortable at may be a
times and despite some sacrifice of the Iberian nation's sense of ci .nctiveness.
Psychologically, culturally, politically, and sociologically Europe is where their
strongest ties now are; and if these factors are not sufficient, then those all-
important economic relations of interdependence must surely make the
European bonds definitive.355
C. SPAIN'S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE UNITED EUROPE
As might well be imagined, Spain's role in a united Europe will depend entirely on
the nature of the united Europe within the developing global system. According to
Spain's Foreign Minister, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, "the European Community has
three basic roles to play: to transcend the division of Europe; to support the process of
political reforms,... and to facilitate economic liberalization. 356  Ordanez notes,
however, that "the prerequisite for progress in this direction is the EC's political unity."
Spain's enthusiasm for the concept of a united Europe is unequivocal. In August,
1989, El Pais published the results of a survey in ich Spaniards were quizzed
regarding their opinions of European union. Accordin . El Pais, "most Spaniards say
that they are in favor of the establishment of a European union with a single common
constitution, currency, passport, parliament, government, and even army." 357 The same
report shows that
... eight of every 10 Spaniards are in favor of holding a referendum in
the European Community to establish a European union and of having a single
355 Ibid.
356 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Foreign Minister on Role in Changing Europe," Daily
Report - West Europe, p. 15, 2CApril 1990.
357 El Pais, "Poll Shows Wide Support for European Union." 10 July 1989.
132
European passport. Three of every four Spaniards (compared to just one in two
only a year ago) now want the recently elected European Parliament to prepare a
draft constitution for European Union, even though that is not its area of
responsibility. A clear absolute majority (between 49 and 67 percent) are in
favor of a single European Parliament, or of a single electoral party system, and
of a president of Europe. 358
Prime Minister Gonzalez, speaking to the Spanish people in late June 1990 following
the EC summit in Dublin "underlined the great effort that European unity will [entail] for
each and every one of the member countries," but also "explained the Spanish proposals
on European citizenship...."359
Given their enthusiasm for European unity, Spain is especially proud of the fact that
a Europe made apparent progress towards this end under the leadership of a Spaniard.
Ordonez notes that "under Spain's presidency," the EEC accomplished the following:
" Approval for "the negotiation of trade and cooperation agreements with
Bulgaria, Poland, and the Soviet Union"
" Grant for "major food and medical aid... to certain countries, such as
Poland and Romania"
* Approval for "the establishment of a European Reconstruction and
Development Bank (BERD)"
* Approval for "a revision of community financial plans with a view to a
1992 whereby additional credits will be granted to the Eastern
countries."360
Ortonez further reports that "in parallel with economic and financial cooperation,
there has also been progress in intensifying the political dialogue with the countries of the
East, which received a major boost during the Spanish presidency." 36 1
358 Ibid.
359 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "More on European Unity, Stability," Daily Report - West
Europe, p. 22, 28 June 1990.
360 FBIS, "Foreign Minister on Role...," p. 15.
361 Ibid.
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While Spain's enthusiasm for its relatively new position in Europe is laudable, it is
difficult not to wonder whether the Spanish foreign minister's comments might not, in
themselves, be indicative of a latent nationalism in Spain - the kind of nationalism that a
united Europe is supposedly trying to overcome.
As noted in the first section of this chapter, the emerging global system is very much
dependent on the outcome of Europe's plans for unity in 1992. If Europe is, in fact, able
to overcome the nationalism that has proven to be a cause of instability in the past, then it
is likely that Europe will be a central pole in a multi-polar system. If, on the other hand,
Europe is not able to unite, Spain's position - commonly considered to be peripheral to
main events in Europe - may take on renewed significance. To illustrate this point, it
may be useful to look at the gross national products (GNP) of the 12 European nations
that currently form the EEC. While the GNP of a nation is only one aspect of power, it
may be significant enough to serve as an indication of a nation's potential. Hence, the
following information regarding each of the 12 EEC member's GNP is provided as the
first step towards envisioning a possible scenario in Europe and Spain's role, should
Europe 1992 prove unsuccessful.
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Country GNP (in billions of US. dollars)
Germany (East and West) 1083











Greece, Portugal, & Spain combined 253.1362
As may have been noted, the EEC members above have been divided into four
groups. These divisions are based on considerations of proximity, historical ties, and
major trading partners as indicated in the 1990 World Almanac and Book of Facts363. It
is interesting to note that the GNP of the first three groups is roughly equivalent, whereas
Spain's natural grouping has a GNP that could hardly rival any of the first three groups.
On the one hand, this information makes Spain look fairly insignificant in the overall
scheme of the new Europe. On the other hand, however, should Europe fail to unite,
Spain may prove to be a valuable asset with the potential to shift the balance of power.
Should the 12 EEC nations be able to overcome, or at least deal constructively with
Europe's history of conflict, then the united Europe would have a GNP of $3,368.6
billion, which would put it ahead of both Japan (with a GNP of $1,900 billion) and the
Soviet Union (with a GNP of $2,300 billion); it would certainly become a major pillar
with the United States (which has a GNP of $4,500 billion) in the global system. As
362 The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1990, pp. 685-772, World Almanac, 1990.
363 Ibid.
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such, Spain recognizes its future lis with Europe. However, should fragmentation in
Europe occur, Spain may well remain a small fish in a big sea - but it may have the
potential to swing the balance of power nevertheless. It is no wonder that Spain is
interested in a united Europe. For the time being, then, Spain's role in Europe is one of
total support and, regarding her Arab and Latin American interests, planned ambiguity.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO
It is currently the commonly held belief that NATO has, in essence, ceased to exist.
If this were the case, then a section on the implications of inything on NATO would seem
a bit absurd. However, if it is true that East-West tension and distrust ha,.e, for all
practical purposes, been dispelled and even if a united Europe looks to an organization
such as the CSCE to replace NATO in meeting its security needs, the fact remains that
NATO, as an organization, may not have totally outlived its usefulness.
Much has changed since 1987 when Josef Jaffe addressed this topic. Furthermore,
his ideas regarding European unity are far from optimistic and, in some instances, are
somewhat antagonistic; even so, they are worth noting. He asks:
Which legacy of the past matters more to Europeans: centuries of
separate statehood in the shadow of war, or the few decades of partial
cooperation under the umbrella of the Pax Americana? In spite of its impressive
record of functional integration, Western Europe remains, to recall Stanley
Hoffman's verdict, 'a collection of largely self-encased nation-states.... If the
hostilities entailed by separate past appear to have evaporated, [Western
Europe's] separate pasts have not.ja -
As Spain and the rest of Europe are in the midst of a transition they hope will bring
unity to their conflict, they are all too well aware of the separate pasts that Joffe points
out. At the same time, Joffe's principal assertion that NATO "is impervious to real
change as long as the world remains dominated a deux"365 is somewhat incomplete in
364 Joffe, p. 188.
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light of a potential global shift from a bi-polar to a multi-polar system. Even if such a
shift becomes reality, however, NATO's outer bounds may be strong enough to withstand
the inevitable pressures both from within and from without. Its history is, in fact, replete
with both types of pressure. Nevertheless, any substantial shift in pressure, either from
without or within the organi7ation, should be carefully analyzed vis a vis its potential
impact on NATO and the existing balance of power.
The challenge for present governments, including the Spanish government, is to
assess such pressures to determine if the global balance of power is jeopardized to the
extent that it outweighs any jeopardy to the European balance of power. In the event that
pressures of a multi-polar system were to erode NATO's sturdy outer bounds, NATO has
the potential, like an inflated balloon under either too much internal or external pressure,
to pop. Given the dangers posed by another world war, maintaining the balance of power
to avoid such a pop (either through the current alliance system or some kind of modified
system, based on world developments) is, without a doubt, worth the effort.
Currently, NATO has the best-ever record of an alliance system that has proven to be
capable of maintaining the balance of power in Europe over an extended period of time.
It may continue to be the best available option for assuring the continuance of this
balance, at least for the time being. Nevertheless, should mounting pressures threaten to
explode the "NATO balloon," and the risk of explosion under these pressures becomes
greater than the risk of the pressures of continued alliance, voluntarily deflating the
balloon in the face of shifting alliances may be the best available option.
Such an occurrence does not necessarily mean an end to the Atlantic Alliance. As
Dr. Edwina S. Campell pointed out in a speech given at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California on 20 September 1989, "We [in the U.S.] tend to view the
questioning of NATO as questioning of the relationship." Such a view, in the case of
365 Joffe, p. 42.
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Spain, is not totally unfounded. Spain does in fact maintain an innate distrust of the U.S.,
largely due to U.S. support of the Franco regime. In addition, several other factors,
including Spain's historical propensity for isolationism, a nostalgic desire for neutrality,
and the argument that "Spain's foreign policy objectives are not related to Alliance
objectives" 366 have led some to suggest the possibility of ultimate withdrawal from
NATO.
However, it seems likely that Spain will opt to remain in NATO for several reasons.
First, in spite of energetic debate prior to the 1986 referendum, its outcome solidified
Spain's membership. Second, none of the major political parties in Spain currently
advocates withdrawal. Third, many Spaniards still see membership in NATO as
connected with membership in the EEC. Fourth, it seems apparent that "Spain has
rejected a position of neutralism and intends to pursue an active defense... [and] finally,
Spain might find the actual mechanics of withdrawing from the Alliance difficult and
disruptive.",36 7 Besides, as Vinas notes, "the PSOE has been able to survive its traumas
over defense policy and NATO. It is now united and believes firmly in the need to
strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. ' 36
While it is clear, then, that Spain is more interested in "strengthening the European
pillar" than in maintaining cross-Atlantic ties, it is also unlikely that Spain will either
withdraw or become fully integrated into NATO. This is particularly true since one of
Gonzalez's primary objectives has been "to secure Spain's autonomy - to follow an
independent course." 369 Thus, Spain's participation in NATO may well come closer and
366 Allin, p. 67.




closer to a resemblance of "Gaullist policy.'5 70
Essentially, then, Spain's role in the Alliance seems to have changed little since the
referendum. It is in Spain's national interest to remain in the Alliance? 7 1 just as it is in
NATO's interest to support European unity and stability, two terms that have come to be
nearly synonymous. Meanwhile Spain has, as Vinas concludes, "ceased to be at the
margin of European affairs."'372 Holding on to the status quo seems to be the only real
alternative for a Spain interested both in preserving its autonomy and in avoiding a policy
of isolationism. "Ambivalence" once again seems to describe both Spain's position and
its future prospects concerning NATO. Ironically, in light of a world situation in which
the status quo is changing on a daily basis, the same ambiguity that has ensured Spain's
survival may also serve the Atlantic Alliance as both strive to be like (and in Spain's case,
possess) the Rock of Gibraltar in a sea of turmoil.





No security system is without flaws, and the Spanish security system is no exception.
On the one hand, Spain has successfully managed to handle its transition to democracy
and developments such as joining the EEC and NATO that would have seemed highly
unlikely if not impossible during Franco's regime. On the other hand, Spain's transitional
period is not over. Having chosen to expend its energy on becoming part of the New
Europe, Spain no longer has thL )tion of returning to its more isolationist tendencies or
of focusing on Latin America or its Arab neighbors.
Europe's progress towards greater unity is uncontrollable; whether Spain can handle
the demands of the unity it seeks remains to be seen, especially given the separatist
elements, particularly the Basque terrorist organization, in Spain.
Presently, the global transition seems to have paused at least temporarily in a kind of
universal system similar to the one Morton Kaplan described over 30 years ago. This
situation can probably be at least partially attributed to the crisis in the Persian Gulf,
which has served as a sort of catalyst in fostering global unity (minus. of course, Iraq).
Whether or not the situation could blosoom into a full-fledged universal system, iwever,
is doubtful. Latent nationalism may be temporarily overshadowed by world events, but
as the shadows fade, the world will be left to face its true nature, which, it seems, has not
yet developed such that it could support a universal system.
If the world's nation-siates have not evolved to the point of being able to accept a
universal global system, however, they have at least been successful in erasing many of
the barriers that have historically symbolized nationalism. The fall of the Berlin wall is
but one example. In addition, Spain's espousal of democracy and impressive economic
progress have contributed to creating a Europe that does not "stop at the Pyrenees."
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As Eastern European nations begin their transition from authoritarian regimes
towards democracy, Spain, while far from being a perfect model, serves as an example of
hope. Likewise, as far as it is possible to compare nationalistic tendencies to Spain's
regionalism, Spain serves as an example for the nations of Europe who are trying to
overcome the nationalism that has sparked sporadic conflict amongst them since the time
of Napoleon. Likewise, while it would be simplistic to suggest too many parallels
between Spain's development and the development of any other nation in Eastern Europe,
it nevertheless seems appropriate to suggest that if Spain is able to preserve its
democracy, and there is every reason for optimism in this regard, then other nations, like
Spain, have the potential to overcome authoritarian governments peacefully as well.
By the same token, the continuing existence of separatist groups in Spain stands as
evidence of the continuing potential for exacerbation, just as the continuing presence of
nationalities in Europe stands as evidence of the continuing potential for separatism. In
short, Spain's future is intrinsically connected with Europe's. If Spain has to deal with
separatism, Europe has to deal with nationalism. If Spain is concerned with
unemployment and a healthy economy, so is Europe and, in fact, the EEC can be
expected to have an equalizing effect on the two economies if tariffs and protectionist
measures are ever really lifted in accordance with goals set. If Spain is questioning the
necessity for NATO, so is Europe. If the issue of Gibraltar is an exterior security issue
for Spain, it is an internal concern for Europe in that both Britain and Spain are members
of NATO and lay claim to the area. If Spain is increasing relations to include both
economic and political support for the Soviet Union, Europe is doing no less. Further,
Spain and Europe share the hope that a new Europe with fewer economic, political, and
possibly even social barriers will be able to emerge through a peaceful transition.
As the past few years bave shown, no world system is entirely stable. Nuances that
affect security trends are ongoing. Nevertheless, some systems are definitely more stable
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than others. Given the events that have set current trends in motion, it is in both Spain's
and Europe's interests to work toward creating a stable hierarchy within a united Europe.
Furthermore, it is in the best interests of the United States to support the European
initiative in the interest of global security.
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TIMELINE OF THE REIGN OF THE MOORS
A.D. 711 - 1492
711 Tariq ibn Ziyad leads Arab-Berber invasion of Spain; southern Spain rapidly
overrun.
732 Arabs defeated near Poiters, France, by Charles Martel, stemming Arab advance
into Europe.
778 Charlemagne tries unsuccessfully to invade Spain.
822 AI-Hakam I dies after ruling Spa for 26 years. His reign put down rebellious
Arab factions in Toledo and Cor )a.
900 Height of Moors in Spain; Christians continue the Reconquest. Cordoba becomes
seat of Arab learning.
929 Abd-al-Rahman III the first to take title of caliph in Spain.
1094 El Cid takes Valencia. Moors recapture it eight years later.
1095 Start of the First Crusade
1118 Muslim city of Zaragoza taken by Alfonso I of Aragon.
1147 Almohad faction of Berbers capture Murcia and unite Moorish Spain and
Morocco, with capitals at Seville and Marrakech.
1236 Cordoba taken by Christians.
1248 Seville taken by Christians as Moors are pushed farther and farther south. Work
on Alhambra begins in Granada.
1275 The Marinids, Berbers from Fez, invade Spain and defeat Christian Castile.
1340 Christians defeat the Marinids in Spain at Salodo, and the long history of
Moroccan invasions of the peninsula comes to an end.
1469 Ferdinand of Aragor weds Isabella of Castille.
1492 Ferdinand and Isabella enter the Alhambra in Granada, crushing the last
stronghold If the Moors. They finance the voyage of Christopher Columbus to the
New World later in the year.




Acoca, Miguel. "Civil War, Continued." New Republic 14 March 1981, pp. 13-15.
Aguirne, Mariano. "Spain's 'Nuclear Allergy' - The U.S. Finds a Treatment." The
Nation 26 December 1988, pp. 722-723.
Air Command and Staff College, USAF. Western Europe, Correspondence Lesson
Booklet. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University (1988).
Alba, Victor. "Spain's Entry Into NATO." In NATO and the Mediterranean. Lawrence
S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimundo Luraghi, eds. Wilmington,
Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1985.
Allin, Major George R. "Spain's NATO Dilemma." Military Review (January 1985), pp.
61-73.
Alonso, Alejandro Munoz. El Terrorismo en Espana. Barcelona: Talleres Graficos,
1982.
Arango, E. Ramon. Spain, From Repression to Renewal. Boulder and London:
Westview Press, 1985.
Badia, Juan Fernando. "La Region y el Estado Regional." Revista Espanola de la
Opinion Publica, Enero-Marzo, 1977, pp. 7-55.
Blanco, Jose Jiminez. La Conciencia Regional en Espana. Madrid: Rumagraf, 1977.
Bums, Tom. "Gromyko, U.S. Envoy Meet With Spanish Leader." Washington Post I
March 1985, p. A10.
. "Gromyko Cautions Against Proposals For Arms in Space. Soviet Meets
With Spanish Leaders." Washington Post 2 March 1985.
Casanova, Jose'. "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition
to Democracy." Social Research 50 (Spring 1983), pp. 929-73.
Chesnoff, Richard Z. "Spain Gives Nod to NATO, Europe."
Chipman, John. "NATO's Southern Region: National Versus Alliance Priorities." In
NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges. Ed. John Chipman.
London and New York: Routledge, 1988.
153
. "NATO and the Security Problems of the Southern Region: From the Azores
to Ordahan." In NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges.
Ed. John Chipman. London and New York: Routledge, 1988.
Clark, Robert P. "Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members." Terrorism 6 (1983), pp. 423-
454.
• The Basque Insurgents. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.
and Michael H. Haltzel. Spain in the 1980s. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing
Company, 1987.
Crozier, Brian. "Red Blossoms in Spain." National Review 20 September 1985, p. 24.
• "Invertebrate Spain." National Review, June 24, 1983, pp. 740-747.
Delaney, Paul. "Spaniards Urged to Unite Against Terrorists." New York Times 29 July
1987.
Donaghy, Peter J. and Michael T. Newton. Spain: A Guide to Political and Economic
Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Dutler, Lee E. "Ethno-Political Activity and the Psychology of Terrorism." Terrorism 10
(1987), pp. 145-163.
Edmonds, Robin. Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years. Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983.
Etzold, Thomas H. "The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean." In NATO and the
Mediterranean. Eds. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo
Lurashi. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 'Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)." JPRS-
TOT-86-010-L, 31 January 1986.
. "Political Partie. Sign Anti-Terrorist Pact." E.E. and C.D.F. Report. JPRS-
TOT-87-053-L, 25 November 87, p. 22.
Foss, Christopher F. "Spain Orders SORAS 6 Plus Simulator." Jane's Defense Weekly,
9 April 1988, p. 690.
Galleeo, Fermin. "Spain Reveals Classified Projects." Jane's Defense Weekly, 27
August 1988, p. 359.
154
. "Spanish Army Approves ST-155/45." Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 July 1988,
p. 19.
"Spanish Pilots 'Working to Rule'." Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 October
1989, p. 855.
"Spanish Update Plans Detailed." Jane's Defense Weekly, 10 March 1990,
p. 418.
Genoves, Santiago. La Violencia an el Pais Vasco y en sus Relaciones Con Espanola.
Mexico City: Universidad Macional Autonoma de Mexico, 1980.
Gonzalez, Felipe. "Spain is a Solidly Democratic Country." U.S. News and World
Report. 7 July 1986, p. 38.
Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. Spain after Franco. Berkeley, Los
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1986.
Hamburg, Roger. "Political and Strategic Factors in Soviet Relations with the West:
Soviet Perceptions." In Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s. Ed. Roger E.
Kanet. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.
Hassner, Pierre. "Implications for U.S.-European Relations." In Soviet Policy Toward
Western Europe. Ed. Herbert J. Ellison. Seattle and London: University of
Washington Press, 1983.
Heiberg, William L. The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO. National Security
Affairs Monograph Series 83-1. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1983.
Herrick, William. "Spain Then ... Who Killed Andrea Nin?" The New Leader 27 June
1983, pp. 10-12.
Heywood, Paul. "Mirror Images: The PCE and PSOE in the Transition to Democracy in
Spain." West European Politics 10 (April 1987), pp. 193-2 10.
Hottinger, Arnold. Spain 1n Transition: Prospects and Policies. Beverly Hills and
London: Sage Publications, 1974.
Jackson, Gabriel. "Spain's NATO Vote." Nation 15 March 1986, pp. 293-94.
"Can the Basques Live With Spain?" Nation, 15 November 1986, pp. 518-
520.
155
• A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War. London: Thames and Hudson,
1974.
Jane's Defense Weekly. "Spain's Engine Doubts Hit EFA." 25 June 1988.
"Spain's RDF Units to be tested at 'Firex 88'." 3 September 1988, p. 423.
"Spanish Combat Vehicle Awaits Project Go-ahead." 19 November 1988, p.
1252.
"UK, Spanish Sea Harrier Pilots Swap Notes." 5 August, 1989, p. 211.
"Spain, UK Team Up For NATO's 'Sharp Spear 89'." 23 September 1989,
p. 563.
Janke, Peter. Spanish Separatism: ETA's Threat to Basque Democracy. London: The
Institute for the Study of Conflict, October, 1980.
Jauregui, Gurutz. "National Identity and Political Violence in the Basque Country."
European Journal of Political Research 14 (1986): pp. 587-605.
Jenkins, Philip. "Under Two Flags: Provocation and Deception in European Terrorism."
Terrorism 11 (1988): pp. 275-287.
Jordan, David C. Spain, The Monarchy and the Atlantic Community. Cambridge,
Massachessetts and Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
Inc., 1979.
Kanet, Roger E. and Daniel R. Kempton. "Global Correlation of Forces." In Westerz
Europe In Soviet Global Strategy. Ed.s. Ray S. Cline, James Arnold Miller. and
Roger E. Kanet. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.
Kaplan, Stephen S. Diplomacy of Power. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1981.
Kaplan, Morton. System and Process in International Politics. Huntington, New York:
Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1975.
Keefe, Eugene K., David P. Coffin, James M. Moore, Jr., Robert Rinehart, and Susan H.
Scurlock. Area Handbook for Spain. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1976.
Krasikov, Anatoly. "On Which Side the Army?" New Times 40 (October 1980): pp. 14-
15.
156
"In Search of an Independent Policy." New Times 41 (1983), pp. 12-15.
Ledeen, Michael. "Spain's Miracle." New Republic 28 October 1978, pp. 9-10.
Lok, Joris Janssen. "Spanish, Dutch In Frigate Talks." Jane's Defense Weekly, 14 April
1990, p. 683.
_ _ "Spanish, Dutch Quit NFR 90." Jane's Defense Weekly, 13 January 1990,
p. 5 1 .
London, Kurt, ed. The Soviet Impact on World Politics. New York: Hawthorn Books,
Inc., 1974.
Los Angeles Times. "Half a Loaf on Human Rights." (Editorial) 23 June 1983, p. 6.
Madariaga, Salvador de. Spain: A Modern History. New York and Washington:
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.
Markham, James M. "Spain's Terror: Onus on Soviet. Madrid Asserts Moscow is
Supporting Terrorists." New York Times 11 May 1981.
Martin, Benjamin. "Identity Crisis." The Nation 17 Nov 1979, pp. 485-486.
Martin, Jose Luis. "A Talk with Felipe Gonzalez." Pagina 12 (Buenos Aires), reprinted
in World Press Review March 1989, p. 25.
Martinez, Robert E. "Spain: Pragmatism and Continuity." Current History. November
1988, pp. 373-76.
Medhurst, Dr. Kenneth. The Basques. London: The Minority Rights Group, April 1972.
Medvedenko, Anatoly. "16th NATO Member?" New Times 31 (1980), pp. 10-11.
Menges, Constantine Christopher. Spain: The Struggle for Democracy Today. Beverly
Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1978.
1
Mikhlin, I. "Under Pro-Atlantic Pressure." New Times 35 (1984), pp. 8-9.
Miller, James Arnold. "Southern Flank of NATO." in Western Europe in Soviet Global
Strategy. Eds. Ray S. Cline, James Arnold Miller, and Roger E. Kanet. Boulder
and London: Westview Press, 1987.
157
Moxon-Browne, Edward. Spain and the ETA: The Bid for Basque Autonomy. London:
The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, July 1987.
Mujal-Leon, Eusebio. "Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism." Problems of
Communism. March-April 1986, pp. 1-27.
NATO: Eurogroup. Western Defense: The European Role in NATO. Brussels, 1988.
Navarrete, Jose F. Lorca. Pluralismo, Regionalismo, Municipalismo. Sevilla:
Universidad de Sevilla, 1978.
New York Times. "Gromyko Advises Spain to Stay Out of NATO." 21 November 1979:
A6.
_ "Soviet Pianist Seeks 'Refuge' in Spain, After Quitting Tour." 13 September
1983: p. C23 (Local Edition).
. "Russian, in Spain, Suggests Talks Over Central America." 21 January 1988:
p. A5 (Local Edition).
Olgin, Yeugeni. "Soviet-Spanish Cooperation and Detente in Europe." International
Affairs. October 1986: 84-89.
Ontiveros, Emilio. "As Spain Rushes Toward '92." The New Leader. 2-16 October
1989, pp. 10-11.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD Economic Survey
1988. Paris: OECD, 1988.
)ECD Economic Survey 1989. Paris: OECD, 1989.
Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz. "Spanish Security Policy in an Era of Internationalization:
Implications for Long-term Defense Planning." Draft of a panel discussion
"Implications for Spain" held at the International Conference of the Asociacion
de Periodistas Europeos, December 1989, Toledo, Spain.
t
"'Strategic Leverage' and 'New Thinking' in the Southern Flank: The
Dynamics of the NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Competition in the Alliance's
Southern Region." (No reference given).
and A. Grant Whitley. "The Balance of Forces in Southern Europe: Between
Uncertainty and Opportunity." The International Spectator XXIII: 1 (January-
March 1988), pp.'28-42.
158
_ "Spain's Security Policy and Army in the 1990s." pp. 90-98. Parameters,
June, 1990.
Payne, Stanley G. Review of Spanish Marxism Versus Soviet Communism: A History of
the P.O.U.M., by Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz. In The Hispanic
American Historical Review August, 1989, pp. 567-68.
• Politics and Society in Twentieth Century Spain. New York and London:
New Viewpoints, 1976.
_ "Terrorism and Democratic Stability in Spain." Current History (November
1979), pp. 167-171.
Perkins, Dexter, "Russia and the Spanish Colonies, 1817-1818." The American
Historical Review 28 (October 1922 - July 1923), pp. 656-72.
Pinuel, Jose Luis. El Terrorismo in la Transicion Espanola (1972-1982). Madrid:
Tecnicas Gratica, 1986.
Piquer, Carlos Robles. "Spain in NATO: An Unusual Kind of Participation." The
Atlantic Community Quarterly, pp. 325-30.
Pollack, Benny. The Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy - Spain's International
Relations from Franco to Democracy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
Post, Jerrold M., M.D. "Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Relations on Terrorist
Group Dynamics." Terrorism 10 (1987), pp. 145-163.
Prevost, Gary. "Eurocommunism and the Spanish Communists." West European Politics
4 (January 1981), pp. 69-84.
"Spain and NATO: The Socialists' Decision." The Atlantic Community
Quarterly, pp. 349-55
Reviriego, Victor Marquez. Cien Espanoles Y La OTAN. Barcelona: Plaza & Janes
Editores, S.A., 19§5.
Revista de Estudios Politicos. "El Referendum del 12 de Marzo de 1986 Sobre La
Pennanencia de Espana en la OTAN Y Sus Consecuencias Para El Sistema
Politico." Num. 52 (Jul-Aug 1986), pp. 183-215.
Rexach, D. Eduardo Serra. "Spain: Politics and Change." The Washington Quarterly,
Winter 1987, 23-27.
159
Riding, Alan. "Challenge to Madrid's Success Story." New York Times 27 January 1990,
p. 7 .
"Changes in Eastern Block Heighten Nationalist Yearnings of Basques." New
York Times 28 January 1990, p. 6
Roberts, Lawrence. "Spain's Quixotic Anarchists." Progressive April 1983.
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II. Boston and Toronto:
Little, Brown and Company, 1985.
Ruehl, Lothar. "Geographical Limitations in Arms Agreements: Political and Strategic
Requirements." In Soviet Power and Western Negotiating Policies. Ed. Uwe
Nerlich. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1983.
Sahlins, Peter. "The Nation in the Villiage: State-Building and Communal struggles in
the Catalan Borderland during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries."
Journal of Modern History June 1988, pp. 234-263.
Sanchez-Gijon, Antonio. "On Spain, NATO and Democracy." In Politics and Security
in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance. Ed. Douglas T. Stuart. London:
The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1988.
Santini, Sylvie. "Spain's Strike: A Warning Signal." L'Express (Paris), reprinted in
World Press Review March 1989: 23.
Schumacher, Edward. "Spain's New Face." New York Times Magazine 22 June 1986,
pp. 26-28.
Serfaty, Meir. "Political Pragmatism in Spain." Current History November 1986, pp.
379-380.
Serra, Sr. Don Narcis. Spain, NATO and Western Security. Adelphi Paper 229. London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988.
Shenon, Philip. "Guilty Plea in Exports to Soviet." New York Times 6 September 1985,
p. DI (Local Edition).
Snitten, E.M. "The International Politics of Spanish Accession to NATO." Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1982.
Sodaro, Michael J. "Whatever Happened to Euro Communism?" Problems of
Communism. November-December 1984, pp. 59-65.
160
Stent, Angela E. "The USSR and Western Europe." In Soviet Foreign Policy in a
Changing World. Eds. Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman. New York:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1986.
"Western Europe and the USSR." In Areas of Challenge for Soviet Foreign
Policy in the 1980s. Eds. Gerritt W. Gong, Angela E. Stent, and Rebecca V.
Strode. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984.
Szajkowski, Bogdan. "Roots of Eurocommunism." Contemporary Crises 3 (1979), pp.
255-67.
Thompson, Wayne C. Ph.D. Western Europe 1988, 7th Annual Edition. Washington,
DC, Harpers Ferry, WV: Skye Corporation / Stryker-Post Publications, 1988.
Treverton, Gregory F. Spain: Domestic Politics and Security Policy. Adelphi Paper 204.
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.
U.S. Department of Defense. Terrorist Group Profiles. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988.
Urban, Jean Barth. "The Soviets and the West European Communist Parties." In Soviet
Policy Toward Western Europe. Ed. Herbert J. Ellison. Seattle and London:
University of Washington Press, 1983.
"The West European Communist Challenge to Soviet Foreign Policy." In
Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s. Ed. Roger E. Kanet. New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1982.
Valls-Russell, Janice. "Offering Retirement to the ETA." The New Leader 30 Nov
1987, pp. 9-10.
Van Oudenaren, John. "The Soviet Union and the Socialist and Social Democratic
Parties of Western Europe." RAND Note N-2400-AF. The Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, California, February 1986.
Vinas, Angel. "Spain and N4ATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges." In
NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges. Ed. John Chipman.
London and New York: Routledge, 1988.
• El Oro de Moscu. Marquez, Spain: Ediciones Grijalbo, S.A., 1979.
Waldmann, Peter. "Gewalsamer Separatismus." Koelner Zeitschriftfuer Soziologie und
Sozialpsychologie Juni 1985, pp. 203-229.
161
Wall Street Journal. "Telefonica de Espana, S.A." 6 May 1988.
• "Spain Postpones Talks With the Soviet Union on Proposed Purchases of
Siberian Natural Gas." 5 May 1982, p. 34.
White, David. "Magic Starts to Wear Thin." Financial Times 18 January 1988.
Wiarda, Howard J. The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal. Washington,
D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989.




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Staion
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002
3. RADM Phillip D. Smith, USN 1
OP-60, The Pentagon, Room 4E556
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
4. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau 1
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5002




6. SA Tamara K. Adams 1
AFOSI Dist 62
APO NY 09083-5360
7. HQAFOSI / IVOA I
Bolling AFB
Washington, DC 20332
8. AFOSI Dist 62 1
APO NY 09083-5360
9. AFOSI Dist 70 / IVOA I
APO NY 09633
163
